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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Fysbis

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
KeyloggingPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Linux

Fysbis is a modular Linux backdoor used by Sofacy, also known as APT28 or Sednit, in cyberespionage operations. It forms part of the Russia-linked group's tooling for compromising Linux systems; Sofacy's broader targeting includes government and defense organizations, particularly in Eastern Europe. Fysbis implements plug-in and controller modules as distinct classes and exists as both 32-bit and 64-bit ELF binaries, with analyzed samples dating from late 2014 through late 2015.

The malware supports remote shell functionality, keylogging, discovery of running processes, and file deletion. It can install and establish persistence with or without root privileges, allowing operation under an ordinary user account. It disguises itself as legitimate synchronization, desktop notification, or system services. Fysbis communicates with command-and-control infrastructure and can Base64-encode its traffic. Later analyzed variants use a rolling double-XOR algorithm to obfuscate installation details and command-and-control configuration. Its relatively simple implementation nevertheless provides effective remote access and surveillance capabilities on compromised Linux systems.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

Drovorub, Fysbis, Downdelph, ADVSTORESHELL

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence3

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has the ability to create and execute commands in a remote shell for CLI.(Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence3

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has established persistence using a systemd service.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesEvidence3

If executing without root privileges, [Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) adds a `.desktop` configuration file to the user's `~/.config/autostart` directory.(Citation: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence3

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has established persistence using a systemd service.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesEvidence3

If executing without root privileges, [Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) adds a `.desktop` configuration file to the user's `~/.config/autostart` directory.(Citation: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

...the most recent ELF 64-bit binary... demonstrated minor evolution of the threat, most notably in terms of obfuscation... the referenced byte mask is applied to the other byte arrays using a rolling double-XOR algorithm to construct malware installation paths, filenames, and descriptions... The same masking method is also used by the binary to decode malware configuration C2 information...

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has been encrypted using XOR and RC4.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has masqueraded as the rsyncd and dbus-inotifier services.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has masqueraded as trusted software rsyncd and dbus-inotifier.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has the ability to delete files.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

...we can see the binary installation path and local reconnaissance to determine which flavor of Linux the malware is running.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) can perform keylogging.(Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)

Discovery

4 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) can collect information about running processes.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence12

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has used the command <code>ls /etc | egrep -e"fedora\*|debian\*|gentoo\*|mandriva\*|mandrake\*|meego\*|redhat\*|lsb-\*|sun-\*|SUSE\*|release"</code> to determine which Linux OS version is running.(Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) has the ability to search for files.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

...we can see the binary installation path and local reconnaissance to determine which flavor of Linux the malware is running.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Figure 3: Sofacy Fysbis stripped binary string references to RemoteShell capability ... Figure 4: Sofacy Fysbis non-stripped binary strings referenes to RemoteShell capability

Collection

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) can perform keylogging.(Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

C2 azureon-line[.]com (TCP/80) ... 198.105.125[.]74 (TCP/80) ... mozilla-plugins[.]com (TCP/80) | C2 azureon-line[.]com (TCP/80) ... C2 198.105.125[.]74 (TCP/80) ... C2 mozilla-plugins[.]com (TCP/80) ... The oldest sample... was found to beacon to the domain azureon-line[.]com... The first of the newer samples... beacons to an IP also widely associated with the Sofacy group... The newest sample... introduces a previously unknown command and control beacon to mozilla-plugins[.]com.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence3

ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) can use Base64 to encode its C2 traffic.(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

For comparison, if we were to inspect Fysbis “RemoteShell” associated strings...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.