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Malware2 associated actors

Metamorfo

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days5 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK93Techniques
IOCs170Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injectionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLureCloaking
Platforms
Windows

Casbaneiro, also known as Metamorfo and Ponteiro, is a Windows banking trojan used to steal banking credentials and personal information and facilitate financial fraud. It targets online-banking customers in Latin America, including Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Its capabilities include keystroke capture, screenshots, deceptive banking windows, keyboard control, clipboard manipulation, file execution, and remote command execution. Some variants disable browser autocomplete to force victims to enter credentials manually.

Distribution commonly uses phishing emails with malicious HTML attachments or invoice- and legal-notice-themed PDFs linking to staged downloads. Observed infection chains use HTA scripts and an AutoIt loader to unpack and inject the payload into legitimate Windows processes. Other campaigns deploy malicious DLLs through side-loading with legitimate, digitally signed applications. Persistence mechanisms include Startup-folder scripts or shortcuts and scheduled tasks.

Casbaneiro monitors banking-related applications and browser activity. In observed campaigns, its primary remote-control channel activates only when a victim visits a targeted banking website, enabling operators to present fraudulent windows and perform actions supporting banking fraud. The malware also collects Microsoft Outlook address-book contacts and message sender and recipient metadata, which some variants exfiltrate without encryption. Separate servers handle information theft, victim registration, and remote control, allowing data theft before the main command channel becomes active.

Evasion measures include geographic filtering of delivery pages, operating-system language restrictions, sandbox checks, fragmented encrypted strings reconstructed at runtime, and process injection. Command-and-control implementations have included raw TCP and HTTPS. Some campaigns use unusual HTTP formatting and deliberately treat HTTP 403 responses as successful victim-registration responses, complicating network analysis.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Saci

Several behaviors in this sample are similar to those observed in the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking malware lineage.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
Augmented Marauder

The point of all this is to drop Casbaneiro, a classic banking Trojan that triggers when victims visit their cryptocurrency or financial service providers online.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

93 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

“Visitors outside the selected countries are redirected to legitimate sites such as Google or YouTube, while targets are served a page that silently downloads a Base64-encoded ZIP archive.”

T1566PhishingEvidence9

Unsuspecting users receive convincing messages from trusted contacts, often crafted to exploit social engineering tactics and encourage interaction with malicious content.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence16

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has been delivered to victims via emails with malicious HTML attachments.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence6

A link first checks the visitor’s IP address... targets are served a page that silently downloads a Base64-encoded ZIP archive.

Execution

15 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

If virtualization is not detected, the payload proceeds to gather host information through multiple WMI queries

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence7

It waits until the victim visits one of the targeted bank websites, then sends system information and accepts commands for keyboard control, clipboard pasting, file execution and command execution.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

Analysis abuse of custom actions in Windows Installer MSI to run malicious JavaScript, VBScript and PowerShell scripts

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence8

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used <code>cmd.exe /c</code> to execute files.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence10

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used VBS code on victims’ systems.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence7

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) includes payloads written in JavaScript.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used native WINAPI calls.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) had used AutoIt to load and execute the DLL payload.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

T1197 BITS Jobs ❌ ✅ ❌ ✅ ✅ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌

T1204User ExecutionEvidence7

The infection chain begins when the user executes a malicious HTA file

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Upon opening the PDF, users are directed to a malicious link that downloads a ZIP archive, leading to the execution of interim HTML Application (HTA) and VBS payloads.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence12

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) requires the user to double-click the executable to run the malicious HTA file or to download a malicious installer.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

...uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules... execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs... loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime... loads a dynamic library (.dylib file) using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer... using dlopen() and dlsym()... calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence13

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has written process names to the Registry, disabled IE browser features, deleted Registry keys, and changed the ExtendedUIHoverTime key.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

T1197 BITS Jobs ❌ ✅ ❌ ✅ ✅ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence14

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has configured persistence to the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\Spotify\Spotify.exe</code> and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence3

“It also creates a Startup shortcut for persistence.”

Privilege Escalation

8 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌

T1055Process InjectionEvidence8

The malware injects the payload into mobsync.exe only if RegSvcs.exe does not exist.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence3

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has injected a malicious DLL into the Windows Media Player process (wmplayer.exe).(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

The loader injects it into a hollowed svchost.exe process to blend with legitimate Windows system processes

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence14

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has configured persistence to the Registry key <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\Spotify\Spotify.exe</code> and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence3

“It also creates a Startup shortcut for persistence.”

Stealth

28 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence11

The decryption key and encrypted strings are split into multiple fragments, which are concatenated at runtime whenever the malware needs to decrypt and use a specific string.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding ❌ ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used VMProtect to pack and protect files.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Metamorfo has used YouTube to store and hide C&C server domains.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has encrypted payloads and strings.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence8

Once executed, it pops up a window that mimics a Windows service.

T1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEvidence1

Bad Rabbit has masqueraded as a Flash Player installer through the executable file install_flash_player.exe.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has disguised an MSI file as the Adobe Acrobat Reader Installer and has masqueraded payloads as OneDrive, WhatsApp, or Spotify, for example.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence8

The malware injects the payload into mobsync.exe only if RegSvcs.exe does not exist.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence3

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has injected a malicious DLL into the Windows Media Player process (wmplayer.exe).(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

The loader injects it into a hollowed svchost.exe process to blend with legitimate Windows system processes

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence7

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has a command to delete a Registry key it uses, <code>\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes</code>.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has deleted itself from the system after execution.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)

T1070.009Clear PersistenceEvidence1

CSPY Downloader has the ability to remove values it writes to the Registry.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The script then iterates over the filtered email list, utilizing the compromised user's own email account to send a tailored phishing email with the newly generated PDF attached.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence15

Upon execution, [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has unzipped itself after being downloaded to the system and has performed string decryption.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

T1197 BITS Jobs ❌ ✅ ❌ ✅ ✅ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌

T1218.005MshtaEvidence9

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used mshta.exe to execute a HTA payload.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence7

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used MsiExec.exe to automatically execute files.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

T1218.011 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 ❌ ✅ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ✅

T1480Execution GuardrailsEvidence1

The Trojan does not immediately use its main command channel. It waits until the victim visits one of the targeted bank websites, then sends system information and accepts commands.

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence2

Only when the victim accesses websites related to targeted banks through a web browser does the malware send information about the infected computer to the server and initiate C2 communication.

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence2

During initialization, the malware creates a mutex named GlobolID-4465173{Username} to prevent concurrent execution.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence8

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

Inside the archive, an HTA file fetches further script content and checks the device for analysis environments and approved operating-system languages.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence6

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has hidden its GUI using the ShowWindow() WINAPI call.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

...uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules... execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs... loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime... loads a dynamic library (.dylib file) using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer... using dlopen() and dlsym()... calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence13

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has written process names to the Registry, disabled IE browser features, deleted Registry keys, and changed the ExtendedUIHoverTime key.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has digitally signed executables using AVAST Software certificates.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence7

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has a function to kill processes associated with defenses and can prevent certain processes from launching.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

Credential Access

8 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence5

“The malware uses clipboard injection and fake windows to support financial fraud.”

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence8

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has a command to launch a keylogger and capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has displayed fake forms on top of banking sites to intercept credentials from victims.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence3

Per tradition, it uses an overlay to trick users into thinking they're logging into a legitimate site...

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The second function, VERIFICARHISTORICOCHROME() , focuses on analyzing the user’s Chrome browser history to identify visits to banking websites

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files ❌ ✅ ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

It includes SQL commands used to harvest credentials from browsers.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers ✅ ✅ ✅ ✅ ❌ ✅ ✅ ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌

Discovery

11 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence7

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) can enumerate all windows on the victim’s machine.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence10

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has collected the username from the victim's machine.(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence10

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has performed process name checks and has monitored applications.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence16

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has collected the hostname and operating system version from the compromised host.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has searched the Program Files directories for specific folders and has searched for strings related to its mutexes.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence5

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) uses JavaScript to get the system time.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence8

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

Inside the archive, an HTA file fetches further script content and checks the device for analysis environments and approved operating-system languages.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence7

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has searched the compromised system for banking applications.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence7

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) collects a list of installed antivirus software from the victim’s system.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence4

It also checks the system’s default language and proceeds only if it is not German, French, or English.

Collection

11 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence5

“The malware uses clipboard injection and fake windows to support financial fraud.”

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence8

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has a command to launch a keylogger and capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has displayed fake forms on top of banking sites to intercept credentials from victims.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence3

Per tradition, it uses an overlay to trick users into thinking they're logging into a legitimate site...

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence10

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) can collect screenshots of the victim’s machine.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1114Email CollectionEvidence2

“[Casbaneiro] collects address-book entries and Outlook sender and recipient details.”

T1114.001Local Email CollectionEvidence4

The malware collects email addresses from the victim’s address book, as well as sender and recipient information from emails stored in Microsoft Outlook.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence12

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has a function to hijack data from the clipboard by monitoring the contents of the clipboard and replacing the cryptocurrency wallet with the attacker's.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine, and set timers to collect the contents of the clipboard and website browsing.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

A significant amount of observed campaigns focus on stealing credentials for banking or other financial accounts, including use of banking trojans such as METAMORFO aka "Horabot," BBtok, and JanelaRAT.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence4

BBSRAT uses Expand to decompress a CAB file into executable content.

Command and Control

16 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

A second server returns HTTP 403 when it receives Base64-encoded victim data. Rather than signalling failure, that response is part of the process; any other status makes the malware retry.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

“[Its] distinctive network behavior includes distributed data-receiving servers.”

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence11

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

the malware logs into a terra.com.br mailbox using hardcoded credentials and retrieves an email titled “meu” to extract an updated C&C address

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used raw TCP for C2.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence3

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used YouTube to store and hide C&C server domains.(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1102.003One-Way CommunicationEvidence3

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has downloaded a zip file for execution on the system.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence15

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used MSI files to download additional files to execute.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence2

“A second server returns HTTP 403 when it receives Base64-encoded victim data.”

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence1

custom encryption algorithms are favored over established ones

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

The injected payload also includes an extensive set of backdoor commands, granting the operator near complete remote control over the infected system.

T1568.003DNS CalculationEvidence1

T1568.003 Dynamic Resolution: DNS Calculation ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌ ❌

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has communicated with hosts over raw TCP on port 9999.(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has encrypted C2 commands with AES-256.(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455)'s C2 communication has been encrypted using OpenSSL.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence12

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) can send the data it collects to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

they do not exfiltrate all harvested data to the C&C server, but use different locations as well

Impact

1 technique
T1565.002Transmitted Data ManipulationEvidence3

[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has a function that can watch the contents of the system clipboard for valid bitcoin addresses, which it then overwrites with the attacker's address.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

170 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

162 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
medium anyrunNews · Nov 3, 2026Release Notes: Related Threat Context for Faster Than Ever SOC Triage and 590+ Coverage Updates | by ANY.RUN | Nov, 2026 | MediumListed among threats included in October's detection coverage updates.Read more ↗malware newsNews · Nov 3, 2026Release Notes: Related Threat Context for Faster Than Ever SOC Triage and 590+ Coverage Updates - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsCasbaneiro appears in the October detection-coverage additions.Read more ↗anyrun blogNews · Nov 3, 2026Release Notes: Related Threat Context and 590+ Detection RulesListed among the threats covered by October’s detection updates.Read more ↗gurucul threat researchNews · Oct 14, 2026Casbaneiro Banking Trojan Paired With Malicious Chromium Extension and Delivered via Abused Remote Access Tooling | Community Portal | GuruculBanking trojan observed in a campaign beginning with phishing that persuaded victims to install a remote-access client. Attackers then executed PowerShell commands and deployed a Delphi payload through DLL side-loading, using the signed Caphyon Advanced Installer utility VmLauncher.exe and malicious zlibai.dll. An accompanying, unnamed Chromium extension used WebSocket-based command and control to capture screenshots, steal cookies and credentials, monitor form fields, and inject malicious HTML overlays. The extension targeted approximately 65 Portuguese and Brazilian banking portals, 11 cryptocurrency exchanges, and webmail services; these extension capabilities are not explicitly attributed to Casbaneiro itself.Read more ↗
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IOC matching170Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping93Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.