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Malware1 associated actor

Pisloader

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

Pisloader is a Windows remote-access trojan and variant of HTTPBrowser used by the China-linked Wekby threat group, also known as APT18 and Dynamite Panda. It was identified in a 2016 cyberespionage campaign targeting a U.S.-based organization. Its supported commands include collecting the victim's IP address and spawning a command shell.

Pisloader uses DNS tunneling for command-and-control communication, periodically sending beacons to a hardcoded server and receiving Base32-encoded commands through DNS TXT records. It validates response formatting and ignores replies that do not match its expected structure. This use of DNS helps disguise malicious communications within ordinary network traffic. The payload also employs return-oriented programming techniques for obfuscation.

Observed deployment involved malware delivered over HTTP and a dropper that decrypted embedded payload data with single-byte XOR, wrote the payload to disk, and executed it. Persistence is established through a Windows Registry-based autorun mechanism configured using the Windows command shell.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT18

The Wekby APT group targeted US-based organizations using malware dubbed ‘pisloader,’ described as a variant of the HTTPBrowser RAT that uses DNS requests for command-and-control communications.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) uses cmd.exe to set the Registry Run key value. It also has a command to spawn a command shell.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

DarkTortilla can use cmd.exe to add registry keys for persistence. HeartCrypt can use the reg add command via cmd.exe for Registry modification. Ryuk has used cmd.exe to create a Registry entry to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) obfuscates files by splitting strings into smaller sub-strings and including "garbage" strings that are never used. The malware also uses return-oriented programming (ROP) technique and single-byte XOR to obfuscate data.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

DarkTortilla can use cmd.exe to add registry keys for persistence. HeartCrypt can use the reg add command via cmd.exe for Registry modification. Ryuk has used cmd.exe to create a Registry entry to establish persistence.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) has a command to collect the victim's IP address.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence11

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) has a command to collect victim system information, including the system name and OS version.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) has commands to list drives on the victim machine and to list file information for a given directory.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.004DNSEvidence4

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) uses DNS as its C2 protocol.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) has a command to upload a file to the victim machine.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence3

ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

Responses from the [Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) C2 server are base32-encoded.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.