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Malware3 associated actors

RainyDay

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK41Techniques
IOCs29Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloading
Platforms
Windows

RainyDay is a Windows remote access trojan and backdoor used by Naikon in cyber-espionage operations targeting military organizations in Southeast Asia. It was incorporated into Naikon’s toolkit from September 2020 during an operation spanning June 2019 to March 2021. It provides remote control of compromised hosts and supports deployment of additional payloads and tools, including the Nebulae backdoor.

RainyDay supports file manipulation and bidirectional transfer, command-shell execution, process enumeration and termination, service manipulation, and screenshot capture. It communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over TCP and HTTP, switching protocols when a channel fails, and supports RC4-encrypted communications. Its execution chain uses legitimate applications to side-load a malicious DLL, which decrypts an XOR-obfuscated payload and executes the backdoor in memory. Deployment has involved self-extracting archives or manual placement of the loading components; these mechanisms do not establish the original initial-access vector.

RainyDay establishes persistence through Windows services and scheduled tasks. Its defensive measures include process protection, concealment of service activity, and masquerading as legitimate software. It can uninstall itself by deleting its service and associated files. Operators have used RainyDay to execute tools that extract local passwords, cached domain credentials, and browser-stored credentials, deploy scanners and reverse proxies, and facilitate lateral movement. Associated file-collection tools monitor local and remote drives for changed documents, stage selected files, and upload them to Dropbox.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Naikon

RainyDayは、ファイル操作、シェルコマンドの実行、プロセス操作、スクリーンキャプチャなどの機能を備えたRATであり、C2通信にTCPおよびHTTPプロトコルを使用します。

via lac watchlac.co.jp
Lotus Blossom

The new variant's features overlap with both the RainyDay and Turian backdoors...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Firefly

Rainyday: A backdoor associated with the Firefly group (aka Naikon).

via symantec blogsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use scheduled tasks to achieve persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

CMD_MAJOR_CMD — Cmd shell

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use the Windows Command Shell for execution.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1106Native APIEvidence4

The file collection tool used by [RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can utilize native API including <code>ReadDirectoryChangeW</code> for folder monitoring.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002)

T1574.001DLLEvidence5

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use side-loading to run malicious executables.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use scheduled tasks to achieve persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion Run /v narsris

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use services to establish persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Once loaded, the tool tries to assign to the registry key value named contom under the Run key the file path of the executable

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use scheduled tasks to achieve persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use services to establish persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Once loaded, the tool tries to assign to the registry key value named contom under the Run key the file path of the executable

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

the config section that appears to be obfuscated by XOR-ing with the 0x2D value.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence4

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) has downloaded as a XOR-encrypted payload.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

The findings reveal their strategy to remain stealthy by mimicking legitimate applications that are running on individual infected machines.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) has named services and scheduled tasks to appear benign including "ChromeCheck" and "googleupdate."(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence5

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) has used names to mimic legitimate software including "vmtoolsd.exe" to spoof Vmtools.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) has the ability to uninstall itself by deleting its service and files.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence8

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can decrypt its payload via a XOR key.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1574.001DLLEvidence5

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use side-loading to run malicious executables.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion Run /v narsris

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

a sample of QuarksPwDump that certainly was used by RainyDay in order to obtain local passwords and domain cached credentials.

T1003.002Security Account ManagerEvidence1

OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager (T1003.002)

T1003.005Cached Domain CredentialsEvidence1

obtain local passwords and domain cached credentials.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence9

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use tools to collect credentials from web browsers.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1555.004Windows Credential ManagerEvidence3

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use the QuarksPwDump tool to obtain local passwords and domain cached credentials.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

Discovery

3 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence4

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can create and register a service for execution.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence8

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can enumerate processes on a target system.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence10

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use a file exfiltration tool to collect recently changed files with specific extensions.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence7

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use a file exfiltration tool to collect recently changed files on a compromised host.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use a file exfiltration tool to copy files to <code>C:\ProgramData\Adobe\temp</code> prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence7

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) has the ability to capture screenshots.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence4

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) has the ability to switch between TCP and HTTP for C2 if one method is not working.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

attackers can also send RainyDay commands over TCP or HTTP...

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use HTTP in C2 communications.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1090ProxyEvidence4

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use proxy tools including boost_proxy_client for reverse proxy functionality.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence2

"APT41 used a tool called CLASSFON to covertly proxy network communications." / "BADCALL functions as a proxy server between the victim and C2 server." / "Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic..."

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence6

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use TCP in C2 communications.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can download files to a compromised host.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use RC4 to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Downloading and uploading files from and to C&C

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence5

[RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) can use a file exfiltration tool to upload specific files to Dropbox.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

29 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

51 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching29Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping41Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.