FluBot
- Type
- Banking trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- SmishingLanding pageLureFake update
- Platforms
- Android
FluBot, also known as Cabassous and FedEx Banker, is an Android banking trojan active since late 2020. It combines credential theft, remote device control, and SMS-based propagation. Campaigns have targeted mobile banking users across Europe, particularly Spain and Germany, as well as Australia and Japan. FluBot has been advertised and rented on underground forums, enabling multiple cybercriminal groups to conduct distribution and financial-fraud operations.
FluBot primarily spreads through smishing messages impersonating parcel-delivery services, voicemail notifications, software updates, and other familiar services. Links direct recipients to deceptive websites that persuade them to sideload malicious Android applications. Infected devices exfiltrate contact lists and send further malicious SMS messages under command-and-control direction, supporting rapid propagation. Distribution infrastructure has included compromised websites, frequently changing links, and mutated message templates designed to evade filtering.
The malware abuses Android Accessibility Services to display fraudulent HTML login overlays over banking and cryptocurrency applications, capture banking credentials and card information, disable Google Play Protect, and automatically approve SMS-sending prompts. It can collect installed-application information to select relevant overlays, record keystrokes, steal contacts and personal information, and send, intercept, hide, and exfiltrate SMS messages. Interception of one-time passcodes enables operators to bypass SMS-based authentication and facilitate fraudulent account access.
FluBot uses packing, string obfuscation, and encrypted payloads loaded at runtime through Android multidex mechanisms to impede analysis. Its command-and-control infrastructure uses a domain generation algorithm and encrypted communications. Versions through 4.8 used HTTPS, while versions beginning with 4.9 introduced DNS tunneling over HTTPS. Geographic filtering, changing packed application artifacts, and verification that newly registered bots can actually send SMS messages further complicate detection and analysis.
Techniques & procedures
43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
users receive an SMS message with the question "Is this you in this video?" and are tricked into clicking a link that installs the malware.
According to our findings, this new operation (referred to as "FluBot") sets a new precedent for spreading methods and DGA implementations.
The video captures the C&C requesting list of contacts, SMS, disabling Play Protect and asking to propagate malware via SMS with links to infected sites.
A simple phishing campaign is still making the rounds on social media, primarily through Facebook's Messenger. Users receive a message from a friend in their list with a question ('Is this you in this video?' or some variation) and a link.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
They have an arsenal of other commands available, including sending an SMS with content provided by the command and control (CnC).
The malware uses the multidex scheme to load the payload as secondary DEX... The technique consists in re-writing the way applications load multiple DEX.
the malware operates by relying on users downloading boobytrapped apps from the internet and then side-loading them on their devices
Huijausviesteissä olevia linkkejä ei tule avata. Pelkkä linkin avaaminen ei vielä asenna haittaohjelmaa laitteelle.
If there is a URL in the settings file, the APK is downloaded and saved to '/sdcard/Android/data/com.lorankey.qrcode/files/Download/addonqrapp.apk', and the installation is initiated.
The classes-v1.bin file will need to be decrypted and then loaded... That dex file then needs to be loaded using the DexClassLoader.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
In short, the malware abuses yet and again Android’s Accessibility Services. For example, to disable Play Protect, or display overlay windows to grab credit card info. But it also abuses the Accessibility Services for features I had not seen in other malware before like automatically accepting to send SMS messages.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
In short, the malware abuses yet and again Android’s Accessibility Services. For example, to disable Play Protect, or display overlay windows to grab credit card info. But it also abuses the Accessibility Services for features I had not seen in other malware before like automatically accepting to send SMS messages.
All those banking trojans also abuse Android Accessibility Services . Accessibility Services are meant to help people with disabilities. Do not grant such rights to any other application!
Stealth
11 techniques
Stealth
The lure servers host a heavily obfuscated PHP file (e.g. called “[a-z].php”).
The com.tencent package name also tells us that the application has probably been packaged with the tencent packer.
So it seems that the malware authors repackaged the official WhatsApp app and added their malicious functionality.
After loading the DEX file, the malware deletes it from the file system to avoid leaving artifacts.
Most likely, the classes-v1.bin file gets decrypted and loaded in one of the static initialization blocks... after the sample has been run once, it actually doesn’t delete the decrypted dex file and simply keeps it in the app folder.
Run USSD commands
they’ve implemented a particularly interesting way to check if a new bot can send SMS and hence it isn’t a bot emulation
The websites check the browser’s user agent matches an Android platform, and won’t respond to other platforms
After loading the DEX file, the malware deletes it from the file system to avoid leaving artifacts.
The classes-v1.bin file will need to be decrypted and then loaded... That dex file then needs to be loaded using the DexClassLoader.
There are however quite some imports for Java reflection classes, so the class and method names are probably constructed at runtime.
Credential Access
6 techniques
Credential Access
overlay fake login screens on top of official apps and collect users' credentials | the app uses the Android Accessibility service to overlay fake login screens on top of official apps and collect users' credentials
Keylogger/Screen Grabber This command enables attackers to grab text on the screen (key logging) using Accessibility Service.
Based on the class names inside the com.tencent.mobileqq package we can see that the sample can: Perform overlay attacks ( BrowserActivity.class )... When the sample receives the list of applications to attack, it immediately begins sending the GET_INJECT command to get a HTML page for each targeted application.
FluBot gives threat actors full remote control of an infected device... exfiltrate user sensitive data, such as contacts, keystrokes, one-time passcodes, and personal information
After analysis of the code, we realized they also introduced code to steal the cookies from the WebView used to show web injections
Since the FluBot operators have full control over an infected device, they can also easily bypass any SMS-based two-step verification process
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
payload:PING,3.4,10,LGE,Nexus 5,en,127
they’ve implemented a particularly interesting way to check if a new bot can send SMS and hence it isn’t a bot emulation
The websites check the browser’s user agent matches an Android platform, and won’t respond to other platforms
It sends a list of all installed applications to see which applications to attack using an overlay... payload:GET_INJECTS_LIST,com.google.android.carriersetup,...
The malware also uses the system’s “locale.getLanguage()” to set the text language for interfacing with the victim ... In FluBot v3.7 the number added to the seed used by DGA is static whereas in v4.0 the number added to the seed is specific to the language set of the victim’s device
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
Haittaohjelma varastaa tietoja käyttäjän laitteelta...
overlay fake login screens on top of official apps and collect users' credentials | the app uses the Android Accessibility service to overlay fake login screens on top of official apps and collect users' credentials
Keylogger/Screen Grabber This command enables attackers to grab text on the screen (key logging) using Accessibility Service.
Based on the class names inside the com.tencent.mobileqq package we can see that the sample can: Perform overlay attacks ( BrowserActivity.class )... When the sample receives the list of applications to attack, it immediately begins sending the GET_INJECT command to get a HTML page for each targeted application.
Command and Control
9 techniques
Command and Control
The stolen information from the infected device was sent encrypting it using RC4 ... and encoding the encrypted bytes. This way, the encoded payload was used as a subdomain of the DGA generated domain.
They have an arsenal of other commands available, including sending an SMS with content provided by the command and control (CnC).
The class that’s responsible for actually communicating with the C&C is the PanelReq class... There are a few methods involving encryption and decryption, but there’s also one method called ‘Send’ which takes two parameters and contains references to HTTP related classes.
Since version 4.9, FluBot has communicated with its C2 server via DNS-Tunneling-over-HTTPS (DoH)... an attacker sets a nameserver that will act as a C2 server, receiving and sending data through the DNS protocol; FluBot uses DoH providers such as Google and Cloudflare to infiltrate and exfiltrate the data to the C2 server.
FluBot uses DNS resolving providers such as Google, Cloudflare, and Alibaba to infiltrate and exfiltrate the data to the C2 server.
A message instructs the target to download a third-party application by clicking a download button. As of September 2021, these downloads are either Flubot or in some cases Teabot.
According to our findings, this new operation (referred to as "FluBot") sets a new precedent for spreading methods and DGA implementations.
Another interesting class is DGA.class which is responsible for the Domain Generation Algorithm. By using a DGA, the sample cannot be taken down by sink-holing the C&C’s domain.
The communication with the C&C is encrypted: we use a Frida hook to display the messages before encryption or after decryption.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
An infected device exfiltrates its contact list to the command and control server
Impact
1 technique
Impact
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ... Impact T1565 Manipulation
Observables
544 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
49 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.