NANOREMOTE is a 64-bit Windows backdoor identified in 2025 and assessed to share a development lineage with the FINALDRAFT (Squidoor) implant associated with the REF7707 espionage ecosystem. It performs host reconnaissance, executes operator commands through Windows command-shell processes, manages files and directories, and loads additional PE payloads from disk or directly from memory. NANOREMOTE can collect system, user, process, privilege, network, and disk information.
The backdoor uses encrypted and compressed HTTP communications and can use the Google Drive API for command-and-control tasking, payload staging, and bidirectional file transfers. Google Drive transfer tasks can be queued, paused, resumed, and cancelled. It uses OAuth configuration to access cloud storage and thereby blends malicious transfer activity with legitimate cloud-service traffic.
Observed deployments used the WMLOADER loader, which masquerades as security software and decrypts the backdoor for in-memory execution. NANOREMOTE also incorporates manual PE mapping functionality derived from libPeConv and Microsoft Detours hooks for process- and thread-termination functions, improving payload execution flexibility and process resiliency. Its initial-access vector has not been established.
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Handler #21... works by spawning new processes and returning the output through Windows pipes... The malware spawns cmd.exe, which in turn launches the specified command.
The shellcode is located at RVA (0x193041) and decrypted using a rolling XOR algorithm... wmsetup.log... [is decrypted] using AES-CBC.
The shellcode looks for a file named wmsetup.log... then starts decrypting it using AES-CBC... After decryption, the shellcode executes the in-memory backdoor, NANOREMOTE.
Handler #12... manually map[s] the sections/headers... before finally executing it in memory... Handler #22 loads and executes a Base64 encoded PE file inside the existing NANOREMOTE process.
Uses WSAIoctl with SIO_GET_INTERFACE_LIST to retrieve internal and external IP address.
Grabs username via GetUserNameW... Checks if current user is member of Administrator group via IsUserAnAdmin.
Handler #1... retrieves the hostname... operating-system information... process path... [and] process ID of running program.
Handler #4 - List folder contents by path... includes whether the item is a directory... hidden... last modified date, file name [and] size. | Handler #6... uses GetLogicalDrives, GetDiskFreeSpaceExW, GetDriveTypeW, [and] GetVolumeInformationW to collect storage disk information.
These requests occur over HTTP where the JSON data is submitted through POST requests... The URI for all requests use /api/client with User-Agent (NanoRemote/1.0).
"NANOREMOTE... uses the Google Drive API for command-and-control (C2)... similarities with... FINALDRAFT... employs Microsoft Graph API for C2"
Handler #16... is used by the threat actor to download files to the victim machine... [using] OAuth 2.0 tokens to authenticate requests to the Google Drive API.
JSON data is submitted through POST requests that are Zlib compressed and encrypted with AES-CBC using a 16-byte key.
Handler #17... is used by the threat actor to upload files from the victim machine to the adversary’s controlled Google Drive account.
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.