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Malware1 associated actor

PUNCHTRACK

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK5Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows
Also known asPSVC

PUNCHTRACK is a point-of-sale memory-scraping malware family associated with FIN8 and used to steal payment card data from compromised retail payment environments. Its core function is to inspect process memory for data matching payment card track formats, extract that information, and aggregate the collected records locally prior to exfiltration. Reported tradecraft includes writing harvested card data to temporary files for staging. FIN8 has also used obfuscation and Windows Management Instrumentation to remotely launch PUNCHTRACK, reflecting operational emphasis on stealth and defense evasion during deployment inside victim networks. The malware is primarily associated with financially motivated intrusions targeting organizations that process payment cards, especially point-of-sale systems in retail and hospitality environments.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN8

(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

[PUNCHTRACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0197) is loaded and executed by a highly obfuscated launcher.(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The content references collection of credential material from local systems, including "Bumblebee can capture and compress stolen credentials from the Registry and volume shadow copies," "GALLIUM collected ... password hashes from the SAM hive in the Registry," and "Windigo has used a script to gather credentials in files left on disk by OpenSSH backdoors."

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence6

[PUNCHTRACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0197) scrapes memory for properly formatted payment card data.(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[PUNCHTRACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0197) aggregates collected data in a tmp file.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)

Mallory platform

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping5Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.