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Mallory
Malware1 associated CVE

PeerBlight

Tracked since Dec 8, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Linux

PeerBlight is a Linux backdoor deployed in attacks exploiting the React Server Components remote-code-execution vulnerability CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell). It has been observed against organizations including construction and entertainment-sector victims. PeerBlight establishes persistence through system service mechanisms, including alternatives for privileged and non-privileged execution, and disguises its process as a kernel-like daemon to reduce operator visibility. Its command set supports reverse shells, file download and upload, permission changes, file deletion, self-upgrade, execution and management of additional payloads, and configurable beacon intervals. PeerBlight uses encrypted command-and-control communications and incorporates multiple resilient fallback mechanisms: a domain-generation algorithm and configuration retrieval through the BitTorrent distributed hash table. The malware identifies associated nodes through a distinctive BitTorrent DHT node-ID convention and can receive signed command-and-control configuration updates through that network. It shares limited code and persistence-convention overlap with RotaJakiro and Pink, but is regarded as a distinct malware family with different protocol, encryption, and command structures.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-55182via cert ssi alertsExploited in the wildReact2ShellLe CERT-FR a connaissance de multiples exploitations de la vulnérabilité CVE-2025-55182. Les serveurs avec une version vulnérable exposés après la publication des preuves de concept publiques du 5 décembre 2025 doivent être considérés comme compromis.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182)... unauthenticated remote code execution... unsafe deserialization"; "RondoDox... exploits... React2Shell... as an initial access vector"

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash, and in some cases delete the script to remove evidence.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Attackers have attempted to deploy cryptominer malware, a Linux backdoor we're tracking as PeerBlight, a reverse proxy tunnel we call CowTunnel, and a Go-based post-exploitation implant dubbed ZinFoq as part of their post-exploitation activity.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

When running with root privileges, PeerBlight installs a systemd service unit that ensures the backdoor survives system reboots.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

When running with root privileges, PeerBlight installs a systemd service unit that ensures the backdoor survives system reboots.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The binary copies itself to /bin/systemd-daemon and enables the service using the generic "System Daemon" description.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

The service masquerades as a legitimate SSH agent component, using the description "SSH Agent Service (System Management)" to blend in with authentic system services.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Additional payloads were downloaded and made executable, including a file named ntpclient , likely named to masquerade as a legitimate NTP client.

T1036.009Break Process TreesEvidence1

PeerBlight overwrites argv[0] in memory to hide its original path ... and replaces it with [ksoftirqd].

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

We identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features interactive reverse shells...

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

uploadFile path, file server details Exfiltrates a file from the victim to the C2... explorer_download Exfiltrates a file to the C2.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

This backdoor uses the BitTorrent DHT network as a fallback C2 mechanism, making it resilient to traditional domain takedowns.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The payload, which we have named “ ZinFoq ” ... communicates with command-and-control infrastructure at “ api.qtss[.]cc ” over HTTPS using hex-encoded payloads

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Communication occurs over raw TCP sockets.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The threat actor attempted to download multiple payloads from C2 servers... The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash...

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The backdoor derives its DGA seed through a multi-step hashing process... The backdoor attempts up to 200 “domain:port” combinations before exhausting its fallback options.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

The PRNG then deterministically selects words from three embedded dictionaries... then appended with one of 18 top-level domains... The backdoor attempts up to 200 “domain:port” combinations

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

All C2 traffic uses standard HTTP POST requests... explorer_download Exfiltrates a file to the C2.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.