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Mallory
MalwareRansomwareExploits 10 CVEs

Makop

Makop is a ransomware family first observed around 2020 and generally treated in the provided reporting as a variant or derivative of Phobos. It is described as a ransomware-as-a-service-style strain open to multiple threat actors and has also been characterized as similar to Dharma, Phobos, and Waiting. Makop primarily targets Windows environments and has repeatedly been associated with compromises of organizations through exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) services, typically using brute-force or dictionary attacks against weak or reused credentials; one report specifically observed use of NLBrute 1.2 for large-scale RDP password guessing. Reporting also notes a shift from earlier delivery via fake resumes or copyright-themed emails toward RDP-driven intrusions, and a later evolution in which GuLoader was observed delivering Makop payloads. Recent reporting further states Makop operators used BYOVD-based EDR-killer techniques and targeted RDP-exposed networks.

Observed Makop intrusion activity includes staging tools in locations such as \tsclient\ shares, user Music folders, Downloads, Desktop, Documents, or the root of C:, sometimes under subfolders such as "Bug" or "Exp." Observed encryptor filenames include bug_osn.exe, bug_hand.exe, 1bugbug.exe, bugbug.exe, taskmgr.exe, mc_osn.exe, and mc_hand.exe, including dot-prefixed variants. Operators were reported using NetScan, Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, and Masscan for discovery and lateral movement; Mimikatz, LaZagne, and NetPass for credential access; CrackAccount and AccountRestore for brute-force access to additional accounts; and Defender Control and Disable Defender to disable Microsoft Defender. Makop operators also abused legitimate tools such as Process Hacker and IOBit Unlocker to terminate processes or remove software, and Process Hacker is specifically described as a favored tool of Makop operators. In some incidents, operators stopped the attack when their tooling was detected, or switched to VMProtect-packed variants and attempted to disable or uninstall security products. Acronis also reported tailored uninstall software used to remove Quick Heal AV.

Makop activity in the provided content includes privilege escalation and defense evasion through multiple Windows local privilege escalation exploits, including CVE-2016-0099, CVE-2017-0213, CVE-2018-8639, CVE-2019-1388, CVE-2020-0787, CVE-2020-0796, CVE-2020-1066, CVE-2021-41379, and CVE-2022-24521, with CVE-2017-0213, CVE-2018-8639, CVE-2021-41379, and CVE-2016-0099 appearing most frequently in telemetry. Operators also used BYOVD techniques with vulnerable drivers including hlpdrv.sys and ThrottleStop.sys to gain kernel-level access and potentially terminate EDR solutions.

Makop has been observed targeting multiple geographies and sectors opportunistically rather than with a strict regional focus. The content specifically mentions attacks against entities in India, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, and a New Jersey-based US water and wastewater facility. Acronis telemetry stated that 55% of observed Makop attacks targeted organizations in India. AhnLab reported Makop attacks against South Korean users via RDP. The content also notes Makop’s inclusion among ransomware variants associated with re-extortion behavior, and one report states Makop, Dharma, Phobos, and Waiting are similar RaaS variants often affecting very small businesses.

The Makop family has also spawned variants. The provided content identifies Ndm448 as a Makop-family ransomware strain targeting Windows systems, encrypting local and accessible network drives, appending a victim-specific .ndm448 extension, dropping ransom notes such as +README-WARNING+.txt, changing desktop wallpaper, claiming prior data exfiltration, and deleting Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin.exe and wmic shadowcopy delete commands. More broadly, the content states that over 350 new ransomware strains discovered in 2025 were mostly based on MedusaLocker, Chaos, and Makop families.

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For your environment

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

10 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

10 CVES
CVE-2020-0796SMBGhostExploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2020-0796 …”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2020-1066.NET Framework COM object activation elevation of privilege (CVE-2020-1066)Exploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2020-1066 …”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2020-0787Windows BITS Elevation of Privilege via Improper Symlink HandlingExploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2020-0787 …”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2017-0213Windows COM Aggregate Marshaler Elevation of PrivilegeExploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2017-0213 … In our telemetry… CVE-2017-0213… [was] among the most frequently used…”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2018-8639Win32k Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2018-8639 … In our telemetry… CVE-2018-8639… [was] among the most frequently used…”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2021-41379Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2021-41379 … In our telemetry… CVE-2021-41379… [was] among the most frequently used…”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2025-7771Arbitrary Physical Memory Read/Write in TechPowerUp ThrottleStop.sysExploited in the wild

“ThrottleStop.sys is a legitimate, signed driver… The ThrottleStop vulnerability (CVE-2025-7771) comes from the way the driver handles memory access. Attackers can exploit this to gain control, ultimately leading to disabling security tools.”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2019-1388Windows Certificate Dialog Elevation of PrivilegeExploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2019-1388 …”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2022-24521Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2022-24521 …”

via acronis blogacronis.com
CVE-2016-0099Secondary Logon Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

“Multiple local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities… CVE-2016-0099 … In our telemetry… CVE-2017-0213, CVE-2018-8639, CVE-2021-41379 and CVE-2016-0099 were among the most frequently used…”

via acronis blogacronis.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

“Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell” and “The ransomware terminates processes such as vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /all /quiet and wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractive…”

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsEvidence1

“Defense Evasion T1027.005 Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools” (Ndm448 list).

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

“Defense Evasion T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion” (Ndm448 list) and also listed in UNC3886 TTPs.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

“Defense Evasion T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window” (Ndm448 list).

Discovery

5 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery T1057 Process Discovery” (Ndm448 list) and also present in UNC3886 list.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery” (Ndm448 list) and narrative describing rapid traversal of user/system directories prior to encryption.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery T1135 Network Share Discovery” (Ndm448 list) and description: “full file encryption across local and accessible network drives”.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery T1518 Software Discovery” (Ndm448 list) and also in UNC3886 list (including security software discovery variant).

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

“Discovery T1614 System Location Discovery” (Ndm448 list) and also in UNC3886 list.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

Fifth, operators of ransomware variants based on leaked source codes of notable ransomware brands widely adopted another pressure method: double ransom payments unless a victim pays a ransom within 24, 48, or 72 hours after a ransomware attack.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

Sigma rule tags include “attack.t1490” and narrative: “vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /all /quiet and wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractive to delete Volume Shadow Copies… prevents victims from restoring their data…”.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities10

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.