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Malware1 associated actor

XAgentOSX

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationReconnaissancePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
macOS
Also known asOSX.Sofacy

XAgentOSX, also known as OSX Sofacy, is a macOS backdoor associated with APT28 (Sofacy/Fancy Bear), a Russian cyberespionage group attributed to GRU Unit 26165. It provides host reconnaissance, surveillance, credential-access, and file-execution capabilities on compromised Mac systems.

The implant identifies the operating-system version and current user, enumerates running processes, and attempts to locate Firefox passwords. Its keylogger records keystrokes and active application-window information, handles special characters, and buffers 50 characters by default before transmitting captured input through command-and-control infrastructure. It can start and stop screenshot collection using native Apple graphics APIs. XAgentOSX also executes specified files through the native NSTask launch mechanism and deletes specified files using Apple's filesystem APIs, supporting post-compromise execution and artifact removal.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

A cited report is titled “XAgentOSX: Sofacy's Xagent macOS Tool.”

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

Examples include "CookieMiner has looked for files in the user's home directory with 'wallet' in their name using find .", "Kinsing has used the find command to search for specific files", and "APT41 has executed file /bin/pwd on exploited victims."

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the execFile function to execute a specified file on the system using the NSTask:launch method.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the deletFileFromPath function to delete a specified file using the NSFileManager:removeFileAtPath method.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains keylogging functionality that will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log, it can handle special characters, and it will buffer by default 50 characters before sending them out over the C2 infrastructure.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence10

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the getFirefoxPassword function to attempt to locate Firefox passwords.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

Discovery

5 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence8

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the getInfoOSX function to return the OS X version as well as the current user.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the getProcessList function to run <code>ps aux</code> to get running processes.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence9

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the getInstalledAPP function to run <code>ls -la /Applications</code> to gather what applications are installed.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence11

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the readFiles function to return a detailed listing (sometimes recursive) of a specified directory.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017) [XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the showBackupIosFolder function to check for IOS device backups by running <code>ls -la ~/Library/Application\ Support/MobileSync/Backup/</code>.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence2

XAgentOSX 'run[s] ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed.'

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains keylogging functionality that will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log, it can handle special characters, and it will buffer by default 50 characters before sending them out over the C2 infrastructure.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence6

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the takeScreenShot (along with startTakeScreenShot and stopTakeScreenShot) functions to take screenshots using the CGGetActiveDisplayList, CGDisplayCreateImage, and NSImage:initWithCGImage methods.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence3

[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) contains the ftpUpload function to use the FTPManager:uploadFile method to upload files from the target system.(Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)

Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.