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Malware4 associated actors

Bandook

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK56Techniques
IOCs339Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissance
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

Bandook is a commercially available Windows remote access trojan used by multiple threat actors since 2007, including the Lebanon-linked cyberespionage group Dark Caracal. It provides remote access and surveillance capabilities, including keystroke logging, local-file collection, and capture and upload of desktop screenshots. It can retrieve a compromised system’s public IP address and supports command-and-control communication through raw TCP sockets. An updated variant also collects browser credentials from Chrome, Brave, and Firefox.

Bandook delivery and execution chains have used malicious document lures that persuade users to enable VBA macros, PowerShell loaders, and Delphi loaders. It has been executed through process hollowing by launching an Internet Explorer process and replacing its memory with the malicious payload. Evasion features in an updated variant include randomized command identifiers and obfuscated plugin export names, complicating analysis and signature-based detection.

Dark Caracal uses a customized version of Bandook within its espionage toolkit. In a June 2026 intrusion at a Venezuelan communications organization, Bandook was deployed alongside the GoCaracal framework through a Delphi loader. Their concurrent deployment demonstrates continued operational use of Bandook rather than its replacement by GoCaracal.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Dark Caracal

(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
Darkling APT

The group is known to leverage Bandook-based backdoors in their attacks.

via broadcombroadcom.com
Caliente Bandits

The infection chain features a PDF containing a URL that leads to an encrypted RAR file which installs Bandook malware. The group uses Spanish-languages lures to distribute a known – but infrequently used – remote access trojan (RAT) called Bandook.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
TA2721

The infection chain features a PDF containing a URL that leads to an encrypted RAR file which installs Bandook malware. The group uses Spanish-languages lures to distribute a known – but infrequently used – remote access trojan (RAT) called Bandook.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

56 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

“Their tactics include phishing, malicious websites, and trojanized mobile applications.”

T1566PhishingEvidence3

“The campaign begins with Spanish-language financial and tax lures sent through phishing emails.”

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence12

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is delivered via a malicious Word document inside a zip file.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence3

« Fichiers SVG weaponisés contenant des liens raccourcis redirigeant vers des sites d’hébergement de payloads » ; « T1566.002 — Phishing: Spearphishing Link ».

Execution

10 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence5

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) can support commands to execute Java-based payloads.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence10

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has used PowerShell loaders as part of execution.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is capable of spawning a Windows command shell.(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence7

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has used malicious VBA code against the target system.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1059.006PythonEvidence4

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) can support commands to execute Python-based payloads.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence3

Bandook can support commands to execute Java-based payloads.

T1106Native APIEvidence5

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has used the ShellExecuteW() function call.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence4

has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails... has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer... has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

The attackers use URL shorteners such as Rebrandly or Bitly in their PDF attachments. The shortened URLs redirect to cloud storage services ... from where the malware is downloaded.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence6

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has used lure documents to convince the user to enable macros.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Before the injection, a registry key is created to control the behavior of the payload. The key name is the PID of msinfo32.exe, and the value contains the control code for the payload.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence1

Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon Key name: shell Value: explorer.exe, %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.exe

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The injector component decrypts the payload in the resource table and injects it into msinfo32.exe.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence8

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has been launched by starting iexplore.exe and replacing it with [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234)'s payload.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence1

Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon Key name: shell Value: explorer.exe, %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.exe

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence6

“Sequential command identifiers ... were replaced with randomised strings, and plugin export names were obfuscated with generic labels.”

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

"Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz"; "APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium"; "Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection."

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence3

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has used .PNG images within a zip file to build the executable. (Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Figure 4: Traffic capture and AES decrypted data of the victim information.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The phishing... often took the form of an email purporting to contain an invoice or a legal document with an attachment containing a blurry image.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The injector component decrypts the payload in the resource table and injects it into msinfo32.exe.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence8

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has been launched by starting iexplore.exe and replacing it with [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234)'s payload.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence9

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has a command to delete a file.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence8

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has decoded its PowerShell script.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

JRat also employs anti-virtualization features to detect and shut down if it is being run in VirtualBox, VMware, or other virtualization software.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Before the injection, a registry key is created to control the behavior of the payload. The key name is the PID of msinfo32.exe, and the value contains the control code for the payload.

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) was signed with valid Certum certificates.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

In the meantime, Thread_Control receives coordinates and control codes from the server.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) contains keylogging capabilities.(Citation: BH Manul Aug 2016)

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

This command asks Bandook to parse cookies from the browser specified by the C2, including Chrome, Edge, and Firefox, and save the result as Default.json in a .zip file.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Selection of Bandook Commands ... ClearCred ... SignoutSkype ... ChromeInject

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Collection: file download, browser-cookie and login-database collection... The [Bandook] sample also included functionality for collecting browser credentials from Chrome, Brave, and Firefox.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has a command to get the public IP address from a system.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Bandook uses Windows API functions to discover running processes on victim’s machines.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence9

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, sw_vers -productVersion, and fsutil.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence13

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has a command to list files on a system.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence7

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) can detect USB devices.(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

JRat also employs anti-virtualization features to detect and shut down if it is being run in VirtualBox, VMware, or other virtualization software.

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) can collect information about the drives available on the system.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

Collection

8 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence6

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) can collect local files from the system .(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence2

dec.dll has a set of functions that enable spying on the victim’s machine... and of stealing information from a USB Drive.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

In the meantime, Thread_Control receives coordinates and control codes from the server.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) contains keylogging capabilities.(Citation: BH Manul Aug 2016)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence11

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is capable of taking an image of and uploading the current desktop.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence6

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has modules that are capable of capturing audio.(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)

T1125Video CaptureEvidence7

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has modules that are capable of capturing video from a victim's webcam.(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

This command asks Bandook to parse cookies from the browser specified by the C2, including Chrome, Edge, and Firefox, and save the result as Default.json in a .zip file.

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Examples include: "ChChes communicates to its C2 server over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header," "UPPERCUT has used HTTP for C2, including sending error codes in Cookie headers," and "GoldMax has used HTTPS and HTTP GET requests with custom HTTP cookies for C2."

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

First, Bandook sends victim information to its C2 server... If the C2 server is available, Bandook receives commands from the server, including *DJDSR^, @0001, @0002, and so on.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has a command built in to use a raw TCP socket.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence11

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) can download files to the system.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

Examples include 'Dark Caracal's version of Bandook communicates ... using HTTP payloads Base64 encoded,' 'BBSRAT ... send ZLIB compressed data back to the C2 server,' and 'FRAMESTING ... from decompressed zlib data within the request's POST data.'

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The commands include capabilities such as: turning on the webcam, adding or removing files from the computer, taking control of the mouse, recording the screen, starting a remote desktop session...

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has used AES encryption for C2 communication.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence9

[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) can upload files from a victim's machine over the C2 channel.(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)

T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

This information is exfiltrated to a different URL located in the global variables of the payload. In our sample this URL was: https://pronews[.]icu/gtwwfggg/get.php?action=gc1

Indicators of compromise

Observables

339 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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IOC matching339Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping56Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.