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Malware1 associated CVE

CowTunnel

Tracked since Dec 10, 2025 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs6Tracked

CowTunnel is a Linux-focused reverse proxy tunnel payload observed by Huntress in post-exploitation activity following exploitation of the critical React Server Components deserialization vulnerability CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell), including against vulnerable Next.js deployments. It consists of a malicious wrapper called NSS and xfrpc version 2.9.644, an open-source Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client. CowTunnel initiates outbound connections to attacker-controlled FRP servers, allowing attackers to bypass firewalls that primarily monitor inbound connections. Reported decrypted configuration referenced FRP servers at 23.226.71[.]197:13306, 23.226.71[.]200:13306, and 23.226.71[.]209:13306 using the token "Nginx-1.22.1". Its capabilities include exposing compromised-host services and proxying traffic over telnet, SOCKS5, TCP, HTTP, FTP, and MSTSC, enabling remote access and network pivoting. Huntress identified a sample with SHA256 776850a1e6d6915e9bf35aa83554616129acd94e3a3f6673bd6ddaec530f4273. Detection content cited in the reporting includes YARA coverage for CowTunnel as a distinct Linux threat. The reporting ties CowTunnel to the broader React2Shell exploitation wave that affected multiple organizations, including construction and entertainment sectors, but does not attribute CowTunnel to a specific threat actor with high confidence.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-55182via huntress blogExploited in the wildReact2ShellWe also uncovered threat actors using a payload we call CowTunnel, which operates as a reverse proxy and initiates outbound connections to attacker-controlled FRP servers. | Huntress is seeing threat actors exploit a vulnerability in React Server Components (CVE-2025-55182) across several organizations... Dubbed “React2Shell”, CVE-2025-55182 exists due to insecure deserialization... and can be exploited by unauthenticated attackers merely by crafting one malicious HTTP request.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182)... unauthenticated remote code execution... unsafe deserialization"; "RondoDox... exploits... React2Shell... as an initial access vector"

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash, and in some cases delete the script to remove evidence.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Attackers have attempted to deploy cryptominer malware, a Linux backdoor we're tracking as PeerBlight, a reverse proxy tunnel we call CowTunnel, and a Go-based post-exploitation implant dubbed ZinFoq as part of their post-exploitation activity.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

The function in the screenshot below contains code to automatically create system user accounts with administrative privileges.

T1136.001Local AccountEvidence1

sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash <username> ... echo '<username>:<password>' | sudo chpasswd ... sudo usermod -aG sudo <username>

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

The function in the screenshot below contains code to automatically create system user accounts with administrative privileges.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The binary copies itself to /bin/systemd-daemon and enables the service using the generic "System Daemon" description.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Additional payloads were downloaded and made executable, including a file named ntpclient , likely named to masquerade as a legitimate NTP client.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Once connected, the payload registers local services with the FRP server, such as the embedded telnet daemon on port 2323. Attackers can then connect to their FRP server and access these services as if they were directly connected to the victim machine.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The payload, which we have named “ ZinFoq ” ... communicates with command-and-control infrastructure at “ api.qtss[.]cc ” over HTTPS using hex-encoded payloads

T1090ProxyEvidence1

We also uncovered threat actors using a payload we call CowTunnel, which operates as a reverse proxy and initiates outbound connections to attacker-controlled FRP servers.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

When executed on a compromised host, the payload initiates an outbound connection to attacker-controlled FRP servers. This outbound connection model is significant because most firewalls are configured to block inbound connections while allowing outbound traffic, enabling the tunnel to bypass perimeter defenses.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

We identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features interactive reverse shells, SOCKS5 proxying for network pivoting...

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The threat actor attempted to download multiple payloads from C2 servers... The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.