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Malware

NANOREMOTE

Tracked since Dec 11, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Windows

NANOREMOTE is a 64-bit Windows backdoor identified in 2025 and assessed to share a development lineage with the FINALDRAFT (Squidoor) implant associated with the REF7707 espionage ecosystem. It performs host reconnaissance, executes operator commands through Windows command-shell processes, manages files and directories, and loads additional PE payloads from disk or directly from memory. NANOREMOTE can collect system, user, process, privilege, network, and disk information.

The backdoor uses encrypted and compressed HTTP communications and can use the Google Drive API for command-and-control tasking, payload staging, and bidirectional file transfers. Google Drive transfer tasks can be queued, paused, resumed, and cancelled. It uses OAuth configuration to access cloud storage and thereby blends malicious transfer activity with legitimate cloud-service traffic.

Observed deployments used the WMLOADER loader, which masquerades as security software and decrypts the backdoor for in-memory execution. NANOREMOTE also incorporates manual PE mapping functionality derived from libPeConv and Microsoft Detours hooks for process- and thread-termination functions, improving payload execution flexibility and process resiliency. Its initial-access vector has not been established.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Handler #21... works by spawning new processes and returning the output through Windows pipes... The malware spawns cmd.exe, which in turn launches the specified command.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The shellcode is located at RVA (0x193041) and decrypted using a rolling XOR algorithm... wmsetup.log... [is decrypted] using AES-CBC.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The shellcode looks for a file named wmsetup.log... then starts decrypting it using AES-CBC... After decryption, the shellcode executes the in-memory backdoor, NANOREMOTE.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Handler #12... manually map[s] the sections/headers... before finally executing it in memory... Handler #22 loads and executes a Base64 encoded PE file inside the existing NANOREMOTE process.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Uses WSAIoctl with SIO_GET_INTERFACE_LIST to retrieve internal and external IP address.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Grabs username via GetUserNameW... Checks if current user is member of Administrator group via IsUserAnAdmin.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Handler #1... retrieves the hostname... operating-system information... process path... [and] process ID of running program.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Handler #4 - List folder contents by path... includes whether the item is a directory... hidden... last modified date, file name [and] size. | Handler #6... uses GetLogicalDrives, GetDiskFreeSpaceExW, GetDriveTypeW, [and] GetVolumeInformationW to collect storage disk information.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

These requests occur over HTTP where the JSON data is submitted through POST requests... The URI for all requests use /api/client with User-Agent (NanoRemote/1.0).

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

"NANOREMOTE... uses the Google Drive API for command-and-control (C2)... similarities with... FINALDRAFT... employs Microsoft Graph API for C2"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Handler #16... is used by the threat actor to download files to the victim machine... [using] OAuth 2.0 tokens to authenticate requests to the Google Drive API.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

JSON data is submitted through POST requests that are Zlib compressed and encrypted with AES-CBC using a 16-byte key.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

Handler #17... is used by the threat actor to upload files from the victim machine to the adversary’s controlled Google Drive account.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.