SoftEther VPN is legitimate VPN software abused by threat actors to establish persistent remote access, conceal command-and-control communications, and provide tunnels supporting data exfiltration. It is not inherently malware. Malicious deployments have been associated with Flax Typhoon, Earth Krahang, and ToddyCat. Flax Typhoon has used the VPN client in espionage operations targeting Taiwanese government, education, critical manufacturing, and information technology organizations.
Attackers install SoftEther clients on compromised Windows and Linux systems and connect them to actor-controlled infrastructure. Observed deployments use existing command-line utilities to download the software, configure automatic reconnection at system startup, and disguise installers as legitimate operating-system executables. These deployments provide durable post-compromise connectivity while blending malicious communications with legitimate VPN traffic.
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The actors install SoftEther VPN clients on victim devices to maintain remote access and hide command-and-control communications.
The actors install SoftEther VPN clients on victim devices to maintain remote access and hide command-and-control communications.
“The threat actors use SoftEther to maintain persistent remote access to victim devices to enable data exfiltration.”
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
« Outils publics : Impacket, ADRecon, ADVipscan »
Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.
To establish persistence, Integrity Technology Group installs virtual private network (VPN) software clients on victim devices [T1133] to obfuscate command and control (C2) communications and frustrate attribution.
« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »
SoftEther installers are downloaded onto Windows victim devices using PowerShell and LOTL binaries [T1059.001].
The Linux-based office-cli utility [T1059.004] continuously targets and accesses Microsoft 365 accounts to automate mail exfiltration.
« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »
Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.
To establish persistence, Integrity Technology Group installs virtual private network (VPN) software clients on victim devices [T1133] to obfuscate command and control (C2) communications and frustrate attribution.
« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »
Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.
Integrity Technology Group runs executables under the names of known, legitimate Windows software to evade detection [T1036.003].
Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.
Based on what has been discovered so far and looking through some of the other files and a few packet captures it looks like Hangro is derived from SoftEther an open source VPN project maintained by the University of Tsukuba.
Tunneled traffic via Chisel and SoftEther.
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.