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Malware

Symbiote

Tracked since Dec 4, 2025 · Updated 6 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Rootkit
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injection
Platforms
Linux

Symbiote is a Linux user-space rootkit and backdoor with credential-stealing capabilities, first detected in November 2021 and associated with attacks targeting the financial sector in Latin America. It is implemented as a malicious ELF shared library loaded into dynamically linked processes through dynamic-linker preloading rather than operating as a standalone executable. This mechanism supports persistence and allows the malware to interpose functions in libc, PAM, and libpcap.

Symbiote conceals files, processes, malicious library activity, and network connections by manipulating directory enumeration and filtering system information returned to applications. It also intercepts the attachment of classic Berkeley Packet Filter programs and prepends instructions that exclude selected malicious traffic from packet captures. These techniques compromise the visibility of dynamically linked administration and monitoring tools without requiring a traditional kernel-module rootkit.

The malware harvests authentication credentials through PAM hooks and intercepts terminal input from SSH and SCP processes through a hooked read function. Analyzed samples encrypt captured credentials with RC4, stage them locally, and exfiltrate them in chunks through crafted DNS requests. Symbiote also modifies PAM authentication behavior to accept an attacker-controlled password, providing covert access and enabling privileged command execution. Its initial infection vector and attribution to a specific threat actor are not established.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The malware hooks the following functions: fopen, fopen64, pam_authenticate, pam_set_item, read, readdir, readdir64, and recvmsg.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence5

Dynamic Linker Hijacking occurs when an attacker manipulates the linking process to redirect execution flow. This can involve altering the library search order through LD_PRELOAD, modifying configuration files like /etc/ld.so.conf, or tampering with cached library mappings in /etc/ld.so.cache.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence1

The "magic packet" concept (TCP SYN with a window of 54321) is a form of traffic signaling to activate the passive C2.

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

Symbiote leverages its rootkit capabilities for remote access to the machine by hooking Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) functions and bypassing the authentication mechanism with a hardcoded password match.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence6

Rootkits are a type of malware used by threat actors to gain complete control over a compromised resource and hide malicious activity.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Stripping binaries and appending a single null byte significantly degraded static detections; limited XOR string/configuration encoding and lightweight packing were also used.

T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence1

The "magic packet" concept (TCP SYN with a window of 54321) is a form of traffic signaling to activate the passive C2.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The malware hides processes and files that are used during the activity by implementing two functions called hidden_proc and hidden_file. It can also hide network connections based on a list of ports

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

When /proc/net/tcp is passed into the malicious library’s open() function, it parses the file contents... the malware will not write the specific entry containing the remote IP address or local port... Finally, the malicious library’s open() function returns a file descriptor for the modified file, concealing the manipulation from the victim.

T1564.008Email Hiding RulesEvidence1

Symbiote uses BPF to hide malicious network traffic on infected systems... Symbiote first adds its bytecode so that it can filter the network traffic it wants to hide.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The malware hooks the following functions: fopen, fopen64, pam_authenticate, pam_set_item, read, readdir, readdir64, and recvmsg.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence5

Dynamic Linker Hijacking occurs when an attacker manipulates the linking process to redirect execution flow. This can involve altering the library search order through LD_PRELOAD, modifying configuration files like /etc/ld.so.conf, or tampering with cached library mappings in /etc/ld.so.cache.

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

Symbiote leverages its rootkit capabilities for remote access to the machine by hooking Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) functions and bypassing the authentication mechanism with a hardcoded password match.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Thanks to it loading first, it can hijack imports from other library files uploaded for the application. Symbiote uses this to hide its presence on the machine by connecting the libc and libpcap functions.

T1686Disable or Modify System FirewallEvidence1

the early BPFdoor installed a Berkeley Packet Filter inside the Linux kernel that inspected incoming network traffic. When a specially crafted “magic packet” containing a predefined byte sequence arrived at the correct port, the backdoor would activate and spawn a shell. Because the system never actually opened a port, tools such as netstat, ss, or nmap saw nothing unusual.

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

This unconventional Linux malware abuses Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) functionality to inspect network traffic directly inside the kernel, and passively listens for specially crafted network packets

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Symbiote ... harvest[s] credentials by hooking libc's read function and checking whether the process that is calling it is ssh or scp. OrBit hooks functions in libc, libpcap, and PAM to harvest credentials.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

If an SSH or SCP process is calling the libc read function, then hook_read is set to keylogger... The malware constructs a string with the following structure “<getaddrlist result>|<log_cmd_line result>|pw_5673”

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The malware’s purpose is to steal credentials from the SSH and SCP processes by hooking the libc read function. | The process expects that the item_type value is equal to 0x6 ( PAM_AUTHTOK ), which is the authentication token (usually it’s a password)

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

Symbiote leverages its rootkit capabilities for remote access to the machine by hooking Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) functions and bypassing the authentication mechanism with a hardcoded password match.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

After infecting running processes on the system, Symbiote provides its operators with rootkit functionalities, in addition to remote access and credential collection capabilities.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

In the function named getaddrlist, the ELF binary extracts a linked list of structures containing the network interfaces of the local machine using the getifaddrs method... The interfaces IP addresses are concatenated together

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware calls the pam_get_item method in order to obtain the following information: ... PAM_USER – the username.

T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

This unconventional Linux malware abuses Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) functionality to inspect network traffic directly inside the kernel, and passively listens for specially crafted network packets

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The ELF binary retrieves information about a process from the “/proc/<pid>/status” file... The purpose of this function is to compare two process names

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

In the sendlinedns function, the malware obtains information about the current kernel using the uname method.

Collection

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Symbiote ... harvest[s] credentials by hooking libc's read function and checking whether the process that is calling it is ssh or scp. OrBit hooks functions in libc, libpcap, and PAM to harvest credentials.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

If an SSH or SCP process is calling the libc read function, then hook_read is set to keylogger... The malware constructs a string with the following structure “<getaddrlist result>|<log_cmd_line result>|pw_5673”

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1

The malicious process creates a file called “/usr/include/linux/usb/usb.h”... The encrypted credentials are written to the file created above

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.004DNSEvidence1

The encrypted credentials are hex-encoded and splitted to be exfiltrated via DNS requests to a domain owned by the threat actor.

T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence1

The "magic packet" concept (TCP SYN with a window of 54321) is a form of traffic signaling to activate the passive C2.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

The extracted credentials are encrypted using RC4, stored in a file on the system, and then exfiltrated to the C2 server via DNS requests.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.