Malware

Exaramel for Linux

Exaramel for Linux is a Linux backdoor associated with the Exaramel malware family. It supports encrypted configuration handling, uses HTTPS for command-and-control communications, and includes command-and-control resiliency by attempting to locate an alternate server when communication errors occur. The malware performs basic host reconnaissance by executing whoami to identify the current user or system owner. It also includes cleanup functionality that can remove its persistence mechanism and delete its configuration data, indicating support for self-maintenance and anti-forensic cleanup. The observed behavior is consistent with a Linux-focused remote access implant designed for post-compromise control, host profiling, and resilient operator communications.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques

T1053.003CronEvidence1

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

Persistence

3 techniques

T1053.003CronEvidence1

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques

T1053.003CronEvidence1

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

T1548.001Setuid and SetgidEvidence1

Stealth

4 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence7

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors deleting files, directories, droppers, logs, scripts, temporary files, exfiltrated archives, and uninstalling themselves to cover tracks or reduce forensic artifacts.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence6

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat groups that 'decrypt', 'decode', 'deobfuscate', 'unpack', or 'decompress' payloads, strings, configuration data, shellcode, and files prior to execution or use.

Discovery

1 technique

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the victim username, identifying logged-in users, running whoami, query user, quser, or similar commands to determine the current user or user sessions.

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence2

APT41 used the Steam community page as a fallback mechanism for C2. Bazar has the ability to use an alternative C2 server if the primary server fails. BISCUIT malware contains a secondary fallback command and control server that is contacted after the primary command and control server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

9 SOURCESView more in app

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 25, 2022

System Owner/User Discovery, Technique T1033 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Linux backdoor that runs whoami to identify the system owner.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Technique T1140 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Linux backdoor that decrypts its configuration file.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

System Owner/User Discovery, Technique T1033 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Runs whoami to identify the system owner.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion, Sub-technique T1070.004 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Linux backdoor that can remove persistence and delete its configuration file.

+5 more in the timeline

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping13

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Exaramel for Linux