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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Loki

Tracked since Dec 12, 2025 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK41Techniques
IOCs129Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationCrypto theftDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingMalspamSpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Loki is an information-stealing malware family targeting Windows systems. It steals credentials from web browsers and FTP clients, cryptocurrency wallet data, and information held by Sticky Notes-related applications and online poker applications. Its primary purpose is to collect and exfiltrate sensitive account and personal information.

Loki is distributed through malicious email campaigns using bank payment confirmations, quotation requests, and other business correspondence as lures. Observed attachments include Windows Cabinet and LZH archives containing executable droppers. It has also been delivered through malicious RTF documents exploiting CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office Equation Editor, with subsequent HTA and PowerShell stages retrieving the payload. Loki has appeared alongside other information stealers in spear-phishing campaigns targeting international businesses, including energy, oil and gas, electronics, and manufacturing organizations, with a notable focus on South Korean companies.

Observed delivery chains use multilayered .NET droppers, encrypted components, and process hollowing to execute Loki within legitimate processes and hinder detection. Other chains employ obfuscated HTA and VBS scripts, PowerShell downloaders, and image-based steganography to conceal an encoded payload. These stages can load assemblies directly into memory and inject payloads into another process. The Windows information stealer is distinct from Android malware and post-exploitation implants that also use the Loki name.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-11882via trendmicro comExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorTrend Micro uncovered a malicious Rich Text Format (RTF) file exploiting CVE-2017-11882 to deliver the spyware Loki (TSPY_LOKI). ... CVE-2017-11882 is a 17-year old memory corruption issue in Microsoft Office ... The flaw resides within Equation Editor (EQNEDT32.EXE) ... A proof-of-concept exploit was released publicly, but this has been fixed by Microsoft’s November Patch Tuesday. | Trend Micro uncovered a malicious Rich Text Format (RTF) file exploiting CVE-2017-11882 to deliver the spyware Loki (TSPY_LOKI).View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Mythic Likho

The cluster develops and updates its custom malware toolkit, deploying a new Loki 2.1 implant compatible with the Mythic and Havoc post-exploitation frameworks.

via bi zonebi.zone
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

T1588.001 — Obtain Capabilities: Malware (Resource Development)

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

the malware were already present on the devices even before the users received them. The malicious apps were not part of the official ROM supplied by the vendor, and were added somewhere along the supply chain.

T1566PhishingEvidence4

The PDF sample only contains one page, shown above, which includes some social engineering content to entice users to download and run the malware.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

The Cobalt hacking group also weaponized this security flaw in one of their campaigns in late November, sending out a similarly constructed RTF file. In their previous spear-phishing campaigns, the DLL is a component of the penetration testing tool Cobalt Strike.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

В январе 2025 года к нам обратились с просьбой оценить опасность одной подозрительной ссылки из письма. Письмо было адресовано отделу кадров машиностроительного завода...

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The evidence includes a backdoor, preserved on Hedges’ machine, that has also been used by Turla. The backdoor, known as LOKI2, was used by the Moonlight Maze attackers to maintain persistence on Linux machines.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

The payload is dropped via an HTML Application (HTA) that invokes PowerShell, which then retrieves the information stealer.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Once downloaded, this file is saved as picturewithattitudeeventforallthings.vbs under %user%\AppData\Roaming\ directory. After the VBS file was executed with wscript.exe

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence3

Trend Micro uncovered a malicious Rich Text Format (RTF) file exploiting CVE-2017-11882 to deliver the spyware Loki (TSPY_LOKI).

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Once the victim opens the attachment and clicks on one of the contained files an information stealer is executed.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

According to the sample content (Figure 2), an annotation object in the sample includes an URI action, where the malware is downloaded.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

On several infected machines, the ngrok utility was found in the directory with the Loki loader. In other cases, instances of the gTunnel utility were discovered running in the context of the svchost.exe and runtimebroker.exe system processes.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The VBS file is added into the system Start Menu so it can automatically run whenever the system starts.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

This encoded portion is then reversed, decoded, and the code is injected into the aspnet_regbrowsers.exe process

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

It eventually uses process hollowing to load and execute the main Loki payload.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Processing command hashes ... 0x5A41B798 token Manage Windows access tokens

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

On several infected machines, the ngrok utility was found in the directory with the Loki loader. In other cases, instances of the gTunnel utility were discovered running in the context of the svchost.exe and runtimebroker.exe system processes.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The VBS file is added into the system Start Menu so it can automatically run whenever the system starts.

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

All the APIs being called in this malware are hidden, which will be restored before calling. This increases the difficulty for researchers to analyze it.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Steganography has been applied to the image to conceal additional Base64-encoded instructions.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

When this malware is executed the very first time, it copies itself to “%AppData%\subfolder”, and renames it as “citrio.exe” in my test enviroment.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

This encoded portion is then reversed, decoded, and the code is injected into the aspnet_regbrowsers.exe process

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

It eventually uses process hollowing to load and execute the main Loki payload.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Processing command hashes ... 0x5A41B798 token Manage Windows access tokens

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

I opened the PE File in Ghidra and Visited the decryptor function . it was using a simple XOR operation ... The key used was 0x5F5F5F5F. The script basically loops the contents of data to XOR it with the key.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence2

The payload is dropped via an HTML Application (HTA) that invokes PowerShell, which then retrieves the information stealer.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The script retrieves the hidden obfuscated, reversed Base64 payload from the Google Drive image, decodes it, loads it as a .NET assembly, and then invokes a method within that assembly.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1601Modify System ImageEvidence1

Six of the malware instances were added by a malicious actor to the device’s ROM using system privileges, meaning they couldn’t be removed by the user and the device had to be re-flashed.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The dropped malware is generally able to steal private information, log keyboard strokes and steal browsing data.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The author of the malware has written a number of functions for stealing credentials from a victim’s machine.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Browser software: Mozilla Firefox, IceDragon, Safari, K-Meleon, Mozilla SeaMonkey, Mozilla Flock, NETGATE Black Hawk, Lunascape, Comodo Dragon, Opera Next, QtWeb, QupZilla, Internet Explorer, Opera, 8pecxstudios, Mozilla Pale Moon, Mozilla Waterfox.

T1555.005Password ManagersEvidence1

Password manager software: mSecure, KeePass, EnPass, RoboForm, 1Password.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

The dropped malware is generally able to steal private information, log keyboard strokes and steal browsing data.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The malware is able to read them from here by calling the API “SHQueryValueExW”.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

It also collects system information from the victim’s machine, such as computer name, user name, processor property, etc.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Processing command hashes ... 0x00251B5E cd Change the current directory ... 0x04C8C122 pwd Show the current directory

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The malware steals png and rtf files from the sub-folders “\stickies\images” and “\stickies\rtf” in several system directories, such as %AppData%, %UserProfile%.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The dropped malware is generally able to steal private information, log keyboard strokes and steal browsing data.

T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

To do this, It goes through three sub-keys (for three different versions) in the system registry to get saved email accounts, email addresses, username, password, SMTP, POP3, IMAP related information, and so on.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

And the data is delivered in a kind of compression format.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Then the injected process further starts to communicate with C2

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

L’API Telegram Bot est massivement exploitée par des auteurs de malwares comme canal d’exfiltration et de commande/contrôle (C2).

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

The agent itself does not support traffic tunneling, so to access private network segments, attackers use third-party publicly available utilities. On several infected machines, the ngrok utility was found ... In other cases, instances of the gTunnel utility were discovered...

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

Le principe : un token bot et un chat_id embarqués dans le binaire permettent d’envoyer les données volées directement dans un chat Telegram via api.telegram.org, sans infrastructure propre à gérer.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

The payload is dropped via an HTML Application (HTA) that invokes PowerShell, which then retrieves the information stealer.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

After all collected information is ready, it sends them to its C&C server using a HTTP POST request, the body of which is the data stolen from the victim’s machine.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

L’API Telegram Bot est massivement exploitée par des auteurs de malwares comme canal d’exfiltration...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

129 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

30 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching129Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping41Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.