UNC5325 is a suspected China-nexus cyber espionage actor associated with exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure vulnerabilities in early 2024, including CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887. The actor has been linked to zero-day and mitigation-bypass activity against Ivanti appliances and has been observed using living-off-the-land techniques, open-source tooling, custom malware, and appliance configuration changes to evade detection and establish persistence. UNC5325 deployed multiple malware families and components, including LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA, PITSTOP, PITDOG, PITJET, and PITHOOK. Its tradecraft included attempts to maintain access across upgrades, patches, and factory resets, indicating a strong focus on durable post-compromise persistence on edge infrastructure. Reported persistence attempts were not successful in observed cases because of a malware logic issue involving encryption key mismatch, but the activity demonstrated deliberate efforts to survive remediation. The actor is assessed as espionage-motivated and China-linked. Malware-code and TTP overlaps have been identified between UNC5325 tooling, particularly LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA and PITHOOK, and malware associated with UNC3886. This supports a moderate-confidence assessment that UNC5325 is associated with UNC3886. UNC3886 has been known for intrusions against network devices and for targeting defense industrial base, technology, and telecommunications organizations, which provides additional context for UNC5325’s likely operational alignment. Observed UNC5325 activity centered on compromising Ivanti Connect Secure appliances, including use of a mitigation bypass for CVE-2024-21893 and chaining of vulnerabilities to obtain unauthenticated access and command execution. The actor’s use of stealthy post-exploitation methods and persistence-oriented malware on perimeter devices is consistent with a sophisticated espionage operator focused on covert access.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
4 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
Mandiant's previous blog post... details zero-day exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 by a suspected China-nexus espionage actor that Mandiant tracks as UNC5325... UNC5330 has been observed chaining CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 to compromise Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Feb. 2024.
Since the initial disclosure of CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 on Jan. 10, 2024... Mandiant's previous blog post details zero-day exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887... UNC5337 is suspected to exploit CVE-2023-46805 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2024-21887 (command injection) for infecting Ivanti Connect Secure appliances.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.