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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Torisma

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 17 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Torisma is a Windows surveillance implant developed and used by the North Korean state-sponsored Lazarus Group during Operation Dream Job. It serves as a selectively deployed second-stage payload, with both 32-bit and 64-bit variants. Its delivery infrastructure restricts deployment to compromised hosts whose IP addresses have been allowlisted by the operators, following initial reconnaissance and victim selection.

Torisma monitors infected systems for newly connected drives and remote desktop connections. It collects local network information, including MAC and IP addresses, and retrieves the current system time. It can transmit victim data to operator-controlled command-and-control servers. Its communications use Base64 encoding and encryption involving XOR and VEST-32, while payload packing adds obfuscation.

Associated infection chains begin with spearphishing emails carrying malicious Microsoft Word documents, including recruitment-themed lures. Document macros deploy an initial reconnaissance implant before selected victims receive Torisma. These campaigns have targeted research, defense, and financial or payments organizations, with substantial observed activity in India and additional targeting in other countries.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used Torisma to actively monitor for new drives and remote desktop connections on an infected system.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations. For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group developed custom tools such as Sumarta, DBLL Dropper, Torisma, and DRATzarus for their operations.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence3

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) has used various Windows API calls.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

A subsequent LoadLibraryA loads dropped dll ... These instructions result in executing the dropped library.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Malware maintain persistence through Start menu folder ... \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\thumbnail.lnk

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

On function return, a new shortcut (lnk) is created under ... \Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\thumbnail.lnk

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Malware maintain persistence through Start menu folder ... \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\thumbnail.lnk

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

On function return, a new shortcut (lnk) is created under ... \Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\thumbnail.lnk

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) has been packed with Iz4 compression.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence4

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) has been Base64 encoded and AES encrypted.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence7

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) has used XOR and Base64 to decode C2 data.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1480Execution GuardrailsEvidence3

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) is only delivered to a compromised host if the victim's IP address is on an allow-list.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

Discovery

8 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence7

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) can collect the local MAC address using `GetAdaptersInfo` as well as the system's IP address.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence3

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) can use `WTSEnumerateSessionsW` to monitor remote desktop connections.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Performing Processes Enumeration

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

Examples include: "Babuk can enumerate disk volumes," "Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives," and "XAgentOSX contains the getInstalledAPP function to run ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed."

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

"Babuk can enumerate disk volumes, get disk information"; "Ryuk has called GetLogicalDrives ... and GetDriveTypeW"; "Cuba can enumerate local drives, disk type, and disk free space"; "Chimera ... fsutil fsinfo drives"

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence4

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) can collect the current time on a victim machine.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) can use `GetlogicalDrives` to get a bitmask of all drives available on a compromised system. It can also use `GetDriveType` to determine if a new drive is a CD-ROM drive.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The collected information is then compressed and encrypted.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Communications make use of HTTP protocol and POST method.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence6

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) has encoded C2 communications with Base64.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) has encrypted its C2 communications using XOR and VEST-32.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) can send victim data to an actor-controlled C2 server.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.