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Malware1 associated actor

RaccoonStealer

Tracked since Dec 12, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK3Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltration
Delivery
SpearphishingMalvertisingSeo poisoningFake updateLanding pageLure
Platforms
Windows

Raccoon Stealer is a malware-as-a-service infostealer operated in the cybercrime ecosystem and rented to affiliates on a subscription basis. It is designed to harvest sensitive data from infected systems, including login credentials, browser-stored information, payment card data, cryptocurrency wallet data, and large volumes of authentication cookies. By stealing session cookies in addition to usernames and passwords, it can enable account takeover without requiring re-entry of credentials and can in some cases bypass multi-factor authentication protections tied to active sessions.

The malware targets Windows environments and is commonly used as a follow-on payload delivered by other malware distribution operations and loaders. It has been observed delivered through social-engineering-driven campaigns and by malware loaders such as Batloader and PrivateLoader. Its role in criminal intrusion chains is typically focused on rapid collection and exfiltration of victim data for resale, reuse, or downstream fraud.

Operational reporting has linked Raccoon Stealer infections to centralized backend infrastructure used to aggregate stolen data from infected hosts. Observed collections associated with version 1.7.2 included victim account data, device details, cleartext passwords, and millions of authentication cookies, illustrating the malware’s emphasis on browser and session theft at scale. Victim data associated with these operations has included personal, workplace, social media, and government account access, making the malware relevant to both consumer and enterprise compromise scenarios.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Minyades

The actors behind Water Minyades are known for delivering other malware during the last quarter of 2022, such as Qakbot, RaccoonStealer, and Bumbleloader via social engineering techniques.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

This type of malware infects devices and then collects user credentials from web browsers, FTP, and email clients, data that is later uploaded to command and control (C&C) servers.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The Elasticsearch server did not only hold personal victim data like emails, usernames, and device details but was also storing cleartext passwords and even authentication cookies.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The other components of the campaign, including the legitimate tools it will download to escalate its privileges and download other malware, will be downloaded by these scripts.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping3Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.