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Malware2 associated actors3 associated CVEs

Chinoxy

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs51Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Chinoxy is a Windows remote access trojan and backdoor used in cyberespionage operations, including sustained campaigns against government organizations in Southeast Asia since at least 2018. It establishes persistence after initial compromise and supports follow-on activity by deploying additional malware and executing attacker tools. In FunnyDream-associated operations, Chinoxy deployed a modified PcShare RAT and executed the ccf32 document-collection tool. Chinoxy has also been associated with the China-linked threat actors BRONZE EDGEWOOD and TA459; TA459 used it against media personnel in April 2022.

Chinoxy abuses DLL side-loading through a legitimate, digitally signed Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process executable to load its malicious DLL. Observed persistence mechanisms include Windows Run registry entries and Startup-folder deployment. It also uses legitimate-looking filenames to conceal malicious components. Some variants decode configuration data from numeric values and communicate with command-and-control infrastructure using a custom protocol incorporating Blowfish encryption. Chinoxy has been delivered through targeted phishing emails carrying malicious RTF attachments generated with the Royal Road weaponizer, which exploits Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities. Its role in documented intrusions is primarily persistent remote access and execution of additional espionage tooling.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-11882via nao sec blogExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorRoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-0798via fortinet threat researchExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCEOpening the email attachment, “Please help to CHECK.doc,” opens a decoy Word document. And at the same time, it exploits CVE-2018-0798 in the background. CVE-2018-0798 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in Microsoft’s Equation Editor (EQNEDT32). Microsoft released a fix for it on January 9, 2018.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-0802via nao sec blogExploited in the wildStack Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Office Equation EditorRoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BRONZE EDGEWOOD

BRONZE EDGEWOOD ... Tools ... Chinoxy, Cobalt Strike, FunnyDream, Md_client, Nishang Post Exploitation Framework, PCShare, Zuguo

via secureworkssecureworks.com
FunnyDream

FunnyDream uses Chinoxy and FunnyDream Backdoor. Chinoxy is a RAT that has been used by FunnyDream since around 2018.

via nao sec blognao-sec.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Most commonly, phishing attacks targeting journalists are used for espionage or to gain key insights into the inner workings of another government, company, or other area of state-designated import.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The attack started with a simple email that included a bare document as an attachment... a suspicious RTF attachment... disguised as having come from a Pakistan government division.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Our analysis revealed that the file behaves similarly... It creates a folder (c:\windows\tasks) and drops config and PE files into it.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

Opening the email attachment... opens a decoy Word document. And at the same time, it exploits CVE-2018-0798 in the background.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Opening the email attachment, “Please help to CHECK.doc,” opens a decoy Word document.

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

[Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) can use a digitally signed binary ("Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process") to load its dll into memory.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Our analysis revealed that the file behaves similarly... It creates a folder (c:\windows\tasks) and drops config and PE files into it.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ... Defense Evasion T1112 Modify Registry

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ... Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence8

[Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) has established persistence via the `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` registry key and by loading a dropper to `(%COMMON_ STARTUP%\\eoffice.exe)`.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1547.014Active SetupEvidence1

MITRE ... T1547.014 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Our analysis revealed that the file behaves similarly... It creates a folder (c:\windows\tasks) and drops config and PE files into it.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Instead of LBTServ.dll containing the final payload, it loads a shellcode from a separate file and injects itself into svchost.exe.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ... Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence8

[Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) has established persistence via the `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` registry key and by loading a dropper to `(%COMMON_ STARTUP%\\eoffice.exe)`.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1547.014Active SetupEvidence1

MITRE ... T1547.014 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence6

MITRE ... Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence4

[Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) has encrypted its configuration file.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3

[Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) has used the name `eoffice.exe` in attempt to appear as a legitimate file.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Instead of LBTServ.dll containing the final payload, it loads a shellcode from a separate file and injects itself into svchost.exe.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence8

The [Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) dropping function can initiate decryption of its config file.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

[Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) can use a digitally signed binary ("Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process") to load its dll into memory.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ... Defense Evasion T1112 Modify Registry

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

MITRE ... Credential Access T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging

Discovery

1 technique
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ... Discovery T1010 Application Window Discovery

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Chinoxy operated as a backdoor and collected data from the infected computers.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

MITRE ... Credential Access T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1

MITRE ... Collection T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Chinoxy is a RAT that has been used by FunnyDream since around 2018. It decoded the config using two numeric data and communicates with the C&C server using its original protocol using Blowfish.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

It then contacts instructor[.]giize[.]com... where the payload is hosted.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Chinoxy malware. This malware is a backdoor that is used to gain persistence on a victim’s machine.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

MITRE ... Command and Control T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

MITRE ... Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Indicators of compromise

Observables

51 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching51Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.