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Malware1 associated actor

MESSAGETAP

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Defense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Linux

MESSAGETAP is a Linux ELF information-stealing implant used by APT41, also known as Winnti or Barium, to selectively intercept SMS communications within telecommunications operators’ infrastructure. Publicly disclosed by FireEye in October 2019, it was discovered on Linux servers operating as Short Message Service Centers (SMSCs). Its surveillance capabilities enable collection of targeted individuals’ message content and associated communications metadata without compromising their mobile devices.

MESSAGETAP uses libpcap to monitor traffic entering and leaving a compromised server, parse protocol layers, and extract SMS content and routing metadata. It filters messages using configured telephone numbers, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers, and keywords, then stores matching messages locally in CSV files for subsequent theft. The implant XOR-decodes its targeting configuration, loads it into memory, and deletes the configuration files from disk to reduce forensic artifacts.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT41

(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

Once loaded into memory, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) deletes the keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt configuration files from disk. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence10

After checking for the existence of two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) XOR decodes and read the contents of the files. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1040Network SniffingEvidence6

[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP and finally extracts SMS message data and routing metadata. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

Discovery

3 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence6

[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP and finally extracts SMS message data and routing metadata. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence3

After loading the keyword and phone data files, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) begins monitoring all network connections to and from the victim server. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence6

[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) checks for the existence of two configuration files (keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt) and attempts to read the files every 30 seconds.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

Collection

4 techniques
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence4

[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) checks two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, for instructions on how to target and save data parsed and extracted from SMS message data from the network traffic. If an SMS message contained either a phone number, IMSI number, or keyword that matched the predefined list, it is saved to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

T1560.003Archive via Custom MethodEvidence3

[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) has XOR-encrypted and stored contents of SMS messages that matched its target list. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The centerpiece is a server-oriented Linux kernel rootkit that hooks netfilter traffic control functions in order to enable firewall-traversing covert C2 (command-and-control) communications.

Mallory platform

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.