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Malware1 associated actor

FatDuke

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Windows

FatDuke is a Windows backdoor used by the Dukes, also known as APT29 and Cozy Bear, in the Operation Ghost espionage campaign. It served as the third-stage implant in a multistage platform that also included PolyglotDuke, RegDuke, and MiniDuke. Operation Ghost targeted diplomatic organizations, including ministries of foreign affairs in several European countries and the Washington, DC embassy of a European Union country.

FatDuke provides extensive post-compromise functionality and flexible configuration. It can execute PowerShell scripts, enumerate running processes, identify the compromised computer’s MAC address, and copy local files and directories. It establishes persistence through Windows Registry autorun entries. Its command-and-control communications use AES encryption, support internal proxying, and employ multiple servers per targeted organization for redundancy. It can retrieve the default browser’s user-agent string and reuse it to make malicious traffic resemble the legitimate user’s browsing activity.

FatDuke incorporates substantial obfuscation using opaque predicates and has been frequently recompiled to evade detection. It also supports secure deletion of its own DLL to remove forensic artifacts. The Dukes compartmentalized Operation Ghost infrastructure by avoiding reuse of command-and-control infrastructure across different victim organizations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT29

(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used numerous pieces of malware that were likely developed for or by the group, including SUNBURST, SUNSPOT, Raindrop, and TEARDROP.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence T1053 Scheduled Task The Dukes use Scheduled Task to launch malware at startup.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Execution T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter .001: PowerShell .003: Windows Command Shell .005: Visual Basic .006: Python .009: Cloud API

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence8

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has the ability to execute PowerShell scripts.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1106Native APIEvidence5

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can call <code>ShellExecuteW</code> to open the default browser on the URL localhost.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Execution T1129 Execution through Module Load Some of their malware load DLL using LoadLibrary Windows API.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence T1053 Scheduled Task The Dukes use Scheduled Task to launch malware at startup.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has used <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence T1053 Scheduled Task The Dukes use Scheduled Task to launch malware at startup.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has used <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can use base64 encoding, string stacking, and opaque predicates for obfuscation.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has been regularly repacked by its operators to create large binaries and evade detection.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1027.016Junk Code InsertionEvidence3

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has been packed with junk code and strings.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1036.012Browser FingerprintEvidence3

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has attempted to mimic a compromised user's traffic by using the same user agent as the installed browser.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Defense Evasion T1070: Indicator Removal .001: Clear Windows Event Logs .004: File Deletion .006: Timestomp .008: Clear Mailbox Data

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence9

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can secure delete its DLL.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence9

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can decrypt AES encrypted C2 communications.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence3

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can execute via rundll32.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence3

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can turn itself on or off at random intervals.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

Discovery

9 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence6

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can get user agent strings for the default browser from <code>HKCU\Software\Classes\http\shell\open\command</code>.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can identify the MAC address on the target computer.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

"REvil can identify the username, machine name..."; "FatDuke can collect the user name, Windows version..."

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

Discovery T1049 System Network Connections Discovery The Dukes can execute commands like net use to gather information on network connections.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence8

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can list running processes on the localhost.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence11

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can collect the user name, Windows version, computer name, and available space on discs from a compromised host.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can enumerate directories on target machines.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Discovery T1135 Network Share Discovery The Dukes can list network shares.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence3

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can turn itself on or off at random intervals.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence7

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can copy files and directories from a compromised host.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence1

Collection T1025 Data from Removable Media The Dukes can collect files on removable drives.

T1039Data from Network Shared DriveEvidence1

Collection T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive The Dukes can collect files on shared drives.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence5

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has used several C2 servers per targeted organization.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Command and Control T1071 Standard Application Layer Protocol The Dukes are using HTTP and HTTPS protocols to communicate with the C&C server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence7

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can be controlled via a custom C2 protocol over HTTP.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Command and Control T1090 Connection Proxy The Dukes can communicate to the C&C server via proxy. They also use named pipes as proxies when a machine is isolated within a network and does not have direct access to the internet.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence3

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can used pipes to connect machines with restricted internet access to remote machines via other infected hosts.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) can AES encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel The Dukes use the C&C channel to exfiltrate stolen data.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.