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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

SaintBot

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs223Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
PersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissanceExfiltration
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

SaintBot is a multistage Windows downloader used to establish persistent access and retrieve and execute additional malicious payloads. Its execution chain includes .NET components, sandbox and virtual-machine checks, locale-based execution restrictions, obfuscation, and process injection. It establishes persistence through a registry autorun mechanism and has been observed attempting to bypass User Account Control through abuse of the Windows Fodhelper utility. SaintBot collects host information, applies XOR and Base64 transformations, and transmits the resulting data to command-and-control infrastructure through HTTP POST requests. Supported commands include executing downloaded payloads, loading executables and DLLs in memory, updating itself on disk, and uninstalling.

SaintBot has been deployed in spear-phishing campaigns associated with UAC-0056, also tracked as Saint Bear, TA471, and Lorec53. Documented targets include Ukrainian government organizations and an energy organization in Ukraine. Delivery chains have used emails impersonating Ukrainian health-service or police authorities, malicious Word documents with embedded JavaScript, and archives containing lure documents and malicious shortcuts. These chains use PowerShell to download and execute intermediate payloads, including files hosted on Discord. SaintBot is frequently deployed alongside OutSteel, a separate document-stealing malware family that can download and execute SaintBot. Their roles are complementary: OutSteel performs document theft, while SaintBot supplies persistent payload-delivery and execution capabilities.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-11882via palo alto networks unit 42 blogExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation Editor"Even the Word documents attached to emails have used a variety of techniques, including malicious macros, embedded JavaScript and the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 to install payloads onto the system." Also: "!!! COVID-21.doc ... Delivery document exploits CVE-2017-11882 to download www.baiden00[.]ru/win21st.txt"View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Ember Bear

SaintBot malware was observed in a targeted email sent to an individual at an energy organization in Ukraine on Feb 1, 2022.

via contagiodump blogcontagiodump.blogspot.com
SaintBear

"...would download and install a payload known as SaintBot (a downloader) and OutSteel (a document stealer)."

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

In January 2022, there were reports of a series of cyberattacks that started from spear-phishing emails disguised as messages from the National Healthcare Service of Ukraine.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The emails were attached with a document and two shortcut files, where one shortcut file downloads and executes the OutSteel malware using PowerShell.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

електронних поштових повідомлень, що містили посилання на ZIP-архів, розміщений на публічному сервісі Discord

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

%TEMP%\rmm.bat

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

ZIP-архів містить документ-приманку та два ідентичні файли-ярлики, у випадку відкриття яких на комп’ютері жертви буде виконано powershell-команду

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

By executing Fodhelper and adding a registry entry, SaintBot is able to execute its own copy in a startup folder with administrative privilege.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\<назва_файлу>.exe

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

два ідентичні файли-ярлики, у випадку відкриття яких на комп’ютері жертви буде виконано powershell-команду

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\<назва_файлу>.exe

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

два ідентичні файли-ярлики, у випадку відкриття яких на комп’ютері жертви буде виконано powershell-команду

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

This malware sample attempts to bypass user account control (UAC) by exploiting Fodhelper

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

By executing Fodhelper and adding a registry entry, SaintBot is able to execute its own copy in a startup folder with administrative privilege.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Upon callback, SaintBot collects information from the infected computers

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

then encrypts and encodes the data with XOR and BASE64.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The data is attached to a prefix and sent to the C&C server with a POST request.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

призведе до завантаження і запуску шкідливої програми OutSteel ... а також завантажить і виконає шкідливу програму SaintBot

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

then encrypts and encodes the data with XOR and BASE64.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

223 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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web archiveNews · Dec 6, 2024How Microsoft names threat actors - Microsoft Defender XDR | Microsoft LearnNamed malware/tool referenced as an alternate name associated with Storm-0587 in Microsoft's naming table.Read more ↗contagiodump blogNews · Feb 18, 2023contagio: Malware Arsenal used by Ember Bear (aka UAC-0056,Saint Bear, UNC2589, Lorec53, TA471, Nodaria, Nascent Ursa, LorecBear, Bleeding Bear, and DEV-0586) in attacks targeting Ukraine (samples)Actively developed downloader distributed through phishing attachments and multistage infection chains. It retrieves additional payloads, updates itself on disk, establishes startup persistence, and uses obfuscation, anti-analysis checks, and process injection. The reference describes deployments alongside OutSteel and a Defender-disabling executable.Read more ↗trend micro researchNews · Mar 3, 2022Cyberattacks are Prominent in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict | Trend Micro (US)Malware delivered via spear-phishing that performs UAC bypass, collects host information, encodes it, and sends it to C2 servers.Read more ↗palo alto networks unit 42 blogNews · Feb 25, 2022Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBotMulti-stage .NET malware loader/downloader used for persistent access and to fetch/execute additional payloads. Uses anti-analysis/locale checks, process injection (e.g., into MSBuild.exe and dfrgui.exe), UAC bypass via fodhelper.exe, persistence via Run key, and C2 command handling (execute payloads, load DLL in-memory, update, uninstall).Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching223Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.