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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Mori

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs30Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Defense evasion
Platforms
Windows

Mori is a Windows backdoor used by MuddyWater, also known as Seedworm, an Iranian state-sponsored cyberespionage group subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Mori uses DNS tunneling to communicate with command-and-control infrastructure. An analyzed C++ DLL implementation also supports HTTP communication over IPv4 or IPv6 and uses Base64 encoding and JSON for command-and-control data handling.

Mori can execute through the Windows Regsvr32 utility using its DLL registration export. It reads and writes Windows Registry data and can delete Registry values. Evasion techniques include encrypted strings used to resolve networking APIs and binary padding with approximately 200 MB of junk resource data. The analyzed implementation creates a mutex when executed.

Mori forms part of MuddyWater’s malware arsenal for operations against government and private-sector organizations. The group’s targeting spans Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America, including telecommunications, defense, local government, and oil and natural gas organizations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MuddyWater

MuddyWater also uses the Mori backdoor that uses Domain Name System tunneling to communicate with the group’s C2 infrastructure.

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence9

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can write data to `HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA` and `HKLM\Software\NFC\` and delete Registry values.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

This file was identified as an obfuscated PowerShell script

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

Examples include: “ComRAT has encrypted and stored its orchestrator code in the Registry…”, “ShadowPad maintains a configuration block and virtual file system in the Registry.”, and “QakBot can store its configuration information…under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.”

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence8

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can delete its DLL file and related files by Registry value.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence6

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can resolve networking APIs from strings that are ADD-encrypted.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence7

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can use `regsvr32.exe` for DLL execution.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence9

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can write data to `HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA` and `HKLM\Software\NFC\` and delete Registry values.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)

Discovery

1 technique
T1012Query RegistryEvidence7

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can read data from the Registry including from `HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA` and `HKLM\Software\NFC\`.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1001.001Junk DataEvidence5

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) has obfuscated the FML.dll with 200MB of junk data.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationEvidence1

Kapeka utilizes JSON objects to send and receive information from command and control nodes. Emotet has used Google’s Protobufs to serialize data sent to and from the C2 server. Remcos can serialize collected data with Protobuf.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

These components retrieve encrypted commands from a C2 server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence8

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can communicate using HTTP over IPv4 or IPv6 depending on a flag set.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1071.004DNSEvidence3

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can use DNS tunneling to communicate with C2.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence4

[Mori](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1047) can use Base64 encoded JSON libraries used in C2.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence2

The advisory says that the APT group MuddyWater also uses the Mori backdoor, which uses Domain Name System tunneling to communicate with the group’s C2 infrastructure.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

It also uses multiple malware sets, such as PowGoop, Small Sieve, Canopy/Starwhale, Mori and POWERSTATS for loading malware, backdoor access, persistence and exfiltration.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

30 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching30Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.