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Malware1 associated actor

CreepyDrive

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

CreepyDrive is a custom PowerShell backdoor associated with the POLONIUM activity cluster, a cyberespionage actor assessed as Lebanon-based and linked to coordination with actors affiliated with Iran’s MOIS. The implant is designed to abuse trusted cloud services for covert command-and-control and data theft, primarily using Microsoft OneDrive through the Microsoft Graph API, with some reporting also noting Dropbox-based tasking. By reading and writing tasking and response data through a victim-accessible cloud storage account over HTTPS, CreepyDrive blends malicious traffic with normal Office 365 and OneDrive activity and complicates network-based detection.

The malware supports bidirectional command-and-control, execution of PowerShell code, file upload from compromised hosts, file download to victim systems, and exfiltration of collected data to cloud storage. Reported tradecraft includes use of PowerShell cmdlets for web retrieval and execution, as well as abuse of legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate to OneDrive. This combination of trusted SaaS infrastructure, legitimate API usage, and valid authentication material provides both operational flexibility and defense evasion benefits.

CreepyDrive has been used in intrusions targeting organizations in Israel across sectors including engineering, information technology, law, communications, media, insurance, and social services. It fits POLONIUM’s broader pattern of modular espionage tooling focused on intelligence collection rather than disruptive or destructive effects. Within that ecosystem, CreepyDrive serves as a cloud-backed implant for persistent remote access, command execution, file transfer, and exfiltration on Windows systems.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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POLONIUM

POLONIUM’s toolset consists of seven custom backdoors: CreepyDrive, which abuses OneDrive and Dropbox cloud services for C&C.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

For example, the CreepyDrive malware uses Cloud services for command and control purposes, likely in an attempt to evade detection by making malicious traffic look legitimate.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

POLONIUM has developed at least six backdoors and several other malicious modules.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1199Trusted RelationshipEvidence1

Detecting command-and-control that lives on a trusted SaaS platform is one of the harder problems in detection engineering, because the malicious traffic and the legitimate traffic terminate at the same hostname, use the same TLS, and use the same API.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence7

[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use Powershell for execution, including the cmdlets `Invoke-WebRequest` and `Invoke-Expression`.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence5

[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can specify the local file path to upload files from.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1550.001Application Access TokenEvidence4

[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate with OneDrive.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can upload files to C2 from victim machines.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Bug 2: URL encoding The rule matches literal / and : characters. Percent-encoding those (%2F, %3A) means the raw logged string no longer matches...

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

CreepyDrive, is a OneDrive-based implant associated with the POLONIUM activity cluster. It reads and writes C2 tasking and exfil through the Microsoft Graph API against a normal user’s OneDrive, so from the network’s perspective it looks like Office 365. | It reads and writes C2 tasking and exfil through the Microsoft Graph API against a normal user’s OneDrive, so from the network’s perspective it looks like Office 365.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence11

[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use HTTPS for C2 using the Microsoft Graph API.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

T1102Web ServiceEvidence3

The adversaries had communicated to both Dropbox and Pastebin. APT28 has used Google Drive for C2. APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence7

[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use OneDrive for C2.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can download files to the compromised host.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

CreepySnail, CreepyDrive and some of POLONIUM’s reverse shell modules use base64-encoded commands to communicate with the C&C server.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

It reads and writes C2 tasking and exfil through the Microsoft Graph API against a normal user’s OneDrive...

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

It reads and writes C2 tasking and exfil through the Microsoft Graph API against a normal user’s OneDrive...

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence9

[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use cloud services including OneDrive for data exfiltration.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.