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Malware4 associated actors

SoftEther

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionExfiltration
Platforms
WindowsLinux

SoftEther VPN is legitimate, open-source VPN software abused by threat actors to maintain persistent remote access to compromised networks, conceal command-and-control communications, and support data exfiltration. Its use in intrusions does not make standard SoftEther installations inherently malicious. Observed malicious deployments include Windows and Linux systems, with clients configured to reconnect automatically at startup. Attackers sometimes disguise installers as legitimate operating-system components and use VPN tunnels to connect compromised environments to actor-controlled infrastructure.

SoftEther has been used by Flax Typhoon, Earth Krahang, and ToddyCat. Flax Typhoon has deployed it during espionage operations targeting Taiwanese government, education, critical manufacturing, and information technology organizations. These operations combine legitimate software and operating-system utilities with exploitation and other post-compromise tools; SoftEther provides network connectivity rather than the credential-stealing or exploitation functions of those separate tools.

NtMonitor VPN is a modified Windows build of SoftEther VPN Bridge that enables unauthorized network bridging. It changes executable metadata, resource packaging, configuration storage, and network signatures to reduce recognition. The modified bridge retains VPN functionality without an added command-execution backdoor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Flax Typhoon

Hackers have rebuilt the open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge to keep a quiet route into compromised networks.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Webworm

Hackers have rebuilt the open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge to keep a quiet route into compromised networks.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Red Juliett

The actors install SoftEther VPN clients on victim devices to maintain remote access and hide command-and-control communications.

via picus security blogpicussecurity.com
Integrity Technology Group

“The threat actors use SoftEther to maintain persistent remote access to victim devices to enable data exfiltration.”

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

« Outils publics : Impacket, ADRecon, ADVipscan »

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence5

To establish persistence, Integrity Technology Group installs virtual private network (VPN) software clients on victim devices [T1133] to obfuscate command and control (C2) communications and frustrate attribution.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

SoftEther installers are downloaded onto Windows victim devices using PowerShell and LOTL binaries [T1059.001].

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

The Linux-based office-cli utility [T1059.004] continuously targets and accesses Microsoft 365 accounts to automate mail exfiltration.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence5

To establish persistence, Integrity Technology Group installs virtual private network (VPN) software clients on victim devices [T1133] to obfuscate command and control (C2) communications and frustrate attribution.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEvidence3

Integrity Technology Group runs executables under the names of known, legitimate Windows software to evade detection [T1036.003].

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.

Discovery

1 technique
T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Based on what has been discovered so far and looking through some of the other files and a few packet captures it looks like Hangro is derived from SoftEther an open source VPN project maintained by the University of Tsukuba.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence6

To maintain access and hide their traffic, the attackers also used web shells, Chisel and SoftEther tunnels, and Tor and SOCKS proxies

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyber security newsNews · Nov 20, 2026Hackers Turn Legitimate VPN Software Into a Stealthy Tool for Spying on Government NetworksLegitimate open-source VPN software explicitly described as rebuilt into NtMonitor VPN. The article also describes earlier abuse by Flax Typhoon to retain post-breach access. The malicious use relies on network-bridging functionality, not a newly disclosed SoftEther vulnerability; ordinary SoftEther installations are not inherently malicious.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Nov 15, 2026FBI FLASH : ARTEX, framework de pentest autonome basé sur LLM, weaponisé par des acteurs malveillants | CyberVeilleDescribed as a tool abused for command-and-control communications in the reported activity; the content does not describe a modified or trojanized version.Read more ↗oligo security blogNews · Nov 12, 2026ARTEX AI Attacks: Techniques and How to Detect ThemLegitimate tunneling software explicitly described as abused to establish tunnels in ARTEX campaigns; the content does not describe a trojanized version.Read more ↗picus security blogNews · Oct 9, 2026CISA AA26-281A: How Chinese Government-Linked Actors Steal Sensitive DataLegitimate VPN software weaponized in this activity for persistent remote access, concealed command-and-control communications, and support for data exfiltration. Clients reconnect automatically at startup, and installers are disguised as conhost.exe or dllhost.exe. The reference does not describe SoftEther itself as a malicious software family.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

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IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.