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Mallory
Malware

VenomSoftX

Tracked since Dec 4, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

This multi-stage stealer exhibits interesting hiding capabilities, concealed as small PowerShell scripts on a single line in the middle of otherwise innocent-looking large log files.

Persistence

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

the malware tries to tamper with API requests the sites use for several actions like money withdrawal or sending security codes

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

This multi-stage stealer exhibits interesting hiding capabilities, concealed as small PowerShell scripts on a single line in the middle of otherwise innocent-looking large log files.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The extension disguises itself as various popular browser extensions to avoid user detection.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

the malware tries to tamper with API requests the sites use for several actions like money withdrawal or sending security codes

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The extension contains several files... webpack_content.js... monitors two input elements for content the user fills into websites... The only file that differs from the rest is webpack_block.js... It also modifies the getter of the password field to steal entered passwords.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

It also modifies the getter of the password field to steal entered passwords. Once the request to the API endpoint is sent, the wallet address is extracted from the request, bundled with the password, and sent to the collector as a base64-encoded JSON via MQTT.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The malicious extension provides full access to every page the victim visits... steals credentials and clipboard content

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

the malware tries to tamper with API requests the sites use for several actions like money withdrawal or sending security codes

Collection

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The extension contains several files... webpack_content.js... monitors two input elements for content the user fills into websites... The only file that differs from the rest is webpack_block.js... It also modifies the getter of the password field to steal entered passwords.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

It also modifies the getter of the password field to steal entered passwords. Once the request to the API endpoint is sent, the wallet address is extracted from the request, bundled with the password, and sent to the collector as a base64-encoded JSON via MQTT.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

ViperSoftX searches for cryptocurrencies stored locally on the infected device in cryptocurrency software and browser extensions, and monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses to perform clipboard swapping.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

The malicious extension provides full access to every page the victim visits, carries out man-in-the-browser attacks to perform cryptocurrency addresses swapping by tampering with API requests’ data on popular cryptocurrency exchanges.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The gathered data... is then concatenated together into a single string, encoded by base64, and sent to the hardcoded C&C server in the User-Agent HTTP header.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The first variant is a simple dropper that downloads another payload from a hardcoded C&C server and executes it.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

The sent data are structured as follows... and sent to an MQTT broker

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The gathered data, as well as the fingerprint, is then concatenated together into a single string, encoded by base64, and sent to the hardcoded C&C server in the User-Agent HTTP header.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.