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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors3 associated CVEs

LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionPost exploitationReconnaissance
Platforms
LinuxNetwork device

LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA is a stealthy backdoor used to maintain access to compromised enterprise network appliances, particularly Ivanti Connect Secure VPN devices. It has been deployed by UNC5325, a suspected China-nexus cyberespionage actor, during exploitation of Ivanti vulnerabilities, including CVE-2024-21893 chained with CVE-2024-21887. The backdoor supports SSL-encrypted communications using the compromised appliance’s web-server private key, SOCKS proxying, and standalone operation through a Unix-domain socket.

Its persistence mechanisms include appending malicious components to an archive in the appliance’s factory-reset partition. These modifications are intended to preserve access across upgrades, patches, and factory resets; observed Ivanti persistence attempts failed because the malware did not account for an encryption-key mismatch.

A backdoor discovered on a Palo Alto Networks firewall following exploitation of CVE-2024-9474 was assessed as associated with LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA. That implementation masquerades as a legitimate logging service, modifies startup and upgrade handling, and injects a library into nginx to intercept incoming connections. It recognizes operator traffic through a distinctive handshake, reuses an existing listening port, and encrypts communications using the appliance’s management-interface certificate. Its command set provides interactive shell access, file reading and writing, host-information retrieval, multi-node routing, network tunneling, and SOCKS5-style proxying over the backdoor network. Some tunneling functions were incomplete or nonfunctional in the analyzed implementation.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-9474via northwaveExploited in the wildRoot Privilege Escalation in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS Management Web InterfaceA suspected nation state threat actor gained entry to a Palo Alto network device through CVE-2024-9474, shortly after details of the vulnerability were made public.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-21893via mandiant threat intelligenceExploited in the wildUnauthenticated SAML SSRF in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTAMandiant observed ... development of a mitigation bypass exploit targeting CVE-2024-21893 ... The mitigation bypass is now tracked as CVE-2024-21893. It is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (CS), Policy Secure (PS), and Neurons for Zero Trust Access (NZTA) appliances... Mandiant identified active exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 by UNC5325 as early as Jan. 19, 2024... threat actors chaining the SSRF vulnerability with ... CVE-2024-21887...View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-21887via mandiant threat intelligenceCommand Injection in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureMandiant has identified UNC5325 using a combination of living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques to better evade detection, while deploying novel malware such as LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA in an attempt to persist across system upgrades, patches, and factory resets.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
UNC5325

Mandiant has identified UNC5325 using a combination of living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques to better evade detection, while deploying novel malware such as LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA in an attempt to persist across system upgrades, patches, and factory resets.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
UNC3886

Mandiant has identified UNC5325 using a combination of living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques to better evade detection, while deploying novel malware such as LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA in an attempt to persist across system upgrades, patches, and factory resets.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"Mandiant identified active exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 by UNC5325... targeting... Ivanti Connect Secure appliances."

Persistence

3 techniques
T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence1

"...deploying novel malware such as LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA in an attempt to persist across system upgrades, patches, and factory resets."

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence3

[LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1121) can initialize itself as a daemon to run persistently in the background.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryEvidence3

[LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1121) can append malicious components to the `tmp/tmpmnt/bin/samba_upgrade.tar` archive inside the factory reset partition in attempt to persist post reset.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence3

[LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1121) can initialize itself as a daemon to run persistently in the background.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Stealth

1 technique
T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence1

"...deploying novel malware such as LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA in an attempt to persist across system upgrades, patches, and factory resets."

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"...modified the appliance's settings in order to evade detection and attempt to maintain persistence."

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5

[LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1121) can check the type of Ivanti VPN device it is running on by executing `first_run()` to identify the first four bytes of the motherboard serial number.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3

[LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1121) can monitor for system upgrade events by checking for the presence of `/tmp/data/root/dev`.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1090ProxyEvidence4

[LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1121) has the ability to function as a SOCKS proxy.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1090.004Domain FrontingEvidence1

Aria-body has the ability to use a reverse SOCKS proxy module... BADHATCH can use SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 proxies... GoBear implements SOCKS5 proxy functionality... Neo-reGeorg has the ability to establish a SOCKS5 proxy... Remcos uses the infected hosts as SOCKS5 proxies...

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

[LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1121) can function as a stand-alone backdoor communicating over the `/tmp/clientsDownload.sock` socket.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1121) can communicate over SSL using the private key from the Ivanti Connect Secure web server.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.