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Malware1 associated CVE

Conficker

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK47Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Worm
Capabilities
PersistenceLateral movementBrute forceDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
USB
Platforms
Windows
Also known asDownadupKido

Conficker, also known as Downadup and Kido, is a self-propagating Windows worm first observed in November 2008. It recruited millions of computers into a botnet, with estimates of approximately nine million to fifteen million infected systems at its 2009 peak. Its primary propagation mechanism exploits the Windows Server service vulnerability addressed by MS08-067, using crafted RPC requests over SMB to execute code remotely. It also spreads through network shares protected by weak passwords and through removable drives.

Conficker establishes persistence through Windows services and Registry autostart entries, and analyzed samples support process injection. It uses date-dependent domain generation to locate command-and-control infrastructure, obtaining the current date from the victim system and external time servers. The Conficker C variant generates approximately 50,000 candidate command-and-control domains daily, complicating infrastructure blocking and disruption.

Conficker infections persist in legacy Windows environments, including manufacturing facilities, municipal water treatment plants, and power distribution substations. Long equipment lifecycles and constraints on patching and endpoint protection can allow infections to remain embedded in industrial networks. The Conficker Working Group, formed in 2009, coordinated public-private countermeasures, including sinkholing generated command-and-control domains.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2008-4250via virusbtnExploited in the wildMicrosoft Windows Server Service Vulnerability (MS08-067)...MS08-067 (CVE-2008-4250), which was a propagation vector of the infamous Conficker worm. | So exploit variants or encrypted exploits can be generated for many RPC vulnerabilities – such as MS08-067 (CVE-2008-4250), which was a propagation vector of the infamous Conficker worm.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

47 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

it could deliver fake antivirus warnings to trick naïve users into believing their computers are infected and persuading them to pay by credit card to have the infection removed

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence3

The best way to defeat potential botnets like Conficker/Downadup is by the security and Domain Name System communities working together.

T1583.005BotnetEvidence1

The members of SpamIt are allegedly the group behind the Storm, Waledec and potentially Conficker botnets, responsible for email distribution and fast-flux hosting of the spam websites

T1584.005BotnetEvidence5

Spamit affiliates are thought to responsible for managing some of the world’s most disruptive, infectious and sophisticated collections of hacked PCs or “botnets,” including Storm, Waledec and potentially Conficker.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

As you can see in the list below, it relies upon computers using poorly chosen passwords such as dictionary words, “password”, “qwerty” or sequences of letters or repeated numbers.

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence11

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) variants used the Windows AUTORUN feature to spread through USB propagation.(Citation: SANS Conficker)(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

MOVEit customers found themselves the victim of an actively exploited zero-day vulnerability, since tracked as CVE-2023-34362.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"Vuoden merkittävät tietoturvauhat liittyivät muun muassa roskapostikampanjoihin..."

Execution

1 technique
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence3

There is a way to distinguish infected machines from clean ones based on the error code for some specially crafted RPC messages. Conficker tries to filter out further exploitation attempts which results in uncommon responses.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

As you can see in the list below, it relies upon computers using poorly chosen passwords such as dictionary words, “password”, “qwerty” or sequences of letters or repeated numbers.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence11

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) adds keys to the Registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code> and various other Registry locations.(Citation: SANS Conficker)(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence8

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) copies itself into the <code>%systemroot%\system32</code> directory and registers as a service.(Citation: SANS Conficker)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Let’s look at one case across many families: Code Injection ... OpenProcess() on the target process ... VirtualAllocEx() ... WriteProcessMemory() ... CreateRemoteThread()

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The signatures folder contains YARA rules to detect unpacked variants of the worm in memory and Snort rules to detect exploitation attempts in a network.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

As you can see in the list below, it relies upon computers using poorly chosen passwords such as dictionary words, “password”, “qwerty” or sequences of letters or repeated numbers.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence8

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) copies itself into the <code>%systemroot%\system32</code> directory and registers as a service.(Citation: SANS Conficker)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence9

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) has obfuscated its code to prevent its removal from host machines.(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

T1027.014Polymorphic CodeEvidence1

今回のようにサーバサイド側でダウンロードさせるマルウェアを多様に変化(ポリモーフィズム)させ、同一URLから異なる検体が時折またはアクセスする度にダウンロードされる仕組みを「サーバサイドポリモーフィズム」と呼びます。

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

the autorun.inf is disguised as the explorer icon and caption

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Let’s look at one case across many families: Code Injection ... OpenProcess() on the target process ... VirtualAllocEx() ... WriteProcessMemory() ... CreateRemoteThread()

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

He trips no alarm, and then, to prevent another clever invader from exploiting the same weakness, he repairs the broken lock and seals the portal shut behind him. He improves the ship’s defenses.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The worm deletes the System Restore Points.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

As you can see in the list below, it relies upon computers using poorly chosen passwords such as dictionary words, “password”, “qwerty” or sequences of letters or repeated numbers.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

A detection device must be able to decrypt encrypted traffic and inspect it. In some IDS/IPS implementations, scanning encrypted traffic for exploits is possible by providing the IPS with decryption keys. The IPS first decrypts the traffic and then forwards the data to its signatures.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

The second line executes the other file using Rundll32.exe which invokes a gibberish export function

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

Conficker uses different global and local mutexes to ensure that only to most up-to-date version is run on the system.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The worm contains anti-analysis, anti-sandbox and anti-vm capabilities

T1564.004NTFS File AttributesEvidence1

Reference: Using Alternate Data Streams in the Collection and Exfiltration of Data ... Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes, Sub-technique T1564.004 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence11

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) adds keys to the Registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code> and various other Registry locations.(Citation: SANS Conficker)(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence7

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) terminates various services related to system security and Windows.(Citation: SANS Conficker)

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Conficker dates from 2008 and aims to grab login names and financial data.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Researchers speculate that the computer could be employed to generate vast amounts of spam; it could steal information like passwords and logins by capturing keystrokes on infected computers

T1110Brute ForceEvidence3

MITRE describes Conficker as a worm that spread using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability and notes that it also relied on dictionary attacks against administrator passwords.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Conficker... designed to steal user credentials and personal financial data...

Discovery

4 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence9

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) scans for other machines to infect.(Citation: SANS Conficker)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Our memory disinfector scans the memory of every running process in the system and terminates Conficker threads without touching the process it runs in.

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence5

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) uses the current UTC victim system date for domain generation and connects to time servers to determine the current date.(Citation: SANS Conficker)(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The worm contains anti-analysis, anti-sandbox and anti-vm capabilities

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence6

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) variants spread through NetBIOS share propagation.(Citation: SANS Conficker)

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence11

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) variants used the Windows AUTORUN feature to spread through USB propagation.(Citation: SANS Conficker)(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence15

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) exploited the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability for remote code execution through a crafted RPC request.(Citation: SANS Conficker)

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Researchers speculate that the computer could be employed to generate vast amounts of spam; it could steal information like passwords and logins by capturing keystrokes on infected computers

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

Ramnit debuted in 2010 and is a remote access tool that its creators use to steal data. Conficker dates from 2008 and aims to grab login names and financial data.

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Where before all the infected computers would have to phone home to a single source for instructions, the authors could now use any infected computer to instruct all the others.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Botnet Conficker ... wykorzystuje do komunikacji ze swoim centrum kontroli (Command & Control) protokół HTTP, łącząc się z serwerem ... na porcie 80. w celu pobrania nowego pliku binarnego.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

During the night of 8th/9th April, computers infected with Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Kido (aka Conficker.c) contacted each other over P2P, telling infected machines to download new malicious files, thus activating the Kido botnet.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence11

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) downloads an HTTP server to the infected machine.(Citation: SANS Conficker)

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence3

The worm contains a DGA algorithm

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence2

The members of SpamIt are allegedly the group behind the Storm, Waledec and potentially Conficker botnets, responsible for email distribution and fast-flux hosting of the spam websites

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence7

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) has used a DGA that seeds with the current UTC victim system date to generate domains.(Citation: SANS Conficker)(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

If the detection device cannot decrypt the traffic then the encrypted exploits can bypass detection. As well as RPC, encrypted traffic can appear on port 80 for HTTPS connections, port 465 for SMTP, port 995 for POP3 and port 993 for IMAP.

Impact

4 techniques
T1489Service StopEvidence1

Examples include Babuk 'can stop anti-virus services', BOLDMOVE disabling daemons, Conficker terminating services, Lazarus malware disabling Windows services, and SolarWinds Compromise where APT29 'used the service control manager on a remote system to disable services associated with security monitoring products.'

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence5

[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) resets system restore points and deletes backup files.(Citation: SANS Conficker)

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence3

Takie ... działanie może hipotetycznie doprowadzić do ataku Distributed Denial of Service na istniejące serwisy WWW.

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Botnets can also be used to distribute other kinds of malware and generate attacks that can take commercial or government Web sites off-line.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

124 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
register securityNews · Nov 3, 2026AI policy wonks declare 'sovereign agents' a threat to civilizationA worm mentioned as a historical example of a threat addressed through public-private coordination. The article does not describe its technical capabilities or infection methods.Read more ↗sh3llc0d3 blogNews · Oct 20, 2026Legacy Commodity Malware in Industrial Control S | ShellcodeLegacy self-propagating malware described as persisting on obsolete Windows industrial workstations and HMIs. The content associates its propagation with MS08-067 SMB vulnerabilities and removable media, and describes periodic SMB scanning within isolated industrial networks. The advisory argues that uncoordinated scanning, endpoint isolation, or automated eradication can disrupt fragile control systems more immediately than the existing infection. It recommends passive monitoring, network containment, and remediation during approved maintenance windows. Its characterization of these infections as harmless depends on the isolation and operating conditions described, not an inherent absence of malware risk.Read more ↗cso onlineNews · Oct 19, 20269 rising malware trends every security pro should know | CSO OnlineCited as a historical example of a network worm. The reference attributes the declining effectiveness of network worms to segmentation, automated patching, and endpoint defenses.Read more ↗dragos blogNews · Oct 15, 2026Legacy Malware Cleanup in OT: Now, Next, Never | DragosHighlighted as a persistent legacy infection affecting operational technology networks. The article advocates risk-based decisions between immediate cleanup, removal during planned maintenance, and monitored retention until system replacement. It does not provide Conficker-specific technical behavior.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping47Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.