Pisloader is a Windows malware family used for command-and-control operations and host reconnaissance. Observed behavior includes establishing persistence through a Registry Run key, collecting the victim system's IP address, and spawning a command shell for remote tasking. It uses cmd.exe as part of its persistence setup and command execution workflow. Pisloader communications have been noted for using Base32-encoded command-and-control responses, indicating an effort to obfuscate traffic. It has also been associated with DNS tunneling tradecraft, reflecting use of covert application-layer communications to exchange data and instructions. The available evidence supports characterization as a backdoor-oriented implant focused on maintaining access, basic host discovery, and remote command execution on Windows systems.
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11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Numerous entries state malware can create a remote shell or reverse shell, for example 4H RAT, BLACKCOFFEE, DarkComet, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and others. | The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using cmd.exe, the Windows command shell, to execute commands, launch payloads, run batch files, and automate actions on compromised hosts.
DarkTortilla can use cmd.exe to add registry keys for persistence. HeartCrypt can use the reg add command via cmd.exe for Registry modification. Ryuk has used cmd.exe to create a Registry entry to establish persistence.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all, netsh.exe, ifconfig, arp, route, nbtstat, and related APIs/commands to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, routing, ARP, and adapter information.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."
ATT&CK Ⓡ does not have an explicit technique assigned for DNS Tunneling; instead, it identifies this technique as a sub-technique of Command and Control Over Application Layer Protocol, described as follows: “Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.”
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Includes a command to collect victim IP addresses.
Backdoor with a command to collect the victim's IP address.
Malware that establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.
Malware whose command-and-control server responses are Base32-encoded.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.