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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

USBferry

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Worm
Capabilities
Initial accessLateral movementReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
USB
Platforms
Windows

USBferry is a Windows USB-propagating espionage malware family used by Tropic Trooper to compromise connected and air-gapped systems and steal sensitive documents. Activity has been observed since 2014, including operations against government institutions, military and navy organizations, military hospitals, and a national bank in Taiwan and the Philippines. Targeted information includes defense-, maritime-, and ship-related documents. The malware detects connected USB storage and copies its installer onto removable media, enabling infection of physically isolated systems. When network connectivity is unavailable, it collects host data and copies it to USB storage for subsequent exfiltration through a connected system.

USBferry executes Windows commands to enumerate local accounts, running processes, remote systems, network configuration, and active connections. Multiple versions and components have been identified, including loaders that unpack encrypted payloads and inject a malicious DLL into the Windows Rundll32 process to reduce detection. Tropic Trooper has used less-secured related organizations as stepping stones into more protected environments, including movement from a military hospital into an air-gapped military network.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Tropic Trooper

The group employs USBferry, a USB malware that performs different commands on specific targets, maintains stealth in environments, and steals critical data through USB storage.

via trend micro blog historicblog.trendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence5

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can copy its installer to attached USB storage devices.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

the methods observed do not differ much from what we see in general malware: emails with malicious attachments, links, or USB worms.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence8

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can execute various Windows commands.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence1

Registered itself as a Winlogon helper DLL in Windows registry in Shell subkey

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

After the encrypted payload is loaded, the loader injects a malicious DLL into rundll32.exe.

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence1

Registered itself as a Winlogon helper DLL in Windows registry in Shell subkey

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

This version also changes the malware location and its name to UF, an abbreviation for USBferry.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

After the encrypted payload is loaded, the loader injects a malicious DLL into rundll32.exe.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence4

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can execute rundll32.exe in memory to avoid detection.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

Discovery

10 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence9

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can detect the infected machine's network topology using <code>ipconfig</code> and <code>arp</code>.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence5

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can use <code>net view</code> to gather information about remote systems.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence3

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can use <code>netstat</code> and <code>nbtstat</code> to detect active network connections.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can use <code>tasklist</code> to gather information about the process running on the infected system.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Frameworks gather information such as computer name, username, domain name, list of running processes, listing of files in directories, drives and network shares, as well as network configuration information

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can detect the victim's file or folder list.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

“actors used the following commands… to enumerate user accounts: net user >> %temp%\download; net user /domain >> %temp%\download … APT1 used the commands net localgroup, net user, and net group to find accounts… APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators … OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain …”

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence3

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can use <code>net user</code> to gather information about local accounts.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence6

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can check for connected USB devices.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Some frameworks, for example USBFerry, USBCulprit, Retro and PlugX, simply pipe the output of built-in Windows commands (for instance, ipconfig or netstat) to a file that is exfiltrated to the attacker

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence5

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can copy its installer to attached USB storage devices.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence6

[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can collect information from an air-gapped host machine.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1

if it finds that the network is unavailable, it tries to collect information from the target machine and copy the collected data into USB storage. This way, the USB exfiltrates the information

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Connected side: Contacted C&C servers via HTTP.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The USBferry malware then tries to connect to the download site

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1052Exfiltration Over Physical MediumEvidence2

if it finds that the network is unavailable, it tries to collect information from the target machine and copy the collected data into USB storage. This way, the USB exfiltrates the information

Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.