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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

GoldDigger

Tracked since Dec 4, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasionSpoofing
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Android

GoldDigger is an Android banking trojan associated with GoldFactory, a financially motivated, Chinese-speaking threat actor. First documented in October 2023, it steals financial information and enables on-device banking fraud. It has targeted users in South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, with additional campaigns in South Africa and the United Kingdom using malicious applications impersonating airlines and shopping retailers.

GoldDigger requests Android accessibility permissions and abuses them to monitor application activity, capture user input, and automate interactions with banking applications. It can initiate fraudulent transactions by injecting input that mimics legitimate user actions. Fake overlays capture banking credentials, while real-time screen access allows operators to observe victims’ activity. Its command functionality includes collecting contacts and SMS messages, recording audio and video, streaming media, requesting location permissions, opening web pages, and launching applications. It receives commands through a WebSocket connection to its command-and-control infrastructure.

GoldDigger can execute a targeted application inside a virtual environment selected by its command-and-control server. This enables interception and modification of application API calls, observation of runtime behavior, and capture of credentials and other sensitive information. API manipulation also supports bypassing detection mechanisms and spoofing device identifiers or account information. GoldDigger uses the dpt-shell packer to obfuscate code and resources and encrypt native logic. Its anti-analysis protections detect Frida attachment, terminate the process when instrumentation is detected, and use process-tracing mechanisms to prevent external debuggers from attaching.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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GoldFactory

The third Android banking trojan to come under the security radar is GoldDigger, which was first documented by Group-IB in October 2023 as capable of carrying out on-device fraud.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

Victims who end up installing these apps are asked to grant accessibility services permissions

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

By abusing the Android accessibility service, threat actors can steal every UI element on the screen, alongside an overlay-based credential theft mechanism.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

By abusing the Android accessibility service, threat actors can steal every UI element on the screen, alongside an overlay-based credential theft mechanism.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

GoldDigger makes use of a sophisticated packer called "dpt-shell" to obfuscate its code and resources in an attempt to resist analysis.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The current GoldDigger campaign mainly impersonates airline companies and shopping retailers

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

GoldDigger makes use of a sophisticated packer called "dpt-shell" to obfuscate its code and resources in an attempt to resist analysis.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

detecting if Frida is attached to the process and, if so, crashing it; preventing external debuggers from attaching by marking itself as being traced using the PTRACE system call.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

the Android malware can display full-screen "system update" overlays to conceal its background actions and deploy an invisible transparent overlay to capture touch and harvest PIN codes.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

capture credentials entered on banking apps using fake overlays

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

GoldDigger makes use of a sophisticated packer called "dpt-shell" to obfuscate its code and resources in an attempt to resist analysis.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

detecting if Frida is attached to the process and, if so, crashing it; preventing external debuggers from attaching by marking itself as being traced using the PTRACE system call.

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

collect contacts and SMS messages

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

the Android malware can display full-screen "system update" overlays to conceal its background actions and deploy an invisible transparent overlay to capture touch and harvest PIN codes.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

capture credentials entered on banking apps using fake overlays

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

The malware abuses accessibility services to monitor user activity, capture credentials, and interact with banking applications while operating with limited visibility to the victim.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

record audio and video and stream it using the RTMP protocol to the C2 server

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

record audio and video and stream it using the RTMP protocol to the C2 server

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

ToxicPanda 2.0 connects to its command-and-control (C2) server by sending an initial HTTPS request to establish a bidirectional WebSocket communication channel

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

GoldDigger can also give the operator real-time access to the victim's screen

Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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the hacker newsNews · Aug 20, 2026ToxicPanda 2.0 and GoldDigger Expand Android Banking Attacks with On-Device FraudAndroid banking trojan used for on-device fraud. It abuses accessibility permissions to inject input into banking apps, initiate fraudulent transactions, capture credentials with fake overlays, provide real-time screen access, collect contacts and SMS, record audio/video, and communicate with C2 over WebSocket.Read more ↗zimperium blogNews · Aug 18, 2026GoldDigger Malware Demonstrates Advanced Mobile Banking ThreatsAndroid malware family that steals financial information and enables fraud on compromised devices. It abuses accessibility services to monitor user activity, capture credentials, and interact with banking applications while remaining minimally visible to the victim.Read more ↗ibmNews · Aug 11, 2026Striking gold: Inside the GoldDigger Android malware | IBMAndroid financial malware capable of running a targeted app inside an isolated virtual environment on command from its command-and-control server. This enables interception and modification of the targeted app's API calls, bypassing detection mechanisms, spoofing device identifiers or account information, and intercepting credentials and sensitive data in real time.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Feb 28, 2026Android - Latest News, Reports & Analysis | The Hacker NewsCustom mobile malware family used by the GoldFactory cybercrime group; specific functionality not described in the provided excerpt.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.