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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

Flagpro

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK40Techniques
IOCs19Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

Flagpro, also known as BUSYICE, is a Windows downloader with backdoor functionality used by the China-linked cyberespionage group BlackTech, also tracked as BRONZE CANAL, Earth Hundun, and Red Djinn. It serves as an early-stage implant for profiling compromised environments and downloading and executing additional malware, including BTSDoor. Confirmed targeting includes Japanese organizations in the defense, media, and telecommunications sectors.

Flagpro is typically delivered through tailored spearphishing emails impersonating legitimate business communications. Attachments include malicious macro-enabled Excel documents, often enclosed in password-protected ZIP or RAR archives. Enabling the macros deploys the executable and establishes persistence through Windows startup-folder execution. Flagpro supports operating-system command execution and has been used to discover the current user, network configuration, remote systems, and network shares. It can retrieve and decrypt saved Microsoft WinInet credentials from the Windows Credential Store and exfiltrate credentials and command results.

Command-and-control communication uses HTTP through Internet Explorer COM objects and the IWebBrowser2 interface, with Base64-encoded commands and returned data. Flagpro periodically polls for instructions and can download and execute second-stage payloads. It recognizes localized Windows Security dialogs associated with Japanese, Taiwanese, and English-language environments and suppresses security or Internet Explorer dialogs to conceal external communications. An MFC-based variant identified as version 2.0 adds enhanced dialog handling and code obfuscation.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BRONZE CANAL

BRONZE CANAL ... Tools ... Bifrose, Deuterbear, DRIGO, Flagpro, Gh0stTimes, KIVARS, PLEAD, Spiderpig, Waterbear, XBOW

via secureworkssecureworks.com
BlackTech

2021: dropping FlagPro ... The downloader can perform C2 via the IWebBrowser2 interface and execute basic commands ... Flagpro can download and execute a backdoor.

via vblocalhostvblocalhost.com
Earth Hundun

BUSYICE (aka Flagpro) • BUSYICE is HTTP client written in C/C++, which works as both backdoor/downloader

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

40 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584.001DomainsEvidence1

A sophisticated hacking group tied to the government of China is exploiting routers in attacks on a variety of organizations... The group specifically targets “branch routers” — smaller appliances used at more remote branch offices to connect to a corporate headquarters.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Open directory containing Consock, new malware Flagpro and folders of router exploits ... Exploits for known CVEs in routers, cloud platforms, and databases

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence10

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been distributed via spearphishing as an email attachment.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

BlackTech sends an email to the target, spoofing the address of a legitimate company.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malicious macros embedded in the Excel document are almost an exact copy of the code seen in the PWC report.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence8

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can use `cmd.exe` to execute commands received from C2.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence9

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can execute malicious VBA macros embedded in .xlsm files.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1106Native APIEvidence3

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can use Native API to enable obfuscation including `GetLastError` and `GetTickCount`.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence9

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has relied on users clicking a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence11

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has dropped an executable file to the startup directory.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Specifically, upon gaining an initial foothold into a target network and gaining administrator access to network edge devices, BlackTech cyber actors often modify the firmware to hide their activity across the edge devices to further maintain persistence in the network.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence11

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has dropped an executable file to the startup directory.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been delivered within ZIP or RAR password-protected archived files.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

"Bumblebee has been delivered as password-protected zipped ISO files" / "Flagpro has been delivered within ZIP or RAR password-protected archived files." / "TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents."

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can download malicious files with a .tmp extension and append them with .exe prior to execution.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can close specific Windows Security and Internet Explorer dialog boxes to mask external connections.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence2

In Flagpro v2.0, the same codes... are repeatedly inserted to hide important as a handy obfuscation technique.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Flagpro can close specific Windows Security and Internet Explorer dialog boxes to mask external connections.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Specifically, upon gaining an initial foothold into a target network and gaining administrator access to network edge devices, BlackTech cyber actors often modify the firmware to hide their activity across the edge devices to further maintain persistence in the network.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Flagpro can close specific Windows Security and Internet Explorer dialog boxes to mask external connections. ... HermeticWiper can disable pop-up information about folders and desktop items...

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The content references collection of credential material from local systems, including "Bumblebee can capture and compress stolen credentials from the Registry and volume shadow copies," "GALLIUM collected ... password hashes from the SAM hive in the Registry," and "Windigo has used a script to gather credentials in files left on disk by OpenSSH backdoors."

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Can read and decrypt Microsoft WinInet saved credentials ... Obtains username and password pairs

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Specifically, upon gaining an initial foothold into a target network and gaining administrator access to network edge devices, BlackTech cyber actors often modify the firmware to hide their activity across the edge devices to further maintain persistence in the network.

Discovery

10 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence4

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can check the name of the window displayed on the system.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence7

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been used to execute the <code>ipconfig /all</code> command on a victim system.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence4

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been used to execute <code>net view</code> on a targeted system.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence9

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been used to run the <code>whoami</code> command on the system.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence3

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been used to execute <code>netstat -ano</code> on a compromised host.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence6

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been used to run the <code>tasklist</code> command on a compromised system.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1069.001Local GroupsEvidence3

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been used to execute the <code>net localgroup administrators</code> command on a targeted system.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

攻撃者は最初に環境調査を行い、Flagproの動作環境が標的として適しているか調査します。適していると判断した場合、2次検体がダウンロード・実行されます。

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence4

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has been used to execute `net view` to discover mapped network shares.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence6

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can check whether the target system is using Japanese, Taiwanese, or English through detection of specific Windows Security and Internet Explorer dialog.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence5

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can collect data from a compromised host, including Windows authentication information.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

A majority of the suspicious code can be found in the DoModal function, which houses a number of calls linked to taking screenshots of the victim’s computer.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The downloader can perform C2 via the IWebBrowser2 interface and execute basic commands.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can communicate with its C2 using HTTP.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) can download additional malware from the C2 server.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence4

C&Cサーバから取得したコマンドはBase64方式でエンコードされており... 送信データはBase64方式でエンコードされ、URLパラメータの値としてC&Cサーバに送られています。

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has encoded bidirectional data communications between a target system and C2 server using Base64.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence3

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has the ability to wait for a specified time interval between communicating with and executing commands from C2.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence6

[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has exfiltrated data to the C2 server.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

19 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching19Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping40Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.