DCSyncer.Slick is a Windows post-exploitation utility used by the Iran-linked espionage actor UNC1549, also tracked as Nimbus Manticore and Subtle Snail, and described in broader reporting as part of the Tortoiseshell toolset. It is used to conduct DCSync-style attacks against Active Directory in order to extract NTLM password hashes directly from domain controllers, supporting privilege escalation and credential access objectives. Reporting describes it as a Windows utility based on DCSyncer that mimics the legitimate Active Directory replication feature. DCSyncer.Slick has been observed in intrusions targeting aerospace, aviation, and defense organizations across the Middle East, and related reporting also links the broader actor to telecommunications targeting. UNC1549 commonly gains initial access through spear-phishing, stolen credentials, abuse of third-party relationships, and access to remote platforms such as Azure Virtual Desktop, Citrix, and VMware. After compromise, the actor deploys DCSyncer.Slick alongside other custom malware and utilities including MINIBIKE, TWOSTROKE, DEEPROOT, LIGHTRAIL, GHOSTLINE, POLLBLEND, CRASHPAD, SIGHTGRAB, and TRUSTTRAP. Mandiant reported that UNC1549 abused DLL search order hijacking to execute DCSyncer.Slick and other payloads, often by masquerading malicious components as legitimate software from vendors such as FortiGate, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Citrix, and VMware, and in some cases installing legitimate software to facilitate the hijack. High-confidence capability information directly stated in the source is that DCSyncer.Slick extracts NTLM password hashes from domain controllers and is used for DCSync attacks for privilege escalation.
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Over subsequent years, the group layered in additional tooling — MiniJunk, MiniBrowse, DCSyncer.Slick, DeepRoot, GhostLine, LightRail, and others...
"DCSYNCER.SLICK, a Windows utility based on DCSyncer to conduct DCSync attacks for privilege escalation"
"DCSYNCER.SLICK, a Windows utility based on DCSyncer to conduct DCSync attacks for privilege escalation"
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has been executed using DLL search order hijacking.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)
[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has utilized dynamic API resolution to conceal functions.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)
[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has XOR-encrypted stolen credentials prior to writing them to files.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)
[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has stored stolen credentials in legitimate resource locations to include `C:\Program Files\VMware\VMwareTools\VMwareVGAuth\LOG.txt`.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)
[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has been executed using DLL search order hijacking.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)
[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has gathered credentials using DCSync Active Directory replication feature.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)
including Kerberoasting, DCSync operations, RDP hijacking, and internal spear phishing
[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has gathered stolen credentials in hardcoded filenames and pathways to include `C:\users\public\LOG.txt` and `C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMware VGAuth\LOG.txt`.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)
[DCSYNCER.SLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9065) has staged stolen credentials in hard-coded local device paths to include `C:\Program Files\VMware\` and `C:\users\public\`.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.