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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

yty

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK33Techniques
IOCs50Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

YTY is a modular Windows backdoor framework used by Donot Team, also known as APT-C-35 and SectorE02, for cyberespionage and sensitive-data collection. Its deployment chain consists of downloaders that ultimately install a minimally functional backdoor responsible for downloading and executing additional components. YTY-derived variants include Gedit and DarkMusical. Campaigns have targeted government, military, foreign affairs, and diplomatic organizations, primarily in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, as well as these countries’ embassies abroad.

YTY is delivered through spearphishing emails carrying malicious Microsoft Office documents. An observed campaign used a Kashmir-themed document exploiting CVE-2017-8570 to execute a downloader and deploy the framework. Persistence is established through Windows scheduled tasks. Analyzed implementations include C++ downloaders, a C# backdoor, and separate collection plugins.

The framework supports keylogging, periodic screenshot capture, document discovery, and file exfiltration. Collection components enumerate fixed disks, record document metadata, and upload selected documents and outputs from other plugins to command-and-control servers. Reconnaissance includes collecting usernames, computer names, operating-system details, network configuration, domain information, running processes, and remote-system information using native Windows utilities such as tasklist, ipconfig, and net view.

YTY components retrieve command-and-control configuration from Google-hosted documents and retain hardcoded fallback addresses. Analyzed versions use AES-encrypted communications and reversed, Base64-encoded strings; earlier versions communicated in plaintext.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-8570via qianxin ti centerExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office Object-Handling Remote Code Execution发现的样本是名为kahsmir issue abida.doc的漏洞利用文档……最后通过CVE-2017-8570触发执行释放的恶意脚本,再通过脚本执行释放的EXE文件。View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DoNot

近期我们再次跟踪到该团伙利用较新的Office Nday漏洞发起的新的攻击活动,并对攻击中使用的yty框架最新的恶意代码进行了详细分析。

via qianxin ti centerti.qianxin.com
SECTOR02

ESET researchers have traced several campaigns that leverage Windows malware derived from the group’s signature yty malware framework. The main purpose of the “yty” malware framework is to collect and exfiltrate data.

via eseteset.com
DoNot APT

DoNot APT is known for using custom-built Windows malware, including backdoors like YTY and GEdit, often delivered through spear-phishing emails or malicious documents.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

According to ESET telemetry, Donot Team has been consistently targeting the same entities with waves of spearphishing emails every two to four months.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

According to ESET telemetry, Donot Team has been consistently targeting the same entities with waves of spearphishing emails every two to four months. The spearphishing emails have malicious Microsoft Office documents attached that the attackers use to deploy their malware.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command <code>SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR “ + path_file + “/ST 09:30“</code>.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malicious framework consists of a chain of downloaders that ultimately download a backdoor with minimal functionality, used to download and execute further components of Donot Team’s toolset.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

“To load the next stage they leverage Microsoft Office macros... Once macros are enabled, the Document_open routine executes...”

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

“...RTF files exploiting Equation Editor vulnerability...”

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command <code>SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR “ + path_file + “/ST 09:30“</code>.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command <code>SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR “ + path_file + “/ST 09:30“</code>.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“The function injects a shellcode (32-bit/64-bit) into the process memory and invokes it.”

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“...downloads from [1] to [3], modifies 3 first bytes back to their original form. This technique is used to evade security solutions and keep them from scanning the executable.”

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) packs a plugin with UPX.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1027.016Junk Code InsertionEvidence3

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) contains junk code in its binary, likely to confuse malware analysts.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“The function injects a shellcode (32-bit/64-bit) into the process memory and invokes it.”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

“Before the execution of the payload, the shellcode decrypts itself... followed by xor with a two-byte key, which changes between stages.”

T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

“...remote template injection... When the RTF document is opened, it tries to fetch a malicious remote template from its C2...”

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

“Before it does so, it creates a mutex to avoid multiple instances running at the same time...”

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) has some basic anti-sandbox detection that tries to detect Virtual PC, Sandboxie, and VMware. (Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence5

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) uses a keylogger plugin to gather keystrokes.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

Discovery

10 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) runs <code>ipconfig /all</code> and collects the domain name.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence4

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) uses the <code>net view</code> command for discovery.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence8

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) collects the victim’s username.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) gets an output of running processes using the <code>tasklist</code> command.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence13

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) gathers the computer name, CPU information, Microsoft Windows version, and runs the command <code>systeminfo</code>.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) gathers information on victim’s drives and has a plugin for document listing.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) has some basic anti-sandbox detection that tries to detect Virtual PC, Sandboxie, and VMware. (Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

“Next, the shellcode checks for security solutions by validating the existence of their drivers’ .sys, located under C:\Windows\System32\drivers.”

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) gathers the the serial number of the main disk volume.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence7

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) collects files with the following extensions: .ppt, .pptx, .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .docm, .rtf, .inp, .xlsm, .csv, .odt, .pps, .vcf and sends them back to the C2 server.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence5

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) uses a keylogger plugin to gather keystrokes.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence7

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) collects screenshots of the victim machine.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“...fetch a malicious remote template from its C2 by sending an HTTP GET request... The first message to the server is sent as a POST request...”

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

The adversaries had communicated to both Dropbox and Pastebin. APT28 has used Google Drive for C2. APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence4

[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) communicates to the C2 server by retrieving a Google Doc.(Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)

T1102.003One-Way CommunicationEvidence1

"Comnie uses blogs and third-party sites (GitHub, tumbler, and BlogSpot) to avoid DNS-based blocking"; "Revenge RAT used blogpost.com as its primary command and control server"; "Turla JavaScript backdoor has used Google Apps Script as its C2 server"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The malicious framework consists of a chain of downloaders that ultimately download a backdoor with minimal functionality, used to download and execute further components of Donot Team’s toolset.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

These include file collectors based on file extension and year of creation, screen capturers, keyloggers, reverse shells, and more.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

50 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

36 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching50Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping33Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.