PrivateLoader
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- PersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- Cracked softwareSeo poisoningLure
- Platforms
- Windows
PrivateLoader is a modular Windows malware loader associated with the ruzki pay-per-install distribution service and active since at least early 2021. It provides a commercial delivery mechanism for multiple criminal operators, downloading and executing information stealers, banking trojans, remote-access trojans, other loaders, spambots, cryptocurrency miners, proxy bots, and ransomware. Its infections are geographically widespread, with substantial activity observed in India and Brazil.
PrivateLoader commonly reaches victims through websites advertising cracked or pirated software, including sites promoted through search-engine optimization. Infection chains use apparently legitimate installers and password-protected archives; documented examples employ NSIS installers to execute PrivateLoader alongside other malicious components. Payload delivery can be tailored to a victim's location, system environment, installed software, and financial activity.
The malware has a multistage architecture comprising loader, core, and service modules. The initial loader retrieves and executes the core, which installs additional payloads and the service component. The service establishes persistence through a scheduled task, supports self-updating, and can execute the loader again to facilitate repeated payload deployment. PrivateLoader uses encrypted strings, obfuscated command-and-control communications, and anti-analysis techniques, and can disable Microsoft Defender. It also supports discovery of sensitive user data and victim-system characteristics.
Payloads distributed through PrivateLoader include RedLine, Vidar, RisePro, Stealc, Amadey, SmokeLoader, IcedID, Tofsee, Socks5Systemz, and STOP/Djvu ransomware. Some operations use SmokeLoader as an intermediate delivery component. Credential theft, proxy operation, cryptocurrency mining, and file encryption are consequences of these delivered payloads rather than defining functions of PrivateLoader itself.
Associated threat actors
7 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
New Actor for win.privateloader ... description = "Detects win.privateloader." ... reference = "https://tavares.re/blog/2022/06/06/hunting-privateloader-pay-per-install-service"
New Actor for win.privateloader ... description = "Detects win.privateloader." ... reference = "https://tavares.re/blog/2022/06/06/hunting-privateloader-pay-per-install-service"
New Actor for win.privateloader ... description = "Detects win.privateloader." ... reference = "https://tavares.re/blog/2022/06/06/hunting-privateloader-pay-per-install-service"
New Actor for win.privateloader ... description = "Detects win.privateloader." ... reference = "https://tavares.re/blog/2022/06/06/hunting-privateloader-pay-per-install-service"
PrivateLoader is a loader from a pay-per-install malware distribution service that has been utilized to distribute info stealers, banking trojans, loaders, spambots, rats, miners and ransomware on Windows machines.
PrivateLoader is one of the most widely used loaders in 2022. It is used by a Pay-Per-Install service to deploy multiple malicious payloads on the infected hosts. First observed in May 2021, PrivateLoader is a modular malware whose main capability is to download and execute one or several payloads.
+1 more in the app. View in Mallory
Techniques & procedures
46 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
4 techniques
Resource Development
Privateloader is being distributed via websites on malicious buttons redirecting the user to what it seems ads and spam networks via affiliate offers.
Privateloader builds are stored in a packed file on some compromised domain in the campaign ID 09.
These secondary PrivateLoaders are tasked with sending environment information back to the C2 and loading additional payloads suitable for the environment (T1588: Obtain Capabilities).
PrivateLoader often hosts malicious payloads on the Discord CDN.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
PrivateLoader was seen being distributed through SEO-optimized websites that claim to provide cracked software. Victims download a password-protected zip file (the password is in the file name) which contains an NSIS installer that executes many malicious payloads, including PrivateLoader.
Typically, AgentTesla campaigns involve phishing emails carrying malicious attachments, oftentimes involving malware loaders down the infection chain, such as GuLoader and PureCrypter, or as the initial infection vector, such as PrivateLoader.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job
The service module takes care of persistence by creating a scheduled task
The query “ida pro crack download” was searched... Clicking on the “Download” button will download “release.rar”... Double-clicking on “setup.exe” will execute the application.
Typically, AgentTesla campaigns involve phishing emails carrying malicious attachments... After all infection stages are executed on the victim's system, the final payload initiates actions to sustain persistence...
This last option is no longer available, at least through official channels, likely due to increased abuse of campaigns to mass-install PEER2PROFIT via PPI (Pay-Per-Install) botnets such as PRIVATELOADER.
Persistence
5 techniques
Persistence
Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job
The service module takes care of persistence by creating a scheduled task
The “vRNddZqIkwaYVpHLFkGcr1Tk.exe” (process 5088) was seen modifying files in the Chrome extension folder. Browser extensions can be abused to establish persistent access to systems (T1176 – Browser Extensions).
PrivateLoader can be persisted as a startup service and is installed with the following attributes: Service name: PowerControl.Service display name: "Power monitoring service for your device."
Att&ck IDs: T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Privilege Escalation
6 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Att&ck IDs: T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job
The service module takes care of persistence by creating a scheduled task
This file is responsible for setting up the persistence and injecting the proxy bot in memory.
PrivateLoader can be persisted as a startup service and is installed with the following attributes: Service name: PowerControl.Service display name: "Power monitoring service for your device."
Att&ck IDs: T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
The PrivateLoader core module uses a Windows 10 user account control (UAC) bypass technique to elevate privileges. The bypass uses a widely documented technique involving the ComputerDefaults.exe system executable (.exe) file, which has the auto-elevate option set.
Stealth
9 techniques
Stealth
Some samples are not being detected because they are packed and this rule will only work on unpacked samples or in memory dumps, for the more recent versions.
In order to evade antivirus security products and frustrate malware reverse engineering, malware operators leverage encryption and compression via executable packing to protect their malicious code.
Most of the important Windows DLL and API names used by PrivateLoader are also stored as encrypted stack strings. After decryption, PrivateLoader dynamically resolves the API functions at runtime.
being hosted on websites that claim to provide cracked software
This file is responsible for setting up the persistence and injecting the proxy bot in memory.
Att&ck IDs: T1070 - Indicator Removal on Host
The script basically searches for those string decryption instruction sequences and then goes back in the code to find the XOR key... the actual encrypted string on the MOV* instructions
the malware has additional capabilities, such as disabling Windows Defender, the discovery of user-sensitive data, and many anti-analysis techniques
The malware payloads can be selectively delivered to victims based on certain criteria (e.g. location, cryptocurrency or financial activity, on a corporate network, specific software installed, etc.)
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
the malware has additional capabilities, such as disabling Windows Defender
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
Att&ck IDs: T1012 - Query Registry
System checks before starting the malware symphony ... T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery
the customers of the service are able to selectively deliver malware to victims based on location, financial activity, environment, and specific software installed
PrivateLoader performs this action by searching a large number of file paths, registry keys, browser extensions, and saved browser logins for the following broad groups...
the malware has additional capabilities, such as disabling Windows Defender, the discovery of user-sensitive data, and many anti-analysis techniques
The malware payloads can be selectively delivered to victims based on certain criteria (e.g. location, cryptocurrency or financial activity, on a corporate network, specific software installed, etc.)
Att&ck IDs: T1518 - Software Discovery
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
the malware has additional capabilities, such as disabling Windows Defender, the discovery of user-sensitive data, and many anti-analysis techniques
TTPs Table 3. MITRE ATT&CK TTPs for RisePro Stealer Tactic Technique Collection T1213 – Data from Information Repositories
Victims download a password-protected zip file (the password is in the file name) which contains an NSIS installer
Command and Control
12 techniques
Command and Control
The server responded to these requests with an XOR encrypted string. The strings were encrypted using a 1-byte key... Both the data which the PrivateLoader bots sent over these HTTP POST requests and the data returned via the C2 server’s HTTP responses were heavily encrypted using a combination of password-based key derivation, base64 encoding, AES encryption, and HMAC validation.
Process 4440 is also seen communicating with its C2 server, 185[.]216.70.235 and 195.20.16[.]45 via port 80 (T1071 – Application Layer Protocol).
it will output most of the encrypted strings, more than 1500, including the current PrivateLoader C2 IP addresses at the time of writing of this blog post
These domains are simply proxies but behind them sits a massive operation performing millions of loads for various customers.
When threat actors host information about core C2 infrastructure on intermediary endpoints, the hosted information is analogously called a ‘Dead Drop Resolver’ or ‘DDR’. Example URLs of DDRs used by PrivateLoader: https://pastebin[.]com/... http://212.193.30[.]45/proxies.txt http://45.144.225[.]57/server.txt
The loader component contains three dead drop resolver URLs hardcoded in the malware that communicate via an HTTP GET request. The purpose of these resolvers is to retrieve PrivateLoader’s command and control (C2) address.
In the first stage, the loader is executed, which downloads and executes the second stage, the core module. The core module's primary purpose is to download and execute more malware, including another PrivateLoader module named service.
PrivateLoader then arranges the entry of other malware. It prepares a Base64-encoded encrypted string (T1132: Data Encoding and T1573: Encrypted Channel)
The loader contacts hardcoded URLs ... it then requests the URL(s) that returns a dead drop resolver, subsequently used to get another URL hosting the next stage payload.
Att&ck IDs: T1571 - Non-Standard Port
PrivateLoader then arranges the entry of other malware. It prepares a Base64-encoded encrypted string (T1132: Data Encoding and T1573: Encrypted Channel)
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Command and Control T1573.001 – Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
In one case, a PrivateLoader bot went on to exfiltrate data over HTTP to an external host named ‘cheapf[.]link’... The name of the file which the PrivateLoader bot used to exfiltrate data was ‘NOP8QIMGV3W47Y.zip’, indicating information stealing activities by Mars Stealer.
Observables
862 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
49 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.