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Malware

JCry

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
PersistenceExtortion
Delivery
Fake updateLure
Platforms
Windows

JCry is Windows ransomware that encrypts victim files and demands Bitcoin payment for decryption. It achieves execution by enticing users to launch a malicious installer disguised as an Adobe Flash Player update. JCry uses PowerShell to execute payloads and also employs VBScript. It establishes persistence through Windows startup-folder autostart mechanisms and deletes Volume Shadow Copies to hinder recovery of encrypted data.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence10

[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has used PowerShell to execute payloads.(Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has used <code>cmd.exe</code> to launch PowerShell.(Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence5

[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has used VBS scripts. (Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails... has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer... has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence6

[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has achieved execution by luring users to click on a file that appeared to be an Adobe Flash Player update installer. (Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has created payloads in the Startup directory to maintain persistence. (Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has created payloads in the Startup directory to maintain persistence. (Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer... malware look like Flash Player, Office, or PDF documents... compromised installation files for legitimate software.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence4

[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has encrypted files and demanded Bitcoin to decrypt those files. (Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence5

[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has been observed deleting shadow copies to ensure that data cannot be restored easily.(Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.