MESSAGETAP is a Linux ELF information-stealing implant used by APT41, also known as Winnti or Barium, to selectively intercept SMS communications within telecommunications operators’ infrastructure. Publicly disclosed by FireEye in October 2019, it was discovered on Linux servers operating as Short Message Service Centers (SMSCs). Its surveillance capabilities enable collection of targeted individuals’ message content and associated communications metadata without compromising their mobile devices.
MESSAGETAP uses libpcap to monitor traffic entering and leaving a compromised server, parse protocol layers, and extract SMS content and routing metadata. It filters messages using configured telephone numbers, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers, and keywords, then stores matching messages locally in CSV files for subsequent theft. The implant XOR-decodes its targeting configuration, loads it into memory, and deletes the configuration files from disk to reduce forensic artifacts.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
MESSAGETAP - Infostealer discovered by FireEye on a telecommunications company’s Linux servers. These servers operate as a Short Message Service Center (SMSC), which routed SMS messages to recipients. The malware was designed to steal SMS traffic and it was also tied to the Winnti group.
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Once loaded into memory, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) deletes the keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt configuration files from disk. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
After checking for the existence of two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) XOR decodes and read the contents of the files. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP and finally extracts SMS message data and routing metadata. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP and finally extracts SMS message data and routing metadata. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
After loading the keyword and phone data files, [MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) begins monitoring all network connections to and from the victim server. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) checks for the existence of two configuration files (keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt) and attempts to read the files every 30 seconds.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) checks two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, for instructions on how to target and save data parsed and extracted from SMS message data from the network traffic. If an SMS message contained either a phone number, IMSI number, or keyword that matched the predefined list, it is saved to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor.(Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
[MESSAGETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0443) has XOR-encrypted and stored contents of SMS messages that matched its target list. (Citation: FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019)
The centerpiece is a server-oriented Linux kernel rootkit that hooks netfilter traffic control functions in order to enable firewall-traversing covert C2 (command-and-control) communications.
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.