Casbaneiro, also known as Metamorfo, is a Windows banking trojan and spyware family associated with Latin American cybercrime activity, particularly campaigns targeting financial institutions and their customers. It is known for modular post-compromise surveillance and credential-harvesting behavior, including screenshot capture, keylogging, collection of the current username, process and security-product discovery, and exfiltration of stolen data to command-and-control infrastructure. The malware has also been observed monitoring running applications and checking process names, consistent with targeting online banking sessions and avoiding analysis or security tooling.
The malware employs multiple defense-evasion and execution techniques. Documented behaviors include abuse of trusted Windows utilities such as msiexec and mshta for proxy execution, use of native Windows API calls, hiding its user interface with ShowWindow, DLL side-loading, and DLL injection into legitimate processes. It can unpack itself after delivery and has shown self-deletion behavior after execution, indicating efforts to reduce forensic visibility. JavaScript-based payload components are also part of its execution chain.
Casbaneiro establishes persistence on Windows through Registry Run entries and Startup-folder shortcut mechanisms. It has also modified Registry settings and deleted Registry data as part of system manipulation and evasion. Observed delivery includes malicious email campaigns using HTML attachments, aligning with phishing-based initial access. Overall, Casbaneiro is a mature Windows financial malware family combining credential theft, user surveillance, persistence, and defense evasion to support fraud and broader post-exploitation activity.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The point of all this is to drop Casbaneiro, a classic banking Trojan that triggers when victims visit their cryptocurrency or financial service providers online.
The point of all this is to drop Casbaneiro, a classic banking Trojan that triggers when victims visit their cryptocurrency or financial service providers online.
38 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Threat actors continue to use email as an infection method, with malicious documents or embedded malicious links. One approach is disguising the email as coming from the World Health Organization.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors sending spearphishing or phishing emails with malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM files, and executables disguised as documents.
Threat actors often use the latest world events... as themes for malware content in order to stay relevant and entice victims to visit malicious websites... The emails contained a malicious attachment when opened that would lead to the download of a zip archive. The hyperlink leads to: hxxp://www.servicosfcporto[.]com/upcloud7?...
Analysis abuse of custom actions in Windows Installer MSI to run malicious JavaScript, VBScript and PowerShell scripts
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using cmd.exe, the Windows command shell, to execute commands, launch payloads, run batch files, and automate actions on compromised hosts.
APT-C-36 has embedded a VBScript within a malicious Word document which is executed upon the document opening.
The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of many malware families and threat groups using Windows/native OS APIs for execution, injection, discovery, anti-debugging, and other actions, ending with 'NtCreateProcess' and 'fork()'.
ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values. Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries. APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe... BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe... ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe... Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
When analyzing the file, we discovered that it contains an obfuscated script that will download the next stage of the malware... archive containing AutoIt interpreter and obfuscated AutoIt script.
actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.
Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe... BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe... ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe... Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors deleting files, directories, droppers, logs, scripts, temporary files, exfiltrated archives, and uninstalling themselves to cover tracks or reduce forensic artifacts.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat groups that 'decrypt', 'decode', 'deobfuscate', 'unpack', or 'decompress' payloads, strings, configuration data, shellcode, and files prior to execution or use.
APT29 has use mshta to execute malicious scripts on a compromised host... APT32 has used mshta.exe for code execution... APT38 has used a renamed version of mshta.exe to execute malicious HTML files... FIN7 has used mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).
Agent Tesla has used ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden to hide windows. APT-C-36 has set the ShowWindow property of the Win32_ProcessStartup object to zero to hide PowerShell execution. APT19 used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden.
When running, Casbaneiro monitors the launched processes and opened URLs to find those related to banking applications.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the username, identifying the current user, enumerating logged-on users, or running commands such as whoami, query user, and quser to determine user context on compromised systems.
Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, BIOS, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, and WMI to gather host information.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of groups and malware that can 'list files and directories,' 'search for files,' 'enumerate drives,' 'gather file metadata,' or 'browse file systems' on compromised hosts.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the current date, time, or time zone from victim systems, including examples such as "The net time command can be used... to determine the local or remote system time" and commands like "net time \\hostname" and "w32tm /tz".
Casbaneiro is a Windows banking Trojan written in Delphi... It is able to collect the data about the infected device, take screenshots and perform keylogging, hijack clipboard data, etc.
The content is a catalog of malware families and threat actors that 'can perform keylogging,' 'log keystrokes,' 'capture keystrokes,' or use 'keylogger' modules/tools.
Allowing the MetaMorfo trojan to execute in a sandbox reveals a command and control server resolving to the following ip addresses
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."
66 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
140 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Trojan delivered via malicious MSI installers from COVID-themed links, downloading additional malware and establishing persistent C2.
Latin American banking trojan mentioned as sharing a custom encryption approach with Ousaban.
Brazilian banking trojan referenced because Ousaban shares the same custom string-encryption scheme with it.
Mentioned only as a related Latin American banking trojan family comparison to Ousaban.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.