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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

BBSRAT

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs17Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ReconnaissancePersistenceDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injectionPost exploitation
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

BBSRAT is a Windows remote access trojan associated with Roaming Tiger activity and attacks against Russian organizations and Mongolian government offices. Its capabilities include enumerating running processes, listing file and directory information, deleting files and directories, querying and modifying Windows service configurations, and starting, stopping, or deleting services. It communicates with command-and-control servers through HTTP or HTTPS GET and POST requests, uses custom encryption for outbound data, and sends ZLIB-compressed data.

BBSRAT has been delivered through spear-phishing emails containing weaponized Microsoft Word documents with political and official-announcement lures. A campaign targeting Mongolian government offices between August 2015 and February 2016 exploited CVE-2012-0158 and, in later documents, CVE-2014-1761. Most documents deployed the Cmstar loader to retrieve BBSRAT, while some embedded BBSRAT directly. Execution techniques include DLL side-loading through the legitimate Citrix Single Sign-On Server executable and process hollowing within a Windows Installer process to conceal execution. Deployment has also used the Windows Expand utility to extract executable content from CAB archives. Persistence is established through Windows Registry Run autostart entries, including entries that launch a legitimate executable used for side-loading.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2012-0158via paloalto researchcenter historicExploited in the wildMicrosoft Common Controls ActiveX Remote Code ExecutionThe attacks themselves followed a consistent playbook throughout the observed timeframe; using weaponized Microsoft Word documents initially containing an exploit for only CVE-2012-0158... All of the Microsoft Word documents leveraged in these attacks used the CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2014-1761 exploits. | All of the weaponized documents except two executed the Cmstar loader... Once Cmstar was loaded onto the victim hosts, it would attempt to retrieve a final payload... those that were available were variants of BBSRAT. The two samples not using Cmstar simply had BBSRAT embedded directly into to the weaponized document.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-1761via paloalto researchcenter historicExploited in the wildMicrosoft Word RTF Memory Corruption VulnerabilityThe newer documents containing exploits for both vulnerabilities appeared to use a publically available PoC authored by ‘HCL’, with little to no modifications made... All of the Microsoft Word documents leveraged in these attacks used the CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2014-1761 exploits. | All of the weaponized documents except two executed the Cmstar loader... Once Cmstar was loaded onto the victim hosts, it would attempt to retrieve a final payload... those that were available were variants of BBSRAT. The two samples not using Cmstar simply had BBSRAT embedded directly into to the weaponized document.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Roaming Tiger

"BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger" is the reference for abuse of Citrix Single Sign On Server, ssonsvr.exe.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The attacks themselves followed a consistent playbook throughout the observed timeframe; using weaponized Microsoft Word documents initially containing an exploit for only CVE-2012-0158...

Execution

5 techniques
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

All of the Microsoft Word documents leveraged in these attacks used the CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2014-1761 exploits.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Weaponized Microsoft Word document found titled 'Путины урилга.doc' (Putin's Invitation). CVE-2012-0158 exploit used, dropping new variant of Cmstar.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence4

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) can start, stop, or delete services.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

DLL side-loading has been used to execute [BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) through a legitimate Citrix executable, ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with [BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) by the dropper.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) can modify service configurations.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence4

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList <code>{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}</code> or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem <code>{F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1}</code> depending on the system's CPU architecture.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe</code>.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence5

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) has been seen loaded into msiexec.exe through process hollowing to hide its execution.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) can modify service configurations.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence4

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList <code>{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}</code> or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem <code>{F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1}</code> depending on the system's CPU architecture.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe</code>.

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The initial dropper embedded in the weaponized document files were obfuscated using a subtraction cipher previously used to obfuscate strings in the NetTraveler malware family.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

...while displaying a decoy document or a legitimate appearing document that is generated and presented to the user to make it appear that the weaponized document that had been executed was indeed, legitimate.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence5

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) has been seen loaded into msiexec.exe through process hollowing to hide its execution.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) can delete files and directories.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence7

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) uses [Expand](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0361) to decompress a CAB file into executable content.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

"BBSRAT uses Expand to decompress a CAB file into executable content." / "Expand can be used to decompress a local or remote CAB file into an executable."

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

BBSRAT will ensure persistence by setting the following registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\comctl32 - rundll32.exe %APPDATA%\comctl32.dll, Enter

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

DLL side-loading has been used to execute [BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) through a legitimate Citrix executable, ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with [BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) by the dropper.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence4

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) can query service configuration information.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) can list running processes.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) can list file and directory information.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

Collection

2 techniques
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

Examples in the content include 'DropBook can unarchive data downloaded from the C2 to obtain the payload and persistence modules,' 'Molerats decompresses ZIP files once on the victim machine,' and 'Rocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.'

T1560.002Archive via LibraryEvidence3

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) can compress data with ZLIB prior to sending it back to the C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Examples include: "ChChes communicates to its C2 server over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header," "UPPERCUT has used HTTP for C2, including sending error codes in Cookie headers," and "GoldMax has used HTTPS and HTTP GET requests with custom HTTP cookies for C2."

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Each of the samples collected via WildFire and VirusTotal contained significant overlaps in tactics used, tools used, as well as infrastructure for command and control channels.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence8

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) uses GET and POST requests over HTTP or HTTPS for command and control to obtain commands and send ZLIB compressed data back to the C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Once Cmstar was loaded onto the victim hosts, it would attempt to retrieve a final payload... those that were available were variants of BBSRAT.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

Examples include 'Dark Caracal's version of Bandook communicates ... using HTTP payloads Base64 encoded,' 'BBSRAT ... send ZLIB compressed data back to the C2 server,' and 'FRAMESTING ... from decompressed zlib data within the request's POST data.'

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) uses a custom encryption algorithm on data sent back to the C2 server over HTTP.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Examples include 'BeaverTail has used HTTP POST to exfiltrate data to C2 infrastructure,' 'LAMEHUG can use HTTP POST requests to exfiltrate data from compromised hosts to C2,' 'StealBit can use HTTP to exfiltrate files to actor-controlled infrastructure,' and 'SolarWinds Compromise ... used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration.'

Indicators of compromise

Observables

17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching17Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.