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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

SlimAgent

Tracked since Dec 9, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
Keylogging
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

SlimAgent is a C++ spyware implant for Windows used by the Russian cyberespionage group APT28, also known as Sednit and Fancy Bear. It records keystrokes, captures screenshots, and collects clipboard data. Its keylogging output uses HTML formatting to distinguish application names, window titles, and captured input. Screenshots are captured through Windows APIs, encrypted using AES and RSA, and stored locally with timestamps.

SlimAgent was discovered on a Ukrainian government computer in April 2024 and publicly documented in June 2025. It has been deployed alongside the BeardShell backdoor, including in attacks against Ukrainian government organizations using social engineering through Signal chats. Code-level similarities in keylogging logic and HTML log formatting link SlimAgent to the keylogger module of APT28’s older X-Agent implant. Related samples sharing its codebase were used against governmental entities in two European countries as early as 2018.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-21509via bleeping computerExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office COM/OLE Security Feature BypassThe two pieces of malware have been used recently to target central executive bodies of Ukraine in attacks that exploited the CVE-2026-21509 vulnerability in Microsoft Office via malicious DOC files.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
APT28

CORESHELL, Komplex, SlimAgent, JHUHUGIT, Seduploader

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
APT29

The researchers uncovered these malware families after discovering SlimAgent, a keylogging implant deployed in a Ukrainian government system capable of keystroke capture, clipboard collection, and screenshot capture.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware BeardShell and SlimAgent are custom malware.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Spear phishing campaigns or the SedKit exploit kit delivered the Seduploader first stage.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

“Sednit typically compromises its targets through social engineering over Signal Desktop or WhatsApp Desktop, persuading them to open Trojanized Excel or Word documents. In some cases, the attackers even call their targets to increase the chances of success.”

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

It can execute PowerShell commands in a .NET runtime environment and was used together with SlimAgent.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1129 Shared Modules BeardShell and SlimAgent are full-fledged DLL files.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The two pieces of malware have been used recently to target central executive bodies of Ukraine in attacks that exploited the CVE-2026-21509 vulnerability in Microsoft Office via malicious DOC files.

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1546.015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking BeardShell and SlimAgent are made persistent by hijacking COM objects.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1546.015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking BeardShell and SlimAgent are made persistent by hijacking COM objects.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1480Execution GuardrailsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1480 Execution Guardrails BeardShell only executes in taskhost.exe or taskhostw.exe. SlimAgent only executes in explorer.exe.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1564 Hide Artifacts SlimAgent logs are written into a hidden file.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence13

在同一操作基础设施上发现的名为Slimagent的键盘记录器,与APT28十多年前的标志性植入程序X-Agent有直接代码渊源。

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1005 Data from Local System BeardShell, Covenant, and SlimAgent collect data from a compromised machine.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence13

在同一操作基础设施上发现的名为Slimagent的键盘记录器,与APT28十多年前的标志性植入程序X-Agent有直接代码渊源。

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence7

SlimAgent is a simple yet efficient spying tool capable of logging keystrokes, capturing screenshots, and collecting clipboard data.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence5

SlimAgent is a simple yet efficient spying tool capable of logging keystrokes, capturing screenshots, and collecting clipboard data.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

该组织从稳定的恶意软件框架转向部署短效、单一用途的工具,一旦暴露立即弃用。

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Результаты выгружаются как зашифрованные изображения с расширениями .bmp/.gif/.jpeg/.png/.tiff через тот же облачный канал (T1041, T1567.002).

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

...эксфильтрация документов через тот же облачный канал (Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1567.002).

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.