Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware3 associated actors6 associated CVEs

Squirrelwaffle

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 15 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns6Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK47Techniques
IOCs97Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

Squirrelwaffle is a Windows malware loader first observed in September 2021 that establishes an initial foothold and downloads and executes additional payloads, notably Cobalt Strike and QakBot. Its distribution has been associated with the malicious spam distributor known as TR.

Squirrelwaffle spreads through phishing and malicious spam campaigns, frequently using replies to existing email conversations sent from compromised accounts. Messages commonly link to ZIP archives containing weaponized Microsoft Word or Excel documents. Infection chains rely on users enabling VBA or Excel 4.0 macros; Word-based chains can drop Visual Basic scripts that invoke PowerShell to retrieve DLL payloads. Windows utilities including Rundll32 and Regsvr32 are used for execution. Campaigns have also exploited ProxyLogon and ProxyShell vulnerabilities in on-premises Microsoft Exchange servers to access mailboxes and distribute convincing malicious replies to internal and external recipients. This server compromise supports distribution and is distinct from execution of the loader on recipient endpoints. Such activity has affected organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The loader collects host information, including the computer name, username, domain membership, application-data location, and local network address, and transmits encoded information through HTTP POST requests to command-and-control servers. It supports downloading and launching executables and DLLs, executing operator-supplied commands, and running shellcode through thread-pool callbacks. Its defense-evasion features include XOR and Base64 encoding of configuration and communications, packed stages, junk-code padding, and in-memory unpacking. It also contains address-blacklisting logic intended to avoid analysis environments. Squirrelwaffle enables follow-on compromise, but credential theft, persistence, and lateral movement performed by subsequently delivered malware are not intrinsic loader capabilities.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

6 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-34473via trendai security blogExploited in the wildProxyShell: Microsoft Exchange Pre-authentication Path ConfusionThe article links ProxyShell exploitation to compromised on-premises Exchange servers used to hijack email threads and distribute malicious internal replies during Squirrelwaffle campaigns. | Evidence of exploitation appeared in IIS logs on compromised Exchange servers. The article identifies this flaw as the pre-authentication path-confusion component of ProxyShell. | In September, Squirrelwaffle emerged as a new loader that is spread through spam campaigns. It is known for sending its malicious emails as replies to preexisting email chains.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-34523via trendai security blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Exchange PowerShell Backend Privilege Escalation (ProxyShell)The researchers observed exploitation of this Exchange PowerShell backend elevation-of-privilege vulnerability and described its use following CVE-2021-34473. | In September, Squirrelwaffle emerged as a new loader that is spread through spam campaigns. It is known for sending its malicious emails as replies to preexisting email chains.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-26855via trendai security blogExploited in the wildProxyLogon SSRF in Microsoft Exchange ServerThe researchers observed exploitation of CVE-2021-26855 in IIS logs on compromised Exchange servers and identified use of a publicly available exploit to retrieve users’ SIDs and emails. | In September, Squirrelwaffle emerged as a new loader that is spread through spam campaigns. It is known for sending its malicious emails as replies to preexisting email chains.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-31207via truesecExploited in the wildMicrosoft Exchange Server Post-Authentication Arbitrary File Write (ProxyShell)We have identified multiple cases of Exchange servers compromised with ProxyShell (chaining CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) in September and October.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-26427via circl luExploited in the wildRCE in Microsoft Exchange Server 2013/2016/2019 (CVE-2021-26427)In late October CIRCL got notified about MS Exchange servers vulnerable for the recent critical Exchange RCE vulnerabilities CVE-2021-26427. Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityView vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-30190via microsoft generalExploited in the wildFollinaMeanwhile, DEV-0464 distributes the “TR” Qakbot and other malware such as SquirrelWaffle. | DEV-0464 also rapidly adopted the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190) in their campaigns.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
TA577

TR has been associated with SquirrelWaffle and Qakbot campaigns but has recently been observed delivering IcedID.

via esentire blogesentire.com
TR

The actors behind that campaign were believed to be 'TR', known to work with a plethora of malware, including Qbot, IcedID, and SquirrelWaffle.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
DEV-0464

Meanwhile, DEV-0464 distributes the “TR” Qakbot and other malware such as SquirrelWaffle.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

47 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

This C2 channel is also used to deliver secondary payloads at the discretion of the attacker.

Initial Access

7 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

This allowed the attacker to perform unauthorized actions on behalf of legitimate users.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The IIS logs showed that special crafted server-side request forgery (SSRF) requests were used to exploit CVE-2021-26855, directed at the Exchange Web Services API endpoint.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence5

CVE-2021-26855: the pre-authentication proxy vulnerability This server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability can allow a threat actor access by sending a specially crafted web request to an Exchange Server. | We observed evidence of the exploits on the vulnerabilities CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-34473, and CVE-2021-34523 in the IIS Logs on three of the Exchange servers that were compromised in different intrusions.

T1566PhishingEvidence13

Link for malicious zip archive from an email pushing Squirrelwaffle loader.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence8

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has been distributed via malicious Microsoft Office documents within spam emails.(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence12

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has been distributed through phishing emails containing a malicious URL.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The attackers leveraged the vulnerable server to mass distribute Squirrelwaffle to both internal and external recipients by inserting malicious replies into employees’ existing email threads (known as email thread hijacking.)

Execution

13 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It turns out that the suspicious PowerShell execution is triggered via a scheduled task.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

and a scheduled task launching PowerShell which in turn starts regsvr32.exe in the same way.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

The obfuscated macros drop a VBS file, which downloads the SQUIRRELWAFFLE loader on the victim’s machine and executes it.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence8

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has used PowerShell to execute its payload.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence8

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has used `cmd.exe` for execution.(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence11

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has used malicious VBA macros in Microsoft Word documents and Excel spreadsheets that execute an `AutoOpen` subroutine.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1059.009Cloud APIEvidence1

These spreadsheets contain malicious Excel4 macros that are responsible for retrieving and executing the SQUIRRELWAFFLE payload.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The call to CreateThreadpoolWait registers the allocated buffer as a callback function to execute when the wait object completes. Finally, the call SetThreadpoolWait sets the wait object for the event, which executes the callback function and launches the shellcode.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence2

SQUIRRELWAFFLE then decodes the command “regsvr32.exe -s ”, appends the executable’s name to it, and calls WinExec to register it as a command component in the registry.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

These are links to QBot/QakBot/DanaBot/SquirrelWaffle malware... An infection will most likely end up in a ransomware case.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

This step is related to User Execution technique T1204 which is part of the Execution TA0002 tactic.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence4

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has relied on victims to click on a malicious link send via phishing campaigns.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence12

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has relied on users enabling malicious macros within Microsoft Excel and Word attachments.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It turns out that the suspicious PowerShell execution is triggered via a scheduled task.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

and a scheduled task launching PowerShell which in turn starts regsvr32.exe in the same way.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

This allowed the attacker to perform unauthorized actions on behalf of legitimate users.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

So far we have identified two ways that the malware made itself persistent. An autorun registry key launching regsvr32.exe to execute a DLL

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It turns out that the suspicious PowerShell execution is triggered via a scheduled task.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

and a scheduled task launching PowerShell which in turn starts regsvr32.exe in the same way.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

it uses the instructions “rep movsb” to copy the entire packer executable from the image base to this newly allocated buffer... Finally, it transfers execution to that virtual address through a “jmp” instruction.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

This allowed the attacker to perform unauthorized actions on behalf of legitimate users.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

So far we have identified two ways that the malware made itself persistent. An autorun registry key launching regsvr32.exe to execute a DLL

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence9

The threat actors use a different technique to hide malicious code/strings such as URLs, IPs, commands, or even shellcode inside the malicious document.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has been packed with a custom packer to hide payloads.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has been obfuscated with a XOR-based algorithm.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The malicious macros v4 is executed and downloaded from a C2 server masquerading as DLL payloads.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

it uses the instructions “rep movsb” to copy the entire packer executable from the image base to this newly allocated buffer... Finally, it transfers execution to that virtual address through a “jmp” instruction.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

This allowed the attacker to perform unauthorized actions on behalf of legitimate users.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence7

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has decrypted files and payloads using a XOR-based algorithm.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence8

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has been executed using `regsvr32.exe`.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence5

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has been executed using `rundll32.exe`.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

After getting the machine’s IP address, SQUIRRELWAFFLE checks to see if the decoded data contains the address. If it does, the malware exits immediately. From this, we know that the encoded buffer contains IP addresses to blacklist... This is typically used to check for IP addresses of sandboxes.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

the malware extracts its entry point... copies the headers to the current executable’s base... iterates the stage 2 executable’s section table to map the raw section to its virtual address in the current executable’s address space and transfer executions to it.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"IcedID has manipulated Keitaro Traffic Direction System to filter researcher and sandbox traffic." / "Squirrelwaffle has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms."

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence7

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has collected the victim’s external IP address.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence9

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) can collect the user name from a compromised host.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence13

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has gathered victim computer information and configurations.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

SQUIRRELWAFFLE first generates a random name with a random length between 1 and 11, appends “.txt” to it... SQUIRRELWAFFLE also generates another random name for the executable, appends it after the machine’s TEMP path

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

After getting the machine’s IP address, SQUIRRELWAFFLE checks to see if the decoded data contains the address. If it does, the malware exits immediately. From this, we know that the encoded buffer contains IP addresses to blacklist... This is typically used to check for IP addresses of sandboxes.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The data sent to the C2 includes: %APPDATA% configuration.

Collection

2 techniques
T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

This exploit gives a threat actor the ability to get users SID and emails. They can even search for and download a target’s emails.

T1560.003Archive via Custom MethodEvidence3

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has encrypted collected data using a XOR-based algorithm.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

Traffic from a Squirrelwaffle loader infection filtered in Wireshark... Traffic filtered in Wireshark showing when Cobalt Strike activity started.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence8

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has used HTTP POST requests for C2 communications.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has downloaded and executed additional encoded payloads.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)(Citation: Netskope Squirrelwaffle Oct 2021)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence4

Since this victim information string is later delivered to C2 servers, SQUIRRELWAFFLE encodes it using the XOR cipher with the key “KJKLO” and Base64 to avoid sending it in plaintext.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has encoded its communications to C2 servers using Base64.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

[Squirrelwaffle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1030) has exfiltrated victim data using HTTP POST requests to its C2 servers.(Citation: ZScaler Squirrelwaffle Sep 2021)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

97 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

58 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+52 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching97Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities6CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping47Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.