Houdini RAT is a VBS-based remote access trojan used by the WIRTE threat actor in campaigns targeting Middle Eastern diplomatic and governmental entities. The malware is typically delivered via decoy documents in Arabic, themed around sensitive political or religious topics, and distributed as VBS files that open the decoy and execute the backdoor. Houdini RAT achieves persistence by copying itself to the APPDATA directory (as Update.vbs) and may use PowerShell for further payload execution, sometimes leveraging the Empire post-exploitation framework. Communication with C2 infrastructure occurs over unencrypted HTTP, with known C2 servers including 149.28.14[.]103:535 and domains such as micorsoft[.]store and office365-update[.]co. The malware's infection vector is unsophisticated but effective, with low initial detection rates by antivirus solutions. It is used to target diplomats, defense professionals, and law enforcement in Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Gaza. Technical consistencies include base64-encoded decoy documents, typographical errors in function names, and the use of regsvr32.exe to execute PowerShell via SCT files. The infrastructure supporting Houdini RAT has shifted over time, including the use of Cloudflare for obfuscation and changes in C2 IP addresses.
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Today we see this attack employed on a regular basis as part of widespread spam phishing campaigns
It allows to call functions exported by DLL libraries, in particular Windows API functions, from JScript and VBScript.
The payload is a VBS file, which, in some cases, comes obfuscated or encoded with couple of layers.
DCOM_DATA is decoded and dropped to %temp% directory under the name “HOUDINI.BIN” and registered with regsvr32.exe.
As the script executes, it drops a copy of itself into %appdata%Microsoft and gains persistence by editing the registry key: ‘ HKEY_CURRENT_USERSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun ’.
The second stage is basically FILE_DATA which is injected to ‘msbuild.exe’ using LOADER_DATA (RunPE).
As the script executes, it drops a copy of itself into %appdata%Microsoft and gains persistence by editing the registry key: ‘ HKEY_CURRENT_USERSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun ’.
The payload is a VBS file, which, in some cases, comes obfuscated or encoded with couple of layers.
The second stage is basically FILE_DATA which is injected to ‘msbuild.exe’ using LOADER_DATA (RunPE).
The script checks whether the current environment is 64bit or not. If it is, it will execute the script with a 32-bit version of wscript.exe (from SysWOW64).
DCOM_DATA is decoded and dropped to %temp% directory under the name “HOUDINI.BIN” and registered with regsvr32.exe.
The script checks whether the current environment is 64bit or not. If it is, it will execute the script with a 32-bit version of wscript.exe (from SysWOW64).
“chroms.linkpc.net” – C2 address. “11” – Port.
14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.