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Malware

Linux Rabbit

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs35Tracked
Type
Cryptominer
Capabilities
Initial accessBrute forceScanningReconnaissancePersistenceLateral movementDefense evasion
Platforms
LinuxIOT

Linux Rabbit is Linux malware used in a Monero cryptomining campaign first observed in August 2018. The broader campaign targeted Linux servers and Internet-of-Things devices. Linux Rabbit selected targets in Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States through geolocation filtering. It generated random network addresses, probed for accessible SSH services, collected hostnames and top-level-domain information, and excluded blacklisted locations and domains, including many government-related domains. It brute-forced SSH authentication using a hard-coded credential list to compromise additional systems and install mining payloads.

Linux Rabbit establishes persistence through system startup and interactive-shell initialization mechanisms. It uses Tor hidden services and gateways for command-and-control communication and can retrieve updates from GitHub. It deploys architecture-specific mining components, including CNRig on x86 systems and CoinHive on ARM/MIPS systems. On compromised web servers, it injects CoinHive scripts into HTML content to mine cryptocurrency through visitors’ browsers. It also removes competing cryptocurrency miners, performs authentication checks intended to avoid honeypots, and includes a built-in killswitch.

Linux Rabbit shares a code base with Rabbot, a related self-propagating worm used in a subsequent campaign that exploited vulnerabilities in IoT devices. The operators behind the campaign have not been identified.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

“Linux Rabbit is able to connect to GitHub and receive updates from the threat actors.”

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) attempts to gain access to the server via SSH.(Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

Execution

1 technique
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

“If the infected machine is a web server, the malware will inject CoinHive script tags into every HTML file… Rabbot… searching for ‘.HTML’ files and inserting JavaScript files into the browser.”

Persistence

4 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

“gain persistence… through ‘rc.local’ files and ‘.bashrc’ files.”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) attempts to gain access to the server via SSH.(Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) maintains persistence on an infected machine through rc.local and .bashrc files. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

“gain persistence… through ‘rc.local’ files and ‘.bashrc’ files.”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) maintains persistence on an infected machine through rc.local and .bashrc files. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

Stealth

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

“The first two authentication certifications are to ensure that the malware is not in a ‘honey pot’. This is likely to avoid static analysis of the malware.”

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence4

Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file uses NTLM login credentials to brute force Windows machines.

T1110.003Password SprayingEvidence4

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) brute forces SSH passwords in order to attempt to gain access and install its malware onto the server. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

Discovery

4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence3

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) opens a socket on port 22 and if it receives a response it attempts to obtain the machine's hostname and Top-Level Domain. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

“check to see if an SSH server is listening on Port 22. The malware will open a socket to see if it receives a response…”

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Some entries use commands such as systeminfo, net config workstation, or collect owner/organization details alongside username information, e.g., 'Kwampirs collects registered owner details by using the commands systeminfo and net config workstation.'

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

“The first two authentication certifications are to ensure that the malware is not in a ‘honey pot’. This is likely to avoid static analysis of the malware.”

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.004SSHEvidence2

Sandworm Team installed a modified Dropbear SSH client as a backdoor; Sandworm used Dropbear SSH with a hardcoded backdoor password to maintain persistence; Linux Rabbit attempts to gain access via SSH; Mafalda can establish an SSH connection from a compromised host to a server; Sea Turtle used external-facing SSH for initial access.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

“Establish a connection to the Command and Control (C2) server using Tor gateways… it utilizes Tor hidden services to act as contact points to access a Tor gateway… establish an active C2 URL. The payload… is then sent… as an encoded URL parameter.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“payload… sent from the C2 server as an encoded URL parameter… Rabbot will send all its payloads through an open port 80 to the Linux (web)servers”

T1132Data EncodingEvidence3

[Linux Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0362) sends the payload from the C2 server as an encoded URL parameter. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

“goal… install cryptocurrency miners… attempts to install both ‘CNRig’ and ‘CoinHive’ Monero miners… inject CoinHive script tags into every HTML file…”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

35 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching35Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.