MESSAGETAP
- Type
- Infostealer
- Capabilities
- Defense evasionReconnaissance
- Platforms
- Linux
MESSAGETAP is a Linux ELF information-stealing implant used by APT41, also known as Winnti or Barium, to selectively intercept SMS communications within telecommunications operators’ infrastructure. Publicly disclosed by FireEye in October 2019, it was discovered on Linux servers operating as Short Message Service Centers (SMSCs). Its surveillance capabilities enable collection of targeted individuals’ message content and associated communications metadata without compromising their mobile devices.
MESSAGETAP uses libpcap to monitor traffic entering and leaving a compromised server, parse protocol layers, and extract SMS content and routing metadata. It filters messages using configured telephone numbers, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers, and keywords, then stores matching messages locally in CSV files for subsequent theft. The implant XOR-decodes its targeting configuration, loads it into memory, and deletes the configuration files from disk to reduce forensic artifacts.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)
Techniques & procedures
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
Once loaded into memory, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) deletes the keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt configuration files from disk. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
After checking for the existence of two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) XOR decodes and read the contents of the files. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP and finally extracts SMS message data and routing metadata. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP and finally extracts SMS message data and routing metadata. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
After loading the keyword and phone data files, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) begins monitoring all network connections to and from the victim server. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) checks for the existence of two configuration files (keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt) and attempts to read the files every 30 seconds.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) checks two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, for instructions on how to target and save data parsed and extracted from SMS message data from the network traffic. If an SMS message contained either a phone number, IMSI number, or keyword that matched the predefined list, it is saved to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) has XOR-encrypted and stored contents of SMS messages that matched its target list. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
The centerpiece is a server-oriented Linux kernel rootkit that hooks netfilter traffic control functions in order to enable firewall-traversing covert C2 (command-and-control) communications.
Recent activity
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.