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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

TAINTEDSCRIBE

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs30Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Windows

TAINTEDSCRIBE is a modular Windows backdoor associated with North Korean government-linked HIDDEN COBRA activity and Lazarus Group. It operates as a beaconing implant that contacts command-and-control infrastructure, retrieves an additional command-processing module, transmits victim information, and waits for operator tasking. Its capabilities include downloading, uploading, deleting, and executing files; providing Windows command-shell access; creating and terminating processes; and enumerating compromised systems. It can discover running processes and local system time, compress files for exfiltration over its command-and-control channel, and modify file timestamps.

The implant establishes persistence by copying itself into the current user's Startup folder and masquerades as Microsoft's Narrator screen reader. Its communications use FakeTLS session authentication to resemble legitimate TLS traffic, followed by TLS-like packet headers enclosing data encrypted with a linear feedback shift register algorithm. It supports randomly selecting among configured, hard-coded command-and-control endpoints and retrying another endpoint after a 60-second delay when a connection fails. These mechanisms support persistent remote control, data theft, and continued post-compromise operations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The two Trojans, PebbleDash and TaintedScribe are beaconing implants that can be used to exfiltrate information, download additional malicious content and execute commands on infected devices. CopperHedge is a variant of the Manuscrypt RAT and is a remote access tool that can be used to run arbitrary commands...

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can enable Windows CLI access and execute files.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can copy itself into the current user’s Startup folder as “Narrator.exe” for persistence.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can copy itself into the current user’s Startup folder as “Narrator.exe” for persistence.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Once the FakeTLS handshake is complete, all further packets use a FakeTLS header, followed by LFSR encrypted data.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence3

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can execute <code>FileRecvWriteRand</code> to append random bytes to the end of a file received from C2.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

The [TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) main executable has disguised itself as Microsoft’s Narrator.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence9

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can delete files from a compromised host.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence4

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can change the timestamp of specified filenames.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence4

The [TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) command and execution module can perform target system enumeration.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence8

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can execute <code>ProcessList</code> for process discovery.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence7

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence10

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can use <code>DirectoryList</code> to enumerate files in a specified directory.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence5

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can execute <code>GetLocalTime</code> for time discovery.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can use <code>DriveList</code> to retrieve drive information.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence5

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) has used <code>FileReadZipSend</code> to compress a file and send to C2.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationEvidence3

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) has used FakeTLS for session authentication.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence4

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can randomly pick one of five hard-coded IP addresses for C2 communication; if one of the IP fails, it will wait 60 seconds and then try another IP address.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The malware utilizes a “FakeTLS” scheme in an attempt to obfuscate its network communications. It picks a random URL from a list to use in the TLS certificate. The sample and the C2 externally appear to perform a standard TLS authentication... | This report looks at a full-featured beaconing implant... These samples uses FakeTLS for session authentication and for network encryption utilizing a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) algorithm.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can download additional modules from its C2 server.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) uses a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) algorithm for network encryption.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The two Trojans, PebbleDash and TaintedScribe are beaconing implants that can be used to exfiltrate information... CopperHedge is a variant of the Manuscrypt RAT ... and exfiltrate data.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

30 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching30Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.