CreepyDrive
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
CreepyDrive is a custom PowerShell backdoor associated with the POLONIUM activity cluster, a cyberespionage actor assessed as Lebanon-based and linked to coordination with actors affiliated with Iran’s MOIS. The implant is designed to abuse trusted cloud services for covert command-and-control and data theft, primarily using Microsoft OneDrive through the Microsoft Graph API, with some reporting also noting Dropbox-based tasking. By reading and writing tasking and response data through a victim-accessible cloud storage account over HTTPS, CreepyDrive blends malicious traffic with normal Office 365 and OneDrive activity and complicates network-based detection.
The malware supports bidirectional command-and-control, execution of PowerShell code, file upload from compromised hosts, file download to victim systems, and exfiltration of collected data to cloud storage. Reported tradecraft includes use of PowerShell cmdlets for web retrieval and execution, as well as abuse of legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate to OneDrive. This combination of trusted SaaS infrastructure, legitimate API usage, and valid authentication material provides both operational flexibility and defense evasion benefits.
CreepyDrive has been used in intrusions targeting organizations in Israel across sectors including engineering, information technology, law, communications, media, insurance, and social services. It fits POLONIUM’s broader pattern of modular espionage tooling focused on intelligence collection rather than disruptive or destructive effects. Within that ecosystem, CreepyDrive serves as a cloud-backed implant for persistent remote access, command execution, file transfer, and exfiltration on Windows systems.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
POLONIUM’s toolset consists of seven custom backdoors: CreepyDrive, which abuses OneDrive and Dropbox cloud services for C&C.
Techniques & procedures
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
For example, the CreepyDrive malware uses Cloud services for command and control purposes, likely in an attempt to evade detection by making malicious traffic look legitimate.
POLONIUM has developed at least six backdoors and several other malicious modules.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Detecting command-and-control that lives on a trusted SaaS platform is one of the harder problems in detection engineering, because the malicious traffic and the legitimate traffic terminate at the same hostname, use the same TLS, and use the same API.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use Powershell for execution, including the cmdlets `Invoke-WebRequest` and `Invoke-Expression`.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can specify the local file path to upload files from.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate with OneDrive.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
Collection
1 technique
Collection
[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can upload files to C2 from victim machines.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
Bug 2: URL encoding The rule matches literal / and : characters. Percent-encoding those (%2F, %3A) means the raw logged string no longer matches...
CreepyDrive, is a OneDrive-based implant associated with the POLONIUM activity cluster. It reads and writes C2 tasking and exfil through the Microsoft Graph API against a normal user’s OneDrive, so from the network’s perspective it looks like Office 365. | It reads and writes C2 tasking and exfil through the Microsoft Graph API against a normal user’s OneDrive, so from the network’s perspective it looks like Office 365.
[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use HTTPS for C2 using the Microsoft Graph API.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
The adversaries had communicated to both Dropbox and Pastebin. APT28 has used Google Drive for C2. APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.
[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use OneDrive for C2.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can download files to the compromised host.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
CreepySnail, CreepyDrive and some of POLONIUM’s reverse shell modules use base64-encoded commands to communicate with the C&C server.
Exfiltration
3 techniques
Exfiltration
It reads and writes C2 tasking and exfil through the Microsoft Graph API against a normal user’s OneDrive...
It reads and writes C2 tasking and exfil through the Microsoft Graph API against a normal user’s OneDrive...
[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) can use cloud services including OneDrive for data exfiltration.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
Observables
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.