BlackLotus
- Type
- Bootkit
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissance
- Platforms
- Windows
BlackLotus is a Windows UEFI bootkit advertised on cybercrime forums in late 2022 and publicly confirmed in 2023 as the first documented in-the-wild UEFI bootkit capable of bypassing Secure Boot on fully updated Windows 11 systems. It exploits the Baton Drop vulnerability, CVE-2022-21894, using older, legitimately signed Windows boot managers that remain trusted unless the necessary Secure Boot revocations are applied. Installation requires preexisting administrative privileges or physical access; BlackLotus serves as a post-compromise persistence and defense-evasion mechanism rather than an initial-access vector.
BlackLotus places malicious boot components in the EFI System Partition and establishes persistence by enrolling an attacker-controlled Machine Owner Key. Its components execute before Windows loads, enabling interference with operating-system security controls. The bootkit disables hypervisor-protected code integrity, BitLocker protection, and Microsoft Defender Antivirus. It deploys a malicious kernel driver that protects its boot files against deletion or tampering and installs a user-mode HTTP downloader. The downloader is injected into a Windows system process and supports command-and-control communications, retrieval of additional payloads, and network discovery.
Its persistence resides in disk-based boot components rather than requiring an implant in motherboard firmware. Remediation requires cleaning or rebuilding the EFI System Partition as well as the operating-system partition. Preventive protection depends on appropriate boot-manager updates and Secure Boot trust revocations, not merely patching the original vulnerability.
Associated vulnerabilities
5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Techniques & procedures
46 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
“Some BlackLotus samples are signed with self-signed certificate.”
“a Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit… publicly available… developer has likely just adapted the available PoC…”
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
PKfail is a firmware supply-chain security issue affecting major device vendors and hundreds of device models. PKfail is the result of shipping default test keys included by IBVs in their reference implementation
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
“uses various native Windows APIs… In some cases, a direct syscall instruction invocation is used…”
“HTTP downloader can load and execute DLLs received from the C&C server.”
“It exploits… CVE-2022-21894… to bypass UEFI Secure Boot… exploitation is still possible as the affected, validly signed binaries have still not been added to the UEFI revocation list… brings its own copies of legitimate – but vulnerable – binaries…”
“capable of communicating… by using a named Event and Section… Names… generated based on… MAC address.”
The routines responsible for installing the hook chain (start with ImgArchStartBootApplication ) are very similar as shown in the figure. BlackLotus trampoline code modification logic to setup hooks is identical to Umap code on GitHub.
Persistence
8 techniques
Persistence
The first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot on fully updated UEFI systems is now a reality. Once the persistence is configured, the BlackLotus bootkit is executed on every system start.
Based on function similarity, we detect the replacement of bootmgfw.efi with the shim.
“to disable this feature, the installer sets the Enabled registry value under the HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity registry key to zero.”
Bootkits are a type of malware that infects the boot process of a computer, allowing attackers to gain persistent access and control over the system.
Attackers could bypass UEFI Secure Boot on a wide range of systems thanks to 11 Microsoft-signed UEFI shim bootloaders carrying vulnerabilities that have remained buried for more than a decade... Exploitation allows untrusted code to run during boot, opening the door to UEFI bootkits ... even with Secure Boot switched on.
Bootkits usually targeted MBR/ESP in the early 2010s, but as the cost of firmware attack decreased rapidly, the modern bootkits started to target DXE or even PEI.
sc.exe create blacklotus_driver.sys binPath=C:\windows\temp\blacklotus_driver.sys type=kernel && sc.exe start blacklotus_driver.sys
The most well-known real-world example is BlackLotus, a UEFI bootkit discovered in 2023 that exploited vulnerabilities in older Windows bootloaders (CVE-2022-21894 and CVE-2023-24932) to bypass Secure Boot on fully updated Windows 11 systems.
Privilege Escalation
9 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot on fully updated UEFI systems is now a reality. Once the persistence is configured, the BlackLotus bootkit is executed on every system start.
Based on function similarity, we detect the replacement of bootmgfw.efi with the shim.
“When… winlogon.exe process has started, it injects and executes… the HTTP downloader – into it.”
“In the case of executing files directly in memory, svchost.exe is used as an injection target.”
Since Secure Boot bypass attacks cross security boundaries or allow the disabling of security features, we need to treat them as privilege escalation vulnerabilities to more accurately reflect the CVSS impact score.
“can use WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUserW to execute downloaded payloads… with local system privileges.”
sc.exe create blacklotus_driver.sys binPath=C:\windows\temp\blacklotus_driver.sys type=kernel && sc.exe start blacklotus_driver.sys
The most well-known real-world example is BlackLotus, a UEFI bootkit discovered in 2023 that exploited vulnerabilities in older Windows bootloaders (CVE-2022-21894 and CVE-2023-24932) to bypass Secure Boot on fully updated Windows 11 systems.
“If it’s not the case, it tries to elevate… using the UAC bypass method… UAC bypass via Program Compatibility assistant.”
Stealth
17 techniques
Stealth
MITRE ATT&CK catalogs the technique as T1014 under defense evasion.
“Almost all embedded strings… are encrypted… embedded files… encrypted using 256-bit AES… some… compressed using LZMS.”
“APIs… resolved exclusively during runtime and function hashes instead of function names are used…”
“hide its files… by using legitimate filenames, such as grubx64.efi… or bootmgfw.efi …”
“When… winlogon.exe process has started, it injects and executes… the HTTP downloader – into it.”
“In the case of executing files directly in memory, svchost.exe is used as an injection target.”
“installer registers itself to be deleted… after… exploitation… removes traces… by deleting all files included in exploitation chain…”
“‘uninstall’ command… removing all bootkit files from the ESP and restoring original… Boot Manager.”
“can use WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUserW to execute downloaded payloads… with local system privileges.”
there are "limited indications" suggesting the involvement of a UEFI bootkit, likely exploiting CVE-2023-24932 ... a security feature bypass vulnerability in the Windows Boot Manager
BlackLotus takes advantage of this, bringing its own copies of legitimate – but vulnerable – binaries to the system in order to exploit the vulnerability...
Certain BlackLotus installation packages, as analyzed by ESET, refrain from carrying out the installation of the bootkit in case the affected host employs regional settings associated with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, or Ukraine.
Bootkits are a type of malware that infects the boot process of a computer, allowing attackers to gain persistent access and control over the system.
Attackers could bypass UEFI Secure Boot on a wide range of systems thanks to 11 Microsoft-signed UEFI shim bootloaders carrying vulnerabilities that have remained buried for more than a decade... Exploitation allows untrusted code to run during boot, opening the door to UEFI bootkits ... even with Secure Boot switched on.
Bootkits usually targeted MBR/ESP in the early 2010s, but as the cost of firmware attack decreased rapidly, the modern bootkits started to target DXE or even PEI.
The routines responsible for installing the hook chain (start with ImgArchStartBootApplication ) are very similar as shown in the figure. BlackLotus trampoline code modification logic to setup hooks is identical to Umap code on GitHub.
“contains various anti-VM, anti-debug… The HTTP downloader won’t be deployed if a kernel debugger is detected…”
Defense Impairment
6 techniques
Defense Impairment
“to disable this feature, the installer sets the Enabled registry value under the HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity registry key to zero.”
With the modified MokList variable, an attacker can easily load any self-signed shim bootloader, which is actually another vulnerability in the chain used to keep secure boot active.
The first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot on fully updated UEFI systems is now a reality.
Secure Boot is a UEFI firmware feature that checks the digital signature of every piece of software trying to load before Windows boots... If a bootloader’s signature doesn’t match what Secure Boot trusts, the firmware refuses to run it.
По MITRE ATT&CK это одновременно Bootkit (T1542.003) для persistence и Code Signing Policy Modification (T1553.006) для defense evasion - Secure Boot формально включён, но фактически удалось его обойти.
A device stuck on the 2011 KEK can only receive DBX updates signed with that key, and the ability to sign on it ended June 24... Losing DBX updates means losing this kind of protection against whatever comes next.
Discovery
6 techniques
Discovery
“determine the public IP… by requesting api.ipify[.]org service.”
“checks the internet connection by querying… www.msftncsi[.]com/ncsi[.]txt”
“beacon… containing… IP… OS… Edition… CPU… GPU… RAM… SecureBoot…”
Certain BlackLotus installation packages, as analyzed by ESET, refrain from carrying out the installation of the bootkit in case the affected host employs regional settings associated with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, or Ukraine.
“installers… do not proceed… if… locales… ro-MD… ru-RU… uk-UA… be-BY… hy-AM… kk-KZ”
“contains various anti-VM, anti-debug… The HTTP downloader won’t be deployed if a kernel debugger is detected…”
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
It also deploys an HTTP downloader that enables communication with the Command and Control server and has the ability to load further user-mode or kernel-mode payloads.
...an HTTP downloader that communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve additional user-mode or kernel-mode malware... the latter is capable of executing commands received from the C2 server over HTTPS.
It also deploys an HTTP downloader that enables communication with the Command and Control server and has the ability to load further user-mode or kernel-mode payloads.
“then URL-safe base64 encoded.”
“data… is decrypted using 256-bit AES in CBC mode with… HWID string used as the key.”
“data is first encrypted using an embedded RSA key, then URL-safe base64 encoded.”
Observables
23 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
85 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.