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Mallory
Malware2 associated CVEs

RobbinHood

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionDefense evasionByovdPrivilege escalation
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

RobbinHood is a Go-based ransomware family targeting Windows systems in enterprise and municipal government networks. It is associated with targeted, human-operated ransomware attacks, including the May 2019 attack on Baltimore, Maryland. The malware lacks built-in network propagation and is deployed to individual endpoints rather than autonomously spreading across network shares.

RobbinHood requires a public RSA key to be present on the target before encryption begins. It generates a unique AES key for each file, encrypts the file contents, and uses RSA to protect the AES key and original filename. It renames encrypted files and creates HTML ransom notes demanding Bitcoin payment. Before encryption, it disconnects network shares and stops services associated with security products, databases, backup software, and mail servers. It also deletes volume shadow copies, disables Windows recovery features, and clears event logs, hindering restoration and investigation.

RobbinHood operators have used bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver techniques to neutralize endpoint defenses. Observed attacks exploited CVE-2018-19320 in a legitimate, digitally signed Gigabyte driver to obtain arbitrary kernel-memory access and disable Windows driver signature enforcement. This enabled an unsigned malicious kernel driver to terminate security processes and delete their backing files, bypassing endpoint tamper protection before ransomware deployment. The technique was observed against Windows 7, Windows 8, and Windows 10.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2018-19320via the hacker newsExploited in the wildArbitrary kernel memory access in GIGABYTE GDrvBlackByte follows RobbinHood and AvosLocker, described as having weaponized bugs in gdrv.sys (CVE-2018-19320) and asWarPot.sys to terminate processes associated with endpoint protection software.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-0144via krebs on securityExploited in the wildEternalBlueMedia publications have cited sources saying the Robbinhood version that hit Baltimore city computers was powered by “Eternal Blue,” a hacking tool developed by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and leaked online in 2017... But new analysis suggests that while Eternal Blue could have been used to spread the infection, the Robbinhood malware itself contains no traces of it. | For almost the past month, key computer systems serving the government of Baltimore, Md. have been held hostage by a ransomware strain known as “Robbinhood.”View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

That would mean that the attacker would need to already have gained administrative-level access to a system on the network... moving laterally to obtain administrative privileges for a domain controller or via psexec

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

this could indicate that the payload is being pushed to each individual machine via a domain controller or through a framework like Empire PowerShell and PSExec.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[RobbinHood](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0400) uses cmd.exe on the victim's computer.(Citation: CarbonBlack RobbinHood May 2019)

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

this could indicate that the payload is being pushed to each individual machine via a domain controller or through a framework like Empire PowerShell and PSExec.

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

That would mean that the attacker would need to already have gained administrative-level access to a system on the network... moving laterally to obtain administrative privileges for a domain controller or via psexec

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence3

the adversaries deployed a legitimate, digitally signed hardware driver in order to delete security products from the targeted computers just prior to performing the destructive file encryption portion of the attack.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

That would mean that the attacker would need to already have gained administrative-level access to a system on the network... moving laterally to obtain administrative privileges for a domain controller or via psexec

Stealth

4 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

Once disabled, they can install a custom malicious kernel driver that is used to terminate antivirus and security software processes.

T1070.005Network Share Connection RemovalEvidence3

[RobbinHood](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0400) disconnects all network shares from the computer with the command <code>net use * /DELETE /Y</code>.(Citation: CarbonBlack RobbinHood May 2019)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

That would mean that the attacker would need to already have gained administrative-level access to a system on the network... moving laterally to obtain administrative privileges for a domain controller or via psexec

T1211Exploitation for StealthEvidence1

The attackers behind the RobbinHood Ransomware are exploiting a vulnerable GIGABYTE driver to install a malicious and unsigned driver into Windows that is used to terminate antivirus and security software.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence9

[RobbinHood](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0400) will search for Windows services that are associated with antivirus software on the system and kill the process.(Citation: CarbonBlack RobbinHood May 2019)

T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence1

wevtutil.exe cl Application wevtutil.exe cl Security wevtutil.exe cl System

Lateral Movement

5 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

This ransomware is not being distributed through spam but rather through other methods, which could include hacked remote desktop services or other Trojans that provide access to the attackers.

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Finally, it also important to make sure that your network does not make Remote Desktop Services publicly accessible via the Internet.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

RobbinHood disconnects all network shares from the computer using the following command: cmd.exe /c net use * /DELETE /Y

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

Media publications have cited sources saying the Robbinhood version that hit Baltimore city computers was powered by “Eternal Blue,” a hacking tool developed by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and leaked online in 2017. But new analysis suggests that while Eternal Blue could have been used to spread the infection, the Robbinhood malware itself contains no traces of it.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Stewart said in a typical breach that leads to a ransomware outbreak, the intruders will attempt to leverage a single infection and use it as a jumping-off point to compromise critical systems on the breached network that would allow the malware to be installed on a large number of systems simultaneously.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“...deploy and save public RSA key and ransomware on each machine and then execute it,” Kremez noted.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence10

[RobbinHood](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0400) will search for an RSA encryption key and then perform its encryption process on the system files.(Citation: CarbonBlack RobbinHood May 2019)

T1489Service StopEvidence6

[RobbinHood](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0400) stops 181 Windows services on the system before beginning the encryption process.(Citation: CarbonBlack RobbinHood May 2019)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence7

[RobbinHood](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0400) deletes shadow copies to ensure that all the data cannot be restored easily.(Citation: CarbonBlack RobbinHood May 2019)

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

the Twitter account could be seen posting links to documents allegedly stolen from Baltimore city government systems, ostensibly to both prove that those behind the Twitter account were responsible for the attack, and possibly to suggest what may happen to more of those documents if the city refuses to pay up

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

33 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.