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Malware1 associated actor

GoldPickaxe

Tracked since Dec 4, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs21Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceSpoofing
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
AndroidiOS

GoldPickaxe is a mobile banking Trojan with Android and iOS variants, first disclosed in 2024 and attributed to GoldFactory, a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated cybercrime group. It targets mobile banking, e-wallet, and financial application users, primarily in Southeast Asia. A distinguishing capability is collecting facial video recordings and identity document images to facilitate abuse of facial-recognition-based electronic know-your-customer checks and banking authentication.

Android campaigns distribute GoldPickaxe through phishing websites impersonating the KuaiBo video-streaming platform. Victims install a counterfeit application containing a dropper that uses Android's SessionInstaller API to deploy a second-stage payload. The payload decrypts and dynamically loads malicious code in memory. Evasion measures include encrypted payloads, omission of a launcher icon, malformed manifests that disrupt static-analysis tools, and AES-encrypted command-and-control communications.

GoldPickaxe's Android variants steal banking and lock-screen credentials, log keystrokes, and exfiltrate SMS messages, contacts, call logs, device information, and installed-application data. They abuse Accessibility Services to read screen content and automate interaction, and use the Media Projection API for screen capture and sharing. Operators can inject text, simulate gestures and clicks, display deceptive overlays, and download additional applications. Fake verification and biometric interfaces induce victims to disclose credentials, identity documents, and facial recordings.

An analyzed Android variant contained a target list of 118 Indonesian banking applications. Infections have also been observed in Malaysia, Singapore, the United States, and Saudi Arabia.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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GoldFactory

First disclosed in 2024, GoldPickaxe is the first known iOS malware capable of stealing victims' facial biometric data to bypass facial-recognition-based e-KYC and banking authentication.

via bgd e gov cirt product advisoriescirt.gov.bd
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The attack starts with a fake website. It spoofs KuaiBo, a Chinese video-streaming app, and offers a free Android download.

Execution

1 technique
T1106Native APIEvidence1

Next, the dropper abuses Android’s SessionInstaller API to add a second app.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The malware even breaks analysis tools. It malforms its manifest to crash JADX and Apktool.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Victims then install a dropper app that looks harmless.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

That payload hides its real logic in an encrypted file, then decrypts and loads it in memory.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

It also skips the home-screen icon, so victims struggle to find and remove it.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

It also logs keystrokes, captures the screen, and shows fake overlays.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

It also logs keystrokes, captures the screen, and shows fake overlays.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The malware is engineered to harvest lock screen credentials and exfiltrate sensitive SMS logs, contact lists, and critical biometric data.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

It also logs keystrokes, captures the screen, and shows fake overlays.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

It also logs keystrokes, captures the screen, and shows fake overlays.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

It also logs keystrokes, captures the screen, and shows fake overlays.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

On command, the malware can fetch and install extra apps too.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

21 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching21Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.