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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

ADVSTORESHELL

Also known asAZZYEVILTOSSNETUISedreco

ADVSTORESHELL is a Windows backdoor associated with APT28 (Fancy Bear/Sofacy/Sednit), a Russian state-linked espionage group publicly tied in the provided content to GRU Unit 26165. It is also referenced by the aliases Azzy and EVILTOSS; however, the content most consistently names the malware as ADVSTORESHELL. The malware appeared in APT28’s toolkit by 2013 and was used in broader espionage operations targeting governments, defense, diplomatic, NATO-related, and other geopolitical targets. The content notes that attackers often paired related APT28 tooling such as X-Agent, Sedreco, and X-Tunnel in intrusions.

Documented capabilities include remote command execution with output staged to a .dat file in the %TEMP% directory, exfiltration over the same channel used for command and control, listing connected devices, enumerating Windows Registry keys, setting and deleting Registry values, and deleting files and directories. ADVSTORESHELL can establish persistence; some variants do so by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object, and the content also notes use of rundll32.exe in a Registry value for persistence.

For communications, ADVSTORESHELL connects to a C2 server over HTTP using the WinINet API, specifically to port 80, and exchanges data via HTTP POST requests. Its C2 traffic is encrypted and then Base64-encoded. The content further states that a variant encrypts some C2 communications with RSA. Prior to exfiltration, ADVSTORESHELL encrypts data with the 3DES algorithm using a hardcoded key.

High-confidence behavioral details from the content include local staging of command output in %TEMP% as .dat files, encrypted and Base64-encoded C2 traffic, RSA use in some variants, 3DES protection of exfiltrated data, Registry enumeration and modification, connected-device discovery, file and directory deletion, and persistence via Shell Icon Overlay handler COM registration.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

The attackers then upgraded valuable targets to the X-Agent backdoor, often pairing it with the Sedreco loader and the X-Tunnel network pivot.

via sekoia blogblog.sekoia.io
APT32

ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys.

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
APT29

“...full-fledged espionage backdoors such as Xagent and Sedreco...”

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Among other things, it uses zero-day exploits, spear phishing and malware to compromise targets.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Figure 2. Main attack methods and malware used by the Sednit group since 2014... Email attachments

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Together with the help of above mentioned tools, the group gained access to the file system and registry; enumerate network resources; create processes... | It used a downloader tool that FireEye dubbed " SOURFACE ", a backdoor labelled " EVILTOSS " that gives hackers remote access and a flexible modular implant called " CHOPSTICK " to enhance functionality of the espionage software.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.' | Many entries explicitly state malware 'can create a reverse shell' or 'launch a remote shell,' including 4H RAT, AuditCred, BLACKCOFFEE, Carbanak, DarkComet, Exaramel for Windows, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and ZxShell.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

Together with the help of above mentioned tools... execute shellcode...

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

A Sedreco plugin comes as a Windows DLL with two exported functions named Init and UnInit. The plugin is loaded in the same address space as Sedreco’s payload with a call to the Windows API LoadLibraryA.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

we have observed other methods, like registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

we have observed other methods, like registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

A Sedreco plugin comes as a Windows DLL with two exported functions named Init and UnInit. The plugin is loaded in the same address space as Sedreco’s payload with a call to the Windows API LoadLibraryA.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

Xagent is a modular backdoor with spying functionalities such as keystroke logging and file exfiltration... RemoteKeylogger 0x1002 Logs keystrokes

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Together with the help of above mentioned tools... access stored credentials...

Discovery

8 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

17 List connected devices

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Together with the help of above mentioned tools, the group gained access to the file system and registry; enumerate network resources...

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

5 List directories ... 22 List files and directories

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

20 Map network resources

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

Xagent is a modular backdoor with spying functionalities such as keystroke logging and file exfiltration... RemoteKeylogger 0x1002 Logs keystrokes

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The source code contains two different channel implementations, one over HTTP and one over email... HttpChannel::getRawPacket() method is implemented as a HTTP GET request... sendRawPacket() is an HTTP POST request.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The attackers then upgraded valuable targets to the X-Agent backdoor, often pairing it with the Sedreco loader and the X-Tunnel network pivot.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

33 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
17 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
16 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching33

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Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.