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Mallory
Malware

FluBot

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 24 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs544Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
SmishingLanding pageLureFake update
Platforms
Android

FluBot, also known as Cabassous and FedEx Banker, is an Android banking trojan active since late 2020. It combines credential theft, remote device control, and SMS-based propagation. Campaigns have targeted mobile banking users across Europe, particularly Spain and Germany, as well as Australia and Japan. FluBot has been advertised and rented on underground forums, enabling multiple cybercriminal groups to conduct distribution and financial-fraud operations.

FluBot primarily spreads through smishing messages impersonating parcel-delivery services, voicemail notifications, software updates, and other familiar services. Links direct recipients to deceptive websites that persuade them to sideload malicious Android applications. Infected devices exfiltrate contact lists and send further malicious SMS messages under command-and-control direction, supporting rapid propagation. Distribution infrastructure has included compromised websites, frequently changing links, and mutated message templates designed to evade filtering.

The malware abuses Android Accessibility Services to display fraudulent HTML login overlays over banking and cryptocurrency applications, capture banking credentials and card information, disable Google Play Protect, and automatically approve SMS-sending prompts. It can collect installed-application information to select relevant overlays, record keystrokes, steal contacts and personal information, and send, intercept, hide, and exfiltrate SMS messages. Interception of one-time passcodes enables operators to bypass SMS-based authentication and facilitate fraudulent account access.

FluBot uses packing, string obfuscation, and encrypted payloads loaded at runtime through Android multidex mechanisms to impede analysis. Its command-and-control infrastructure uses a domain generation algorithm and encrypted communications. Versions through 4.8 used HTTPS, while versions beginning with 4.9 introduced DNS tunneling over HTTPS. Geographic filtering, changing packed application artifacts, and verification that newly registered bots can actually send SMS messages further complicate detection and analysis.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

users receive an SMS message with the question "Is this you in this video?" and are tricked into clicking a link that installs the malware.

T1566PhishingEvidence11

According to our findings, this new operation (referred to as "FluBot") sets a new precedent for spreading methods and DGA implementations.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence5

The video captures the C&C requesting list of contacts, SMS, disabling Play Protect and asking to propagate malware via SMS with links to infected sites.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence7

A simple phishing campaign is still making the rounds on social media, primarily through Facebook's Messenger. Users receive a message from a friend in their list with a question ('Is this you in this video?' or some variation) and a link.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

They have an arsenal of other commands available, including sending an SMS with content provided by the command and control (CnC).

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

The malware uses the multidex scheme to load the payload as secondary DEX... The technique consists in re-writing the way applications load multiple DEX.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

the malware operates by relying on users downloading boobytrapped apps from the internet and then side-loading them on their devices

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

Huijausviesteissä olevia linkkejä ei tule avata. Pelkkä linkin avaaminen ei vielä asenna haittaohjelmaa laitteelle.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence8

If there is a URL in the settings file, the APK is downloaded and saved to '/sdcard/Android/data/com.lorankey.qrcode/files/Download/addonqrapp.apk', and the installation is initiated.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The classes-v1.bin file will need to be decrypted and then loaded... That dex file then needs to be loaded using the DexClassLoader.

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence6

In short, the malware abuses yet and again Android’s Accessibility Services. For example, to disable Play Protect, or display overlay windows to grab credit card info. But it also abuses the Accessibility Services for features I had not seen in other malware before like automatically accepting to send SMS messages.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence6

In short, the malware abuses yet and again Android’s Accessibility Services. For example, to disable Play Protect, or display overlay windows to grab credit card info. But it also abuses the Accessibility Services for features I had not seen in other malware before like automatically accepting to send SMS messages.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

All those banking trojans also abuse Android Accessibility Services . Accessibility Services are meant to help people with disabilities. Do not grant such rights to any other application!

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

The lure servers host a heavily obfuscated PHP file (e.g. called “[a-z].php”).

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence3

The com.tencent package name also tells us that the application has probably been packaged with the tencent packer.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

So it seems that the malware authors repackaged the official WhatsApp app and added their malicious functionality.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

After loading the DEX file, the malware deletes it from the file system to avoid leaving artifacts.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Most likely, the classes-v1.bin file gets decrypted and loaded in one of the static initialization blocks... after the sample has been run once, it actually doesn’t delete the decrypted dex file and simply keeps it in the app folder.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Run USSD commands

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

they’ve implemented a particularly interesting way to check if a new bot can send SMS and hence it isn’t a bot emulation

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

The websites check the browser’s user agent matches an Android platform, and won’t respond to other platforms

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

After loading the DEX file, the malware deletes it from the file system to avoid leaving artifacts.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The classes-v1.bin file will need to be decrypted and then loaded... That dex file then needs to be loaded using the DexClassLoader.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

There are however quite some imports for Java reflection classes, so the class and method names are probably constructed at runtime.

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence8

overlay fake login screens on top of official apps and collect users' credentials | the app uses the Android Accessibility service to overlay fake login screens on top of official apps and collect users' credentials

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Keylogger/Screen Grabber This command enables attackers to grab text on the screen (key logging) using Accessibility Service.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

Based on the class names inside the com.tencent.mobileqq package we can see that the sample can: Perform overlay attacks ( BrowserActivity.class )... When the sample receives the list of applications to attack, it immediately begins sending the GET_INJECT command to get a HTML page for each targeted application.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence3

FluBot gives threat actors full remote control of an infected device... exfiltrate user sensitive data, such as contacts, keystrokes, one-time passcodes, and personal information

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

After analysis of the code, we realized they also introduced code to steal the cookies from the WebView used to show web injections

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Since the FluBot operators have full control over an infected device, they can also easily bypass any SMS-based two-step verification process

Discovery

5 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

payload:PING,3.4,10,LGE,Nexus 5,en,127

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

they’ve implemented a particularly interesting way to check if a new bot can send SMS and hence it isn’t a bot emulation

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

The websites check the browser’s user agent matches an Android platform, and won’t respond to other platforms

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

It sends a list of all installed applications to see which applications to attack using an overlay... payload:GET_INJECTS_LIST,com.google.android.carriersetup,...

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware also uses the system’s “locale.getLanguage()” to set the text language for interfacing with the victim ... In FluBot v3.7 the number added to the seed used by DGA is static whereas in v4.0 the number added to the seed is specific to the language set of the victim’s device

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Haittaohjelma varastaa tietoja käyttäjän laitteelta...

T1056Input CaptureEvidence8

overlay fake login screens on top of official apps and collect users' credentials | the app uses the Android Accessibility service to overlay fake login screens on top of official apps and collect users' credentials

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Keylogger/Screen Grabber This command enables attackers to grab text on the screen (key logging) using Accessibility Service.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

Based on the class names inside the com.tencent.mobileqq package we can see that the sample can: Perform overlay attacks ( BrowserActivity.class )... When the sample receives the list of applications to attack, it immediately begins sending the GET_INJECT command to get a HTML page for each targeted application.

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The stolen information from the infected device was sent encrypting it using RC4 ... and encoding the encrypted bytes. This way, the encoded payload was used as a subdomain of the DGA generated domain.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence7

They have an arsenal of other commands available, including sending an SMS with content provided by the command and control (CnC).

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The class that’s responsible for actually communicating with the C&C is the PanelReq class... There are a few methods involving encryption and decryption, but there’s also one method called ‘Send’ which takes two parameters and contains references to HTTP related classes.

T1071.004DNSEvidence3

Since version 4.9, FluBot has communicated with its C2 server via DNS-Tunneling-over-HTTPS (DoH)... an attacker sets a nameserver that will act as a C2 server, receiving and sending data through the DNS protocol; FluBot uses DoH providers such as Google and Cloudflare to infiltrate and exfiltrate the data to the C2 server.

T1090ProxyEvidence4

FluBot uses DNS resolving providers such as Google, Cloudflare, and Alibaba to infiltrate and exfiltrate the data to the C2 server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

A message instructs the target to download a third-party application by clicking a download button. As of September 2021, these downloads are either Flubot or in some cases Teabot.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence8

According to our findings, this new operation (referred to as "FluBot") sets a new precedent for spreading methods and DGA implementations.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence3

Another interesting class is DGA.class which is responsible for the Domain Generation Algorithm. By using a DGA, the sample cannot be taken down by sink-holing the C&C’s domain.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

The communication with the C&C is encrypted: we use a Frida hook to display the messages before encryption or after decryption.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence7

An infected device exfiltrates its contact list to the command and control server

Impact

1 technique
T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ... Impact T1565 Manipulation

Indicators of compromise

Observables

544 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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IOC matching544Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.