RogueRobin is a Windows malware family that functions as a PowerShell-centric backdoor and remote access implant. It has been observed executing PowerShell from malicious Excel-driven command shells, abusing regsvr32 to launch COM scriptlets, and decoding embedded payloads from Base64-compressed content during execution. The malware supports covert command-and-control communications over DNS tunneling and Base64-encodes data sent through that channel. RogueRobin performs host reconnaissance by collecting the victim’s IP address, domain affiliation, username, and whether the current user has administrative privileges. It also enumerates running processes, including checks for analysis and monitoring tools such as Wireshark and Sysinternals, indicating sandbox and security-tool awareness for defense evasion. Reported tasking includes screenshot capture functionality. For persistence, RogueRobin creates PowerShell-based autorun mechanisms in the user context, including Startup-folder shortcut creation and batch-script launchers that execute hidden PowerShell at logon. The malware is associated with post-compromise surveillance and interactive follow-on operations on Windows hosts.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In this blog post, we examine a DNS tunneling malware, known as RogueRobin, that has been associated with the DarkHydrus threat group.
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Cobalt Group has used regsvr32.exe to execute scripts. Saint Bot has used regsvr32 to execute scripts. Xbash can use regsvr32 for executing scripts.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell to execute payloads, run commands, download additional malware, perform lateral movement, evade defenses, and execute scripts in memory. | Examples include: 'APT28 downloads and executes PowerShell scripts and performs PowerShell commands'; 'APT3 has used PowerShell on victim systems to download and run payloads after exploitation'; 'TA505 has used PowerShell to download and execute malware and reconnaissance scripts.'
To assist in establishing persistence, RogueRobin creates %APPDATA%\OneDrive.bat and saves the following string to it: powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -exec bypass -File "%APPDATA%\OneDrive.ps1".
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat groups that 'decrypt', 'decode', 'deobfuscate', 'unpack', or 'decompress' payloads, strings, configuration data, shellcode, and files prior to execution or use.
To perform these queries, RogueRobin directly invokes the native Windows binary nslookup.exe.
AppleSeed can call regsvr32.exe for execution. APT19 used Regsvr32 to bypass application control techniques. APT32 created a Scheduled Task/Job that used regsvr32.exe to execute a COM scriptlet that dynamically downloaded a backdoor and injected it into memory.
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all after exploiting a machine; numerous malware and groups used ipconfig, ifconfig, arp, route, netsh, nbtstat, NBTscan, and related APIs to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, domain, ARP cache, routing, and adapter details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the username, identifying the current user, enumerating logged-on users, or running commands such as whoami, query user, and quser to determine user context on compromised systems.
Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.
Several entries describe identifying whether the current user has admin privileges, determining privilege level, identifying groups the user belongs to, or verifying execution as SYSTEM.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, BIOS, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, and WMI to gather host information.
Both the PowerShell and .NET RogueRobin variants perform a series of checks to ensure they are not being run in a sandbox or analysis environment.
The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that "can capture screenshots," "take screenshots," "perform screen captures," or "watch the victim's screen." It ends with references to "CopyFromScreen" and "xwd."
Examples in the content include 'DropBook can unarchive data downloaded from the C2 to obtain the payload and persistence modules,' 'Molerats decompresses ZIP files once on the victim machine,' and 'Rocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.'
Each variant periodically checks in with the controller for waiting jobs to perform. Then they receive and perform these tasks and send the results back to the controller.
In this blog post, we examine a DNS tunneling malware, known as RogueRobin... The core of RogueRobin’s DNS tunneling mechanism involves encoding of DNS requests and replies of various resource record types between the victim host and its controller.
13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
49 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Backdoor that collects the victim username and whether the user has admin privileges.
Malware that uses PowerShell scripts launched from Excel and for persistence via OneDrive.ps1.
Gathers victim IP address and domain information.
Malware that persists by placing a Startup-folder shortcut that launches a PowerShell script at logon.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.