Malware

XAgentOSX

Also known asOSX.Sofacy

XAgentOSX is a macOS variant of the XAgent espionage malware family associated with the Sofacy/APT28 intrusion set. It is a surveillance-oriented backdoor used for post-compromise collection and host reconnaissance on Apple systems. Documented functionality includes enumerating running processes, collecting operating system version and current user information, attempting to recover saved Firefox passwords, capturing screenshots through native macOS graphics APIs, logging keystrokes while tracking active application windows, executing files via native task-launch mechanisms, and deleting files from disk. Its feature set is consistent with targeted intelligence collection against compromised macOS hosts rather than broad disruptive activity. The malware’s use of native macOS frameworks for screen capture, execution, and file operations reflects platform-specific development for Apple environments.

For your environment

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

Examples include "CookieMiner has looked for files in the user's home directory with 'wallet' in their name using find .", "Kinsing has used the find command to search for specific files", and "APT41 has executed file /bin/pwd on exploited victims."

T1106Native APIEvidence2

The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of many malware families and threat groups using Windows/native OS APIs for execution, injection, discovery, anti-debugging, and other actions, ending with 'NtCreateProcess' and 'fork()'.

Stealth

1 technique

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence8

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors deleting files, directories, droppers, logs, scripts, temporary files, exfiltrated archives, and uninstalling themselves to cover tracks or reduce forensic artifacts.

Credential Access

3 techniques

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The content is a catalog of malware families and threat actors that 'can perform keylogging,' 'log keystrokes,' 'capture keystrokes,' or use 'keylogger' modules/tools.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence7

Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT3 has used tools to dump passwords from browsers... APT41 used BrowserGhost, a tool designed to obtain credentials from browsers, to retrieve information from password stores... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge

Discovery

5 techniques

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the username, identifying the current user, enumerating logged-on users, or running commands such as whoami, query user, and quser to determine user context on compromised systems.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence4

Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

Examples in the content include 'XAgentOSX contains the getInstalledAPP function to run ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed' and 'Fysbis has used the command ls /etc | egrep ... to determine which Linux OS version is running.'

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence2

XAgentOSX 'run[s] ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed.'

Collection

2 techniques

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The content is a catalog of malware families and threat actors that 'can perform keylogging,' 'log keystrokes,' 'capture keystrokes,' or use 'keylogger' modules/tools.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence4

The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that "can capture screenshots," "take screenshots," "perform screen captures," or "watch the victim's screen." It ends with references to "CopyFromScreen" and "xwd."

Command and Control

1 technique

T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence1

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

26 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

26 SOURCESView more in app

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 25, 2022

System Owner/User Discovery, Technique T1033 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

macOS backdoor that returns OS version and current user information.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

System Owner/User Discovery, Technique T1033 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Returns the OS X version and current user.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Native API, Technique T1106 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

macOS backdoor that executes specified files using NSTask launch functionality.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Sub-technique T1555.003 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

macOS backdoor containing functionality to locate Firefox passwords.

+22 more in the timeline

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping13

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

XAgentOSX

Also known asOSX.Sofacy