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Mallory
Malware

OSX.ZuRu

Tracked since Dec 11, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs16Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationReconnaissancePost exploitationDLL sideloading
Delivery
Landing pageMalvertising
Platforms
macOS

OSX.ZuRu is a macOS malware family distributed through trojanized versions of legitimate applications, notably terminal, remote access, and database client software. It was observed in campaigns that abused sponsored search results to lure users to counterfeit download sites serving altered application bundles. The malware modifies otherwise legitimate macOS apps to load a malicious dynamic library at startup, allowing code execution as soon as the trojanized application launches.

The implanted library acts as a first-stage loader and backdoor component. It gathers a host identifier, communicates with command-and-control infrastructure, and executes server-supplied shell commands to retrieve and run additional payloads. Reported second-stage components included a Python-based reconnaissance and theft module that surveyed the infected host and collected sensitive data such as SSH keys, keychain material, shell history, and other system information, as well as an additional payload associated with Cobalt Strike activity. This establishes OSX.ZuRu as both a delivery mechanism for follow-on tooling and a direct data-theft threat.

OSX.ZuRu has been linked to campaigns targeting macOS users in China, including Baidu users searching for popular software. Known lures included trojanized builds of iTerm2, SecureCRT, Microsoft Remote Desktop for Mac, and Navicat. Its observed behavior combines dylib-based execution hijacking, host reconnaissance, payload retrieval, command execution, and exfiltration of stolen data. The malware is notable for illustrating how macOS users can be compromised through poisoned software distribution channels rather than exploits alone.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The script copied and exfiltrated a number of items, among which were any SSH keys located on the victims’ device.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

The malware came to be known as OSX.Zuru and included among its components a Python script that it dropped at /tmp/g.py .

Credential Access

1 technique
T1552.004Private KeysEvidence1

The script copied and exfiltrated a number of items, among which were any SSH keys located on the victims’ device.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

On macOS, threat actors will quietly exfiltrate session cookies, keychains, SSH keys and more as malicious processes from adware to spyware look to harvest data

Indicators of compromise

Observables

16 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching16Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.