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Mallory
Malware5 associated actors

SodaMaster

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs52Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingReconnaissanceDefense evasionPost exploitationDLL sideloadingProcess injectionPersistence
Delivery
Exploit kit
Platforms
Windows
Also known asDARKTOWNDelfsCakedfls

SodaMaster, also known as DelfsCake, dfls, and HEAVYPOT, is a memory-resident remote access trojan and backdoor for Windows used in cyberespionage operations. It is closely associated with the China-linked APT10/Cicada intrusion set and the A41APT campaign, with documented use since at least 2020. It has also been deployed by FishMonger during Operation FishMedley, so its use is not exclusive to APT10. Campaigns deploying SodaMaster have targeted Japanese companies and their overseas branches, as well as government bodies, NGOs, religious organizations, and organizations in the telecommunications, legal, and pharmaceutical sectors across Asia, Europe, and North America.

SodaMaster collects host information, including the username, computer name, operating-system details, process identifier, and privilege information, and can enumerate running processes. It receives and executes additional payloads from command-and-control servers. Version 3 expanded its functionality to include Outlook credential theft, screenshot capture, keylogging, and execution of DLLs and shellcode. Its communications use a hardcoded RSA public key to protect initial beacon data and RC4 for subsequent traffic. Earlier versions perform VMware-related Registry checks and can delay execution to hinder sandbox analysis; version 3 removed virtual-machine detection. Samples have also used falsified compilation timestamps.

SodaMaster is commonly deployed after attackers have obtained access to a network, including in campaigns involving compromised VPN infrastructure and Microsoft Exchange servers. Deployment chains have used SigLoader/DESLoader and HUI Loader to decrypt and execute the implant in memory. Associated loaders abuse legitimate executables through DLL side-loading and inject decrypted payloads into suspended Windows processes. Some SodaMaster loaders establish persistence through Windows services.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Earth Tengshe

Earth Tengshe used custom malware, such as SigLoader, SodaMaster, P8RAT, FYAnti, and Jackpot.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
A41APT

SigLoader and SodaMaster are still used in 2021... SodaMaster Evolution... Command List of SodaMaster Version 3

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
BlackTech

SodaMaster — Aka. DelfsCake, dfls, HEAVYPOT ▪ One of DESLoader's payloads ▪ Fileless RAT ▪ Command identifiers are d, f, l and s

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
menuPass

SodaMaster — Aka. DelfsCake, dfls, HEAVYPOT ▪ One of DESLoader's payloads ▪ Fileless RAT ▪ Command identifiers are d, f, l and s

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
Earth Lusca

SodaMaster is a backdoor that was documented by Kaspersky in 2021. APT10 was the first group known to have access to this backdoor but Operation FishMedley indicates that it may now be shared among multiple China-aligned APT groups.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

FishMonger bought domains and used them for C&C traffic.

T1583.004ServerEvidence1

FishMonger rented servers at several hosting providers.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Penetrate via internet-facing system by using vulnerabilities or stolen credentials ... The actor always intruded via Internet-facing systems ... Intrusion via VPN Devices ... Using known vulnerabilities ... Pulse Connect Secure ... FortiGate: CVE-2018-13379 ... Cisco AnyConnect: CVE-2020-3125 ... Exploiting ProxyShell vulnerability

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Install malware by using Taskscheduler ... In A41APT campaign, scheduled tasks are favor to be used

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

なお、コマンド「d」に関しては、コマンドの受信時のデータを使用してライブラリのロードと関数アドレスの取得を行い、その関数をCall命令で呼び出します。

T1072Software Deployment ToolsEvidence1

At Victim D, the attackers gained access to an admin console and used it to deploy implants on other machines in the local network.

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can use <code>RegOpenKeyW</code> to access the Registry.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The attackers also exploit the legitimate VLC Media Player by launching a custom loader via the VLC Exports function

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Install malware by using Taskscheduler ... In A41APT campaign, scheduled tasks are favor to be used

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

SodaMaster can use RegOpenKeyW to access the Registry.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Some SodaMaster loaders persist via a Windows service.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Install malware by using Taskscheduler ... In A41APT campaign, scheduled tasks are favor to be used

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Execution Flow of HUI Loader ... XOR decode & code injection ... svchost.exe

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Some SodaMaster loaders persist via a Windows service.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can use "stackstrings" for obfuscation.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Execution Flow of HUI Loader ... XOR decode & code injection ... svchost.exe

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

Decrypt multiple PEs and shellcodes sequentially in multiple stages. Multiple algorithms are used for decryption. Finally, the payload is executed in memory.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

It is a fileless malware that is capable of multiple functions, including evading detection in a sandbox by checking for a registry key or delaying execution

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can check for the presence of the Registry key <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\Applications\\VMwareHostOpen.exe</code> before proceeding to its main functionality.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence4

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) has the ability to put itself to "sleep" for a specified time.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The attackers also exploit the legitimate VLC Media Player by launching a custom loader via the VLC Exports function

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

その後、復号したペイロードをメモリ領域に展開し実行します。

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

SodaMaster can use RegOpenKeyW to access the Registry.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Following tools were found in the lateral movement stage ... Mimikatz ... secretdump.py ... Command List of SodaMaster Version 3 ... c Steals credentials of Outlook

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Command List of SodaMaster Version 3 ... q Enables key logging ... r Disables key logging

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

They have an export named getAllAuthData that implements a password stealer for Firefox. It reads the Firefox SQLite database and runs the query SELECT encryptedUsername, encryptedPassword, hostname,httpRealm FROM moz_logins .

Discovery

7 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence7

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) has the ability to query the Registry to detect a key specific to VMware.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence8

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can identify the username on a compromised host.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence9

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can search a list of running processes.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence14

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can enumerate the host name and OS version on a target system.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

It is a fileless malware that is capable of multiple functions, including evading detection in a sandbox by checking for a registry key or delaying execution

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can check for the presence of the Registry key <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\Applications\\VMwareHostOpen.exe</code> before proceeding to its main functionality.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence4

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) has the ability to put itself to "sleep" for a specified time.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

At Victim F, the implants were delivered using Impacket... At Victim F, the operators also used Impacket to move laterally.

T1072Software Deployment ToolsEvidence1

At Victim D, the attackers gained access to an admin console and used it to deploy implants on other machines in the local network.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Command List of SodaMaster Version 3 ... q Enables key logging ... r Disables key logging

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Command List of SodaMaster Version 3 ... m Collects screenshot

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

最終的に実行されるペイロード(DelfsCake)は、DLL形式で、C2サーバからデータやペイロードなどを受信して実行する機能を有します。

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) has the ability to download additional payloads from C2 to the targeted system.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence1

Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding (T1132.002)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can use RC4 to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) can use a hardcoded RSA key to encrypt some of its C2 traffic.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Search for secret information, exfiltrate after encryption and compression ... The first data sent to SodaMaster C2

Indicators of compromise

Observables

52 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

27 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching52Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping34Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.