SoftEther
- Capabilities
- PersistenceDefense evasionExfiltration
- Platforms
- WindowsLinux
SoftEther VPN is legitimate, open-source VPN software abused by threat actors to maintain persistent remote access to compromised networks, conceal command-and-control communications, and support data exfiltration. Its use in intrusions does not make standard SoftEther installations inherently malicious. Observed malicious deployments include Windows and Linux systems, with clients configured to reconnect automatically at startup. Attackers sometimes disguise installers as legitimate operating-system components and use VPN tunnels to connect compromised environments to actor-controlled infrastructure.
SoftEther has been used by Flax Typhoon, Earth Krahang, and ToddyCat. Flax Typhoon has deployed it during espionage operations targeting Taiwanese government, education, critical manufacturing, and information technology organizations. These operations combine legitimate software and operating-system utilities with exploitation and other post-compromise tools; SoftEther provides network connectivity rather than the credential-stealing or exploitation functions of those separate tools.
NtMonitor VPN is a modified Windows build of SoftEther VPN Bridge that enables unauthorized network bridging. It changes executable metadata, resource packaging, configuration storage, and network signatures to reduce recognition. The modified bridge retains VPN functionality without an added command-execution backdoor.
Associated threat actors
4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Hackers have rebuilt the open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge to keep a quiet route into compromised networks.
Hackers have rebuilt the open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge to keep a quiet route into compromised networks.
The actors install SoftEther VPN clients on victim devices to maintain remote access and hide command-and-control communications.
“The threat actors use SoftEther to maintain persistent remote access to victim devices to enable data exfiltration.”
Techniques & procedures
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
« Outils publics : Impacket, ADRecon, ADVipscan »
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.
To establish persistence, Integrity Technology Group installs virtual private network (VPN) software clients on victim devices [T1133] to obfuscate command and control (C2) communications and frustrate attribution.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »
SoftEther installers are downloaded onto Windows victim devices using PowerShell and LOTL binaries [T1059.001].
The Linux-based office-cli utility [T1059.004] continuously targets and accesses Microsoft 365 accounts to automate mail exfiltration.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »
Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.
To establish persistence, Integrity Technology Group installs virtual private network (VPN) software clients on victim devices [T1133] to obfuscate command and control (C2) communications and frustrate attribution.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
« LIGHTPAINT ... installant un VPN légitime (SoftEther) avec persistence automatisée »
Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
Integrity Technology Group runs executables under the names of known, legitimate Windows software to evade detection [T1036.003].
Going Forward From this it looks like Hangro uses mTLS to support authentication as part of the VPN service and requires a valid certificate signed by hrra2024.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Based on what has been discovered so far and looking through some of the other files and a few packet captures it looks like Hangro is derived from SoftEther an open source VPN project maintained by the University of Tsukuba.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
To maintain access and hide their traffic, the attackers also used web shells, Chisel and SoftEther tunnels, and Tor and SOCKS proxies
Observables
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.